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ABSTRACT 
 
A widely discussed philosophical puzzle in contemporary epistemology is the so-called sceptical 
“paradox.” Ascriber contextualism has taken centre stage as the anti-sceptical theory that 
purportedly offers the best solution to the sceptical “paradox.” Ascriber contextualists Stewart 
Cohen (1988, 1999) and Keith DeRose (1995) advertise their anti-sceptical theory as the one that 
exclusively explains and solves it. This is false advertising, however. My thesis, which has been 
greatly influenced by the critical work of Michael Williams (1991) and Duncan Pritchard (2005), 
is that the generation of the sceptical “paradox” depends on whether the epistemologist is an 
internalist or externalist about knowledge, and that the ascriber contextualist attempt to solve the 
sceptical “paradox” rests on a long history of mistakes concerning internalist assumptions made 
by externalists Fred Dretske (1970) and Robert Nozick (1981). By applying the semantic thesis 
of ascriber contextualism to epistemology, ascriber contextualists seek to emend the rejection of 
the closure principle made by these externalists. This rejection came from these externalists 
mistakenly making internalist assumptions when facing sceptical hypotheses. Unfortunately, 
ascriber contextualists leave much unfixed, and end up inheriting and suffering from the serious 
mistake about internalist assumptions that had plagued the epistemologies of these externalists 
and now infects the ascriber contextualist “solution” to the sceptical “paradox.” With the help of 
hindsight to examine this history and an appreciation of how the adoption of one of these 
respective views about knowledge makes all the difference for whether the sceptical “paradox” 
arises, we come to see that the contextualist “solution” to the sceptical “paradox” is unnecessary.       
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INTRODUCTION 
Philosophical theories are judged by how well they can solve and explain puzzles. Explanatory 
power is the principal theoretical virtue of philosophical theories. In contemporary epistemology, 
especially because of the influence of ascriber contextualism, the so-called sceptical “paradox” 
has been a puzzle that has also become a test for the adequacy of anti-sceptical theories, testing 
specifically whether these theories can solve and explain the sceptical “paradox.” The following 
three individually plausible but mutually inconsistent propositions are said to issue in the 
sceptical “paradox”: (1) I know that some ordinary empirical propositions are true; (2) If I know 
some ordinary empirical proposition, and I know that this ordinary empirical proposition entails 
the falsity of a radical sceptical hypothesis, then I can know the falsity of a radical sceptical 
hypothesis; (3) I cannot know the falsity of radical sceptical hypotheses. To reveal the sense of 
“paradox” and feel the threat of scepticism, consider that there is nothing to prevent proposition 
(3) from being entered into a variant of the conditional (2) to yield the following argument: If I 
cannot know the falsity of radical sceptical hypotheses, and that I cannot know the falsity of 
radical sceptical hypotheses entails that I do not know any ordinary empirical propositions, then I 
do not know any ordinary empirical propositions. Accordingly, this sceptical argument reveals 
that I do not know that proposition (1) is true, because I do not know that proposition (3) is false. 
With the exception of the radical sceptic, everyone finds the denial of proposition (1) to be 
clearly unacceptable. The puzzle, then, is to explain how these three supposedly plausible 
propositions can be preserved without them resulting in mutual inconsistency generally and the 
sceptical “paradox” specifically.  
Ascriber contextualists claim to have both solved the sceptical “paradox” and provided 
the only viable explanation of it. Ascriber contextualism is a semantic thesis, which states that 
the meaning of a term can be sensitive to changes in the conversational context of the ascriber. 
As this semantic thesis applies to epistemology, the theory states that the meaning of the word 
“know” varies with changes in the conversational context of the ascriber who claims that “S 
knows that p” or “I know that p” (in which case the ascriber making this claim is making a self-
ascription). Such variation of meaning in the word “know” is caused specifically by error-
possibilities being raised in the ascriber‟s conversational context, such as by conversational 
participants considering or mentioning radical sceptical hypotheses in that context. To take a 
famous example of a radical sceptical hypothesis, an ascriber may consider the possibility of 
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being tricked by an all-powerful evil demon at this very instant. According to ascriber 
contextualists, if the ascriber dwells on this radical sceptical error-possibility, then this will 
determine both the kind of conversational context that the ascriber is in at the time of the 
ascription or denial and the meaning of the word “know” in any “knowledge”-ascription or 
“knowledge”-denial made in that kind of conversational context.  
 The contextualist “solution” of the sceptical “paradox” is to claim that there are different 
kinds of conversational context with different standards that determine the meaning of the word 
“know.” Roughly, there is the quotidian context with lax standards and the sceptical context with 
strict standards. Consequently, propositions (1) and (2) are true and proposition (3) is false in the 
quotidian context, whereas proposition (3) and the variant of the conditional (2) used to reveal 
the sense of “paradox” are true and proposition (1) is false in the sceptical context. All of the 
plausible propositions can be expressed without inconsistency, provided that they are expressed 
in different kinds of conversational context. According to contextualists, the meaning of the 
word “know” varies with the context from which the argument employing it is issued. Thus, 
ascriber contextualism allegedly finds a “solution” by expressing all of the individually plausible 
propositions in different kinds of context without mutual inconsistency or generating the 
sceptical “paradox.”  
With the exception of proposition (1), many epistemologists challenge the acceptability 
of these propositions that supposedly issue in the sceptical “paradox.” Epistemologists Fred 
Dretske (1970) and Robert Nozick (1981), for instance, reject proposition (2), which partially 
expresses the closure principle.
1
 For these epistemologists the question is not whether 
proposition (2) is independently plausible, but whether it is true. Essentially, Dretske and Nozick 
claim that agents, in order to have knowledge of ordinary empirical propositions, do not need to 
know the falsity of radical sceptical hypotheses. Accepting proposition (2) enables the sceptic to 
launch an argument for closure-based scepticism – an argument similar to the one I used above 
to reveal the sense of “paradox” and feel the threat of scepticism. The anti-sceptical strategy of 
these epistemologists is to claim that proposition (2) is false so that agents do not need to know 
                                                          
1
 The principle that knowledge is closed under known entailment states that if an epistemic subject S knows an 
ordinary empirical proposition p and S knows that p entails another proposition q – or S “competently deduces,” to 
use Timothy Williamson‟s (2000) apt term, q from p – then S knows that q or at least is in a position to know that q. 
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the falsity of radical sceptical hypotheses as entailments of ordinary empirical propositions in 
order to know ordinary empirical propositions in the first place. 
Ascriber contextualists Stewart Cohen (1988, 1999) and Keith DeRose (1995) oppose 
Dretske‟s and Nozick‟s rejection of proposition (2), since they contend that the propositions 
making up the sceptical “paradox” are independently plausible and such a move to reject one of 
them is simply an attempt to evade the sceptical “paradox.” After all, contextualists view the 
sceptical “paradox” as a genuine philosophical puzzle that requires both a solution and an 
explanation of how the “paradox” arises in the first place. Yet Dretske and Nozick motivate the 
rejection of proposition (2) by claiming that proposition (3) is true. Dretske and Nozick hold that 
proposition (3) is true, but also that proposition (2) is false, which allows them to continue to 
claim that proposition (1) is true.  
Curiously, Cohen (1988, 1999) and DeRose (1995) have fully accepted Dretske‟s (1970) 
and Nozick‟s (1981) general claim that (3) epistemic agents cannot know the falsity of radical 
sceptical hypotheses. Upon close examination, however, Dretske‟s and Nozick‟s theoretical 
motivations for rejecting proposition (2) are found to be extremely problematic. Both Dretske 
and Nozick make epistemological commitments to externalism about knowledge, the view that 
whatever turns an agent‟s true belief into knowledge can remain beyond or external to that 
agent‟s cognitive awareness. The competing view of knowledge is internalism, the view that 
whatever turns an agent‟s true belief into knowledge must remain reflectively and cognitively 
accessible to that agent, in which such knowledge is from within the first-person perspective. 
Upon close examination we shall see that Dretske and Nozick break their externalist 
commitments, because the general rejection of proposition (2) comes from them unwittingly 
making distinctively internalist assumptions about knowledge. More specifically, Dretske‟s and 
Nozick‟s general claim (3) that agents do not know the falsity of radical sceptical hypotheses, 
rests on a mistake, which results from them confusing externalist commitments with internalist 
assumptions. Consequently, given that their commitments are to externalism, neither Dretske nor 
Nozick should have rejected proposition (2) nor should they have rejected the closure principle 
more generally for the reasons that they did so.   
Seeing that ascriber contextualists Cohen and DeRose fully accept Dretske‟s and 
Nozick‟s general claim (3), which rests on a mistake, they accordingly inherit this mistake. If 
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they do not inherit this mistake directly, at the very least ascriber contextualists suffer from the 
effects of this mistake, insofar as these ascriber contextualists staunchly defend the truth of 
proposition (3) by pointing to Dretske‟s and Nozick‟s acceptance of it, but nonetheless fail to 
realize that Dretske and Nozick have made a serious mistake in so doing. My thesis, which has 
been greatly influenced by the critical work of Michael Williams (1991) and Duncan Pritchard 
(2005), is that the ascriber contextualist “solution” to the sceptical “paradox” both loses the 
theoretical motivation for its application in light of these mistakes and lacks the explanatory edge 
it purports to have over its rival anti-sceptical theories, especially when we realize that the 
plausibility of proposition (3) depends entirely on which view of knowledge, internalist or 
externalist, is taken. The consequence of taking an externalist view of knowledge is that there is, 
in general, no reason why proposition (3) should pose a problem, because the reasons for 
endorsing the truth of proposition (3) depend on making internalist assumptions about 
knowledge. Consequently, if an epistemologist is an externalist, then the sceptical “paradox” is 
never generated, since the “paradox” does not arise unless all of its propositions are accepted.  
The consequence of taking an internalist view of knowledge, however, is a commitment to the 
truth of proposition (3), and so the sceptical “paradox” remains a genuine philosophical puzzle 
for the internalist. Yet even internalists who develop contextualist “solutions” to the sceptical 
“paradox,” such as Cohen (1988, 1999), have tremendous difficulty in finding harmony between 
internalism and contextualism. Indeed, Cohen‟s internalist contextualist “solution” proves to be 
ad hoc and ultimately unacceptable. 
The first chapter examines the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge, including 
versions of this theory put forth by Fred Dretske (1970), Alvin Goldman (1976), Gail Stine 
(1976), and Stewart Cohen (1988). I have conducted this examination because ascriber 
contextualism historically developed out of, and the sceptical “paradox” emerged from, the 
relevant alternatives theory of knowledge. A discussion of what ascriber contextualism is occurs 
when I discuss Goldman‟s two views of relevance, because Goldman‟s second view of relevance 
brought about the development of ascriber contextualism. Any such discussion would be 
woefully incomplete, however, without voicing DeRose‟s (1992) critical response to the relevant 
alternatives theory of knowledge generally and Goldman‟s two views of relevance specifically. 
DeRose‟s critical response ultimately demands that ascriber contextualism be distinguished from 
the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge. A major focus of the chapter is on Dretske‟s 
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rejection of the closure principle and his poorly motivated reasons for doing so, since his mistake 
proves to be crucial in supporting my thesis when I turn to Cohen‟s presentation of, and ascriber 
contextualist “solution” to, the sceptical “paradox.” 
The second chapter challenges the purported and self-proclaimed explanatory power of 
ascriber contextualism as a semantic thesis about the context-sensitive meaning of the word 
“know,” since ascriber contextualists apply this semantic thesis to epistemology to solve and 
explain the sceptical “paradox.” The idea that the meaning of the word “know” is context-
sensitive is extremely controversial. But ascriber contextualists claim that the context-sensitivity 
of epistemic vocabulary explains how the sceptical “paradox” arises in the first place. According 
to contextualists, such an explanation is a desideratum for a satisfying resolution of the sceptical 
“paradox.” Specifically, ascriber contextualists claim that ascribers or sceptics are sometimes 
semantically blind to the context-sensitivity of epistemic vocabulary. This is a form of blindness 
which explains how it is that the ascriber believes that the “knowledge”-ascription conflicts with 
the sceptical hypothesis or “knowledge”-denial, while the sceptic believes that the “knowledge”-
denial conflicts with the “knowledge”-ascription, even when the ascriber‟s “knowledge”-
ascription is made in the quotidian context and the sceptic‟s “knowledge”-denial is made in the 
sceptical context. From a theoretical point of view, the semantic blindness that the ascriber and 
sceptic allegedly experience to context-sensitive epistemic vocabulary explains how this could 
be. According to contextualists, the fact that the ascriber‟s “knowledge”-ascription and the 
sceptic‟s “knowledge”-denial are made within different kinds of context makes them non-
conflicting. The main contextualist device for explaining the context-sensitivity of the word 
“know” is to treat this word as an indexical akin to the words “I,” “here,” and “now.” 
Contextualists contend that if the word “know” is an indexical, then the apparent conflict 
between the ascriber‟s “knowledge”-ascription and the sceptic‟s “knowledge”-denial is no more 
in conflict than the merely apparent conflict between the sentences “I am hungry (at t1)” and “I 
am not hungry (at t1).” The conflict may be merely apparent, given that the indexical “I” in each 
sentence could refer to a different individual with a different state of appetite from the other. 
Accounts of the indexicality of epistemic vocabulary, however, are strained and prove to be 
unacceptable. The findings of this second chapter remove much of the purported explanatory 
power of the ascriber contextualist “solution” to the sceptical “paradox” by undermining and 
diminishing that explanatory power on its own terms.  
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The third chapter reaffirms my main claim that the plausibility of endorsing proposition 
(3) depends on whether one adopts an internalist or externalist view of knowledge. This will 
reveal that the sceptical “paradox” is only puzzling to the internalist. A similar story to the one 
told in the first chapter, although with different characters, is told in this final chapter. Instead of 
Dretske and Cohen at its centre, however, the story revolves around Nozick and DeRose. I 
investigate Nozick‟s subjunctive conditionals account of knowledge, which proposes a 
philosophical explanation of radical scepticism. While Nozick is a self-proclaimed externalist, he 
ends up both breaking his externalist commitments and rejecting the closure principle, because 
he mistakenly makes an internalist assumption about knowledge in the face of radical sceptical 
hypotheses. This is an egregious mistake for any externalist to make. Curiously, DeRose‟s 
epistemological orientation is externalist too, but yet he fails to see Nozick‟s mistake. The fact 
that DeRose thinks that Nozick‟s explanation of radical scepticism is the right approach but also 
believes that Nozick should not have rejected proposition (2) or the closure principle, motivates 
DeRose to contextualize Nozick‟s subjunctive conditionals account of knowledge. DeRose does 
so in order to explain the plausibility of proposition (3) and “solve” what he calls the “Skeptical 
Problem,” which he admits only differs from Cohen‟s sceptical “paradox” with respect to its 
name and the details. Consequently, he cannot reject proposition (2), as Nozick did, since 
DeRose needs to find an adequate “solution” to the “Skeptical Problem.” An adequate “solution” 
requires that all of the propositions, including proposition (2), remain intact. Yet if DeRose is an 
externalist about knowledge and Nozick makes a serious mistake by making an internalist 
assumption about knowledge in the face of radical sceptical hypotheses, then DeRose‟s 
motivation for applying ascriber contextualism to handle radical scepticism is as poorly 
motivated as Nozick‟s rejection of the closure principle.  
While explanatory power is the principal theoretical virtue of philosophical theories, 
another important theoretical virtue of such theories is economy. Ultimately, ascriber 
contextualists posit contexts unnecessarily. The “solution” to the sceptical “paradox” does not 
require ascriber contextualism, because the “paradox” does not arise if an epistemologist is an 
externalist. Since proposition (3) will be implausible and unacceptable for the externalist, this 
will thereby render the application of ascriber contextualism as simply unnecessary. The 
sceptical “paradox,” however, will continue to haunt the internalist – who in the end may have to 
appeal to the supposedly “almighty” benefits of ascriber contextualism to “exorcize” the radical 
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sceptical possibility of an all-powerful Cartesian evil demon. The contextualist “solution” tends 
to be the layer which obfuscates the point that epistemological differences, in the form of 
externalism and internalism, make all the difference. I think that I have found a razor-sharp 
reason to shave off the contextualist layer, as I will now endeavour to show.
1 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
RELEVANT ALTERNATIVES, CONTEXTUALISM, AND SCEPTICISM 
1.1 Outline 
When discussing so many interconnected and complex ideas there is a danger of burying the 
lead. To avoid this danger, I want to immediately provide the following headline: What is called 
the sceptical “paradox” is not a paradox and the ascriber contextualist attempt to solve it is 
unnecessary. What is called the sceptical “paradox” is not a paradox, because the acceptability of 
the proposition that subjects do not know the falsity of sceptical alternatives crucially depends on 
which view of knowledge, externalism or internalism, is taken. That proposition is only 
acceptable if one takes an internalist view of knowledge. This renders the ascriber contextualist 
attempt to solve the sceptical “paradox” unnecessary. There is no need to apply a semantic thesis 
to try to solve the “paradox,” since the “paradox” dissolves if the epistemologist takes an 
externalist view of knowledge. Let me try to briefly explain why this is so in this section and 
then go on to make the arguments for my thesis. 
Recall the trinity of propositions that are said to make up the sceptical “paradox.” One 
proposition of the sceptical “paradox” is that epistemic subjects know many ordinary empirical 
propositions, such as that they know what time it is, what they had for breakfast, or which 
baseball team won the world series last year. The relevant alternatives theorist holds that only 
relevant alternatives to these ordinary empirical propositions need to be ruled out in order to 
know them. The relevant alternatives theorist contends that sceptical alternatives, such as that I 
may have been tricked by an all-powerful evil demon into thinking that the Boston Red Sox won 
it, very often remain irrelevant alternatives to know ordinary empirical propositions. But 
sometimes the sceptical alternatives are less radical and harder to say whether they are relevant, 
such as when, for instance, one hears a familiar bird call (say, the call of what sounds like a 
sparrow) but cannot rule out the alternative that the call may have come from a mocking bird – a 
natural imitator of other birds. In this case, the question of how to determine whether this 
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alternative is relevant or irrelevant becomes a very difficult question to answer precisely. The 
difficulty of the question comes from trying to figure out what kinds of factors or conditions 
affect relevance. For instance, in the mocking bird case, does the relevance of this alternative 
depend strictly on geographical location? Does it depend on that subject‟s ability to discriminate 
the call of a mocking bird from that of other birds? Does it depend on a combination of these 
kinds of factors or conditions? Could it depend on the kind of conversational context of the 
speaker raising this possibility, as the ascriber contextualist argues? Sections 1.2, 1.3, and 1.6 
discuss the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge and the issue of relevance. Many ascriber 
contextualists who are relevant alternatives theorists, such as Stine (section 1.5) and Cohen 
(section 1.6), have held that ascriber contextualism makes it much easier to say when an 
alternative is relevant and when it is irrelevant. Essentially, being able to settle the issue of 
relevance would make it much easier to claim that subjects know many ordinary empirical 
propositions and to say how that is so.    
Another proposition in the trinity is that the closure principle holds. Section 1.4 discusses 
Dretske‟s rejection of the closure principle. Section 1.5 examines Stine‟s criticism of Dretske‟s 
rejection and her attempt to preserve the closure principle by endorsing ascriber contextualism. 
Section 1.6 discusses Cohen‟s attempt to preserve the closure principle by also endorsing 
ascriber contextualism. Ascriber contextualists, such as Stine and Cohen, seek to preserve the 
closure principle and think that Dretske mistakenly rejects it. Stine charges Dretske with 
committing some error akin to equivocation when he argues for closure failure, whereas Cohen 
thinks that it is simply implausible to reject the closure principle. I also argue that Dretske 
mistakenly rejects the closure principle. But I identify Dretske‟s mistake as coming from an 
internalist assumption he makes when he claims that subjects do not know the falsity of sceptical 
alternatives. Dretske is an externalist. So this is an isolated internalist assumption that he makes. 
But it is a crucial one, since it causes him to reject the closure principle. I contend that if he gets 
rid of this assumption and continues to be an externalist, then sceptical alternatives will remain 
non-threatening and the closure principle will indeed hold. I make these claims in section 1.4. 
The remaining proposition in the so-called sceptical “paradox” is that epistemic subjects 
do not know the falsity of sceptical alternatives. Relevant alternatives theorists, many of whom 
are ascriber contextualists, are responding to closure-based scepticism. Closure-based scepticism 
can be radical or moderate in scope. Relevant alternatives theorists hold that only a subset of the 
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alternatives, the relevant alternatives, are the ones that subjects need to rule out. Yet finding a 
good reason to respond to scepticism has been a persistent difficulty for this theory of 
knowledge. By rejecting the closure principle, Dretske removes the very basis of this form of 
scepticism. This is a response to scepticism. But his argument against the sceptic will not work, 
because he mistakenly rejects the closure principle. To remove the apparent threat of scepticism, 
Stine and Cohen endorse ascriber contextualism. Yet ascriber contextualists are unaware that the 
threat of scepticism is merely apparent if the epistemologist is an externalist about knowledge. 
Generally, whether scepticism is threatening or not will depend on fundamental epistemological 
commitments involving internalism and externalism.  
With this last point in mind, I finally arrive at the sceptical “paradox” in section 1.7. I 
challenge the general acceptability of the proposition that subjects do not know the falsity of 
sceptical alternatives. If that proposition is not generally acceptable, then the sceptical “paradox” 
dissolves, rendering the ascriber contextualist “solution” to it unnecessary. Unfortunately, 
ascriber contextualists who are externalists do not seem to realize this and continue to 
unnecessarily propose ascriber contextualist “solutions” to what they consider to be the sceptical 
“paradox.” However, internalists may continue to be riddled by this situation, because the 
internalist will claim that subjects know many ordinary empirical propositions, the closure 
principle holds, and subjects do not know the falsity of sceptical alternatives. There is the further 
question of whether the ascriber contextualist who is an internalist could find a “solution” to 
what that theorist considers to be the sceptical “paradox.” Section 1.7 explores this question, 
since Cohen is such an ascriber contextualist. Yet it appears that Cohen‟s “solution” is ad hoc. 
Ultimately, however, ascriber contextualists posit contexts unnecessarily, since the sceptical 
“paradox” dissolves at the epistemological level of analysis and need not require the application 
of a semantic thesis about the meaning of the word “knows.”     
1.2 What is the Relevant Alternatives Theory of Knowledge?      
The relevant alternatives theory of knowledge states that in order for an epistemic subject S to 
know a particular ordinary empirical proposition p, S must have a true belief that p and be able 
to rule out, on the basis of S‟s evidence or perceptual abilities, a subset of the alternatives to p; 
namely, S must be able to rule out the set of relevant alternatives to p. For instance, if S is said to 
know what time it is on the basis of a good working watch, then it would seem the alternative 
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that S‟s watch has stopped and tells the wrong time would remain an irrelevant alternative to S‟s 
knowing what time it is. If S‟s watch has been malfunctioning lately, however, then the 
alternative that S‟s watch has stopped and tells the wrong time may be a relevant alternative that 
S needs to rule out to know what time it is (again, in this case, using the watch as the basis to 
know what time it is). Which factors precisely make an alternative relevant is a vexed question. 
There is, however, wide agreement among Relevant Alternatives (RA) theorists that radical 
sceptical alternatives often remain irrelevant to whether S knows ordinary empirical 
propositions, such as to whether S knows what time it is or what S had for breakfast this 
morning.
2
 For example, S does not need to know the falsity of the radical sceptical alternative 
that the world may have sprung into being five minutes ago, complete with pseudo-memories, in 
order to know that S had oatmeal this morning.
3
 If S sometimes has cornflakes or toast instead, 
then ruling out these (relevant) alternatives would be necessary for S to know what S had for 
breakfast. Accordingly, the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge often is viewed as a 
corrective to scepticism. As Patrick Rysiew (2006) remarks, “Just about every RA theorist takes 
the avoidance of scepticism as a desideratum for a satisfactory theory of knowledge.”4 Yet, to 
truly avoid scepticism in the most desired way, the RA theorist must confront the sceptic on the 
issue of whether knowledge is closed under known entailment.  
The principle of knowledge closed under known entailment states that if an epistemic 
subject S knows an ordinary empirical proposition p and S knows that p entails another 
proposition q – or S “competently deduces,” to use Timothy Williamson‟s (2000) apt term, q 
from p – then S knows that q or at least is in a position to know that q.5 Since scepticism is being 
discussed, for the present purposes, the closure principle could be equally presented in the 
following modified form: if S knows that p and S knows that p entails the negation ~sa of a 
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 The paradigmatic example of an ordinary empirical proposition in the literature is the proposition “I know that I 
have hands.” No doubt this is due to Moore (1959). I do not consider this to be a very good example, however, 
because the question “Do you know that you have hands?” would only arise when examining what one knows in the 
face of a radical sceptical threat. Unlike that example, the questions “Do you know what time it is?” or “Do you 
know what you had for breakfast this morning?” are less out of place and more quotidian, which is why I have 
chosen the answers to them as lead examples of ordinary empirical propositions.  
3
 This is Bertrand Russell‟s famous five minute sceptical hypothesis, which he thought was “logically tenable” in 
accounting for memories, but like all other  radical sceptical alternatives, Russell found this hypothesis to be totally 
“uninteresting” and not to be taken “seriously”(Russell 1921, 132). 
4
 Rysiew 2006, 266 [original emphasis].  
5
Williamson 2000, 117. The qualification of “is in a position to know” acknowledges that S need not know all the 
entailments of S‟s belief or body of beliefs to know that P. See: Hawthorne 2000, 119. 
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particular sceptical alternative – and S competently deduces ~sa from p – then S knows that ~sa 
or is at least in a position to know that ~sa. The sceptic exploits the closure principle to make the 
argument for closure-based scepticism, an argument which states that if the closure principle 
holds, then S must know that ~sa to know some ordinary empirical proposition p; S does not 
know that ~sa, or at least does not seem to know that ~sa on the basis of S‟s evidence for the 
ordinary empirical proposition p; therefore, S does not know that p.
6
 Without reasserting the 
relevant alternatives theory in the face of this sceptical threat – a theory which no sceptic finds 
convincing, and at this stage some non-sceptics may find unconvincing too – how can the RA 
theorist respond to the sceptic‟s argument for closure-based scepticism? Before I turn to the 
different answers that RA theorists have given to this question, I want to examine the major issue 
of relevance, which RA theorists have often had difficulty in addressing, especially to the 
satisfaction of their critics. 
1.3 The Issue of Relevance 
In the last section I briefly noted that the question of what makes an alternative relevant or 
irrelevant is a vexed question. Controversial as it may be, it remains necessary for the RA 
theorist to elucidate this central notion of relevance if the relevant alternatives theory of 
knowledge is to remain a viable epistemology. Yet only saying so much understates the problem. 
Critics of the relevant alternatives theory are not optimistically awaiting an account of relevance, 
but rather have found all of the accounts or specific elaborations offered so far to be extremely 
wanting. Some of these critics even consider the RA theorist‟s task a hopeless one.7 Although he 
does not consider it hopeless, Rysiew (2006) observes the unhappiness that critics of the relevant 
alternatives theory have felt over this issue of relevance:  
It‟s not the mere fact that the RA theorist needs an account of... „relevance‟ that has 
tended to lead people to regard the RA approach with suspicion. In itself, this simply 
means that the RA theorist has some further work to do; and what theorist doesn‟t? No; 
the principal source of scepticism regarding the ability of the RA theorist to come up with 
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 Duncan Pritchard (2005) calls this the argument the closure-based scepticism argument (Pritchard 2005, 27). I 
shall likewise refer to it in this way. Such scepticism concerns contingent propositions known a posteriori, and not 
necessary propositions. The scope of such scepticism can be local (e.g., there is no knowledge of other minds, or 
God, or the external world or some particular subject for some particular reason) and moderate or can be global 
(e.g., there is no knowledge of any contingent propositions) and radical. See: Dancy 1985, 8.    
7
 Sosa (1986), for instance, contends that the RA theory remains “obscure,” because it cannot elucidate the notion of 
“relevance.” 
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a complete and satisfactory account of knowing stems, rather, from an unhappiness with 
the specific elaborations of the core RA claim that various theorists have offered.
8
 
Even if there is considerable disagreement over specific elaborations of the notion of relevance, 
especially with regard to which factors determine relevance, there is unanimity among RA 
theorists that the relevant alternatives to ordinary empirical propositions exist within a flexible 
and variable framework. Dretske (1981) is particularly clear about this kind of variation: 
“…although knowledge requires the evidential elimination of all relevant alternatives (to what is 
known), there is a shifting, variable set of relevant alternatives.”9 Not all RA theorists, however, 
agree with Dretske‟s (1981) requirement that knowledge requires evidential elimination; Stine 
(1976), for instance, adamantly rejects this as a requirement for knowledge.
10
 For expository 
purposes, a more neutral term, such as “epistemic position,” may be preferred to the contested 
term “evidential position.” Nevertheless, there are not even murmurings of dissent among RA 
theorists against this kind of variation from being applied to the framework or set of relevant 
alternatives. As a theoretical consequence of this kind of variation, an epistemic subject S may 
be in a strong epistemic position with respect to knowing that p on one occasion within one 
framework, but may not be in that same epistemic position on another occasion within a different 
framework, because of the introduction of relevant alternatives into that framework. What causes 
variation in the set of relevant alternatives is a matter of great controversy, especially between 
ascriber contextualist RA theorists and their older non-contextualist relatives. 
To gain an appreciation of this controversy, it will be helpful to come to it by way of 
Goldman‟s (1976) use of the famous barn façade example.11 In this example, Goldman contrasts 
two cases to analyze the concept of non-inferential perceptual knowledge, but he also considers 
two different interpretations or views of the notion of relevance. The first case is a set-up to the 
second case, which is of true philosophical interest. Goldman‟s two views of relevance will be 
the main focus of this section. After introducing Goldman‟s two views of relevance, I will 
discuss DeRose‟s (1992) critical response to Goldman, since DeRose‟s response provides a clear 
way of understanding what ascriber contextualism is and what it is not.  
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 Rysiew 2006, 259 [original emphasis]. 
9
 Dretske 1981, 370.  
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 Stine 1976, 257.  
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 Goldman (1976) made this example famous, but he credits it to Carl Ginet.   
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 Consider Goldman‟s first case of perceptual knowledge:  
Henry is driving in the country-side with his son. For the boy‟s edification Henry 
identifies various objects on the landscape as they come into view. “That‟s a cow,” says 
Henry, “That‟s a tractor,” “That‟s a silo,” “That‟s a barn,” etc. Henry has no doubt about 
the identity of these objects; in particular, he has no doubt that the last-mentioned object 
is a barn and indeed it is. Each of the identified objects has features characteristic of its 
type. Moreover, each object is fully in view, Henry has excellent eyesight, and he has 
enough time to look at them reasonably carefully, since there is little traffic to distract 
him.
12
    
According to Goldman, except in perhaps our more philosophical moments, we have a strong 
inclination to credit Henry with knowledge in this first case. This should be of no surprise since 
Goldman constructs the case so that the conditions are such that nothing funny is happening. 
Goldman goes on to contrast this first case with the following second case, which is of 
philosophical interest:  
Suppose we are told that, unknown to Henry, the district he has just entered is full of 
papier-mâché facsimiles of barns. These facsimiles look from the road exactly like barns, 
but are really just façades, without back walls or interiors, quite incapable of being used 
as barns. They are so cleverly constructed that travelers invariably mistake them for 
barns. Having just entered the district, Henry has not encountered any facsimiles; the 
object he sees is a genuine barn. But if the object on that site were a facsimile, Henry 
would mistake it for a barn. Given this new information, we would be strongly inclined to 
withdraw the claim that Henry knows the object is a barn.
13
    
In this second case, Henry just happens to be looking at a real barn, which prevents us from 
crediting him with knowledge; or as Goldman points out, upon our receiving this new 
information about fake barns, we tend to retract our previous knowledge-claim about Henry 
issued from our judgment of the first case. In his own analysis of perceptual knowledge and 
treatment of the second case, Goldman provides a counterfactual, subjunctive knowledge-test, in 
which Henry would know that he is looking at a real barn only if Henry were able to discriminate 
or distinguish the real barn from the fake types, which are, possibly – depending on one‟s 
interpretation of relevance – relevant alternatives in the given state of affairs.14 On Goldman‟s 
analysis, this is the counterfactual test that Henry needs to pass so that he would cease to 
mistakenly believe that the barn was a barn if it were a facade. After passing the test, then, it 
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 Goldman 1976, 772.   
13
 Goldman 1976, 773 [original emphasis].  
14
 Goldman 1976, 774.  
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would be no accident if Henry were looking at a real barn, even in a land rife with fakes.
15
 For 
the purposes of this discussion, however, Goldman‟s analysis of perceptual knowledge is not as 
important as the two competing views of relevance he proposes for how to specify the set of 
relevant alternatives in the second case.  
In Goldman‟s presentation of the two views of relevance, the main issue is what bearing a 
commitment to one of these views has on the semantic content of the word “know.” According 
to Goldman‟s first view of relevance, “the semantic content of „know‟ contains (implicit) rules 
that map any putative knower‟s circumstances into a set of relevant alternatives.”16 As I 
understand Goldman‟s first view, if Henry is credited with knowing that he is looking at a 
genuine barn, then the semantic content of the word “know,” in the knowledge-claim “Henry 
knows that he is looking at a (genuine) barn,” means that Henry has ruled out all of the fake 
barns as relevant alternatives in his environmental circumstances, circumstances which are the 
“terrain” on which the semantic content maps. In contrast, Goldman‟s second view of relevance 
denies that the word “know” has a determinate semantic content or mapping-relation (semantic 
content-to-environmental circumstances). This second view instead positively states that “there 
are regularities governing the alternative hypotheses a speaker (i.e., an attributer or denier of 
knowledge) thinks of, and deems relevant.”17 In elaborating on the second view, Goldman 
writes: “It is not only the circumstances of the putative knower‟s situation, however, that 
influence the choice of alternatives. The speaker‟s own linguistic and psychological context are 
also important.”18 For example, imagine two philosophy students having a conversation about 
the radical sceptical possibility of Henry being tricked by an omnipotent evil demon. The 
students have just come out an epistemology class in which Descartes‟s first meditation was 
discussed. The students have radical sceptical alternatives on their minds. One of the students 
claims that “Henry does not know that he is looking at a barn, because he does not know that he 
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 At this point you may be wondering why Goldman did not just include a condition of non-accidentality to the 
knowledge-conditions. The reason is that Goldman did not think that the notion of non-accidentality was itself 
explicable. The notion of “non-accidentality” was put forth by Unger (1968), but Goldman held that “The notion of 
„non-accidentality‟ itself is not very satisfying, however, for the notion of „non-accidentality‟ itself needs 
explication”(Goldman 1976, 773). Goldman, however, without directly explicating it, achieves this non-
accidentality through his subjunctive, counterfactual knowledge-test, since it prevents Henry from just happening to 
be looking at a real barn.    
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 Goldman 1976, 776.  
18
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9 
 
is not being tricked by an omnipotent evil demon.” According to Goldman‟s second view of 
relevance, this radical sceptical alternative may be a relevant alternative, especially considering 
the student‟s linguistic and psychological context. In Goldman‟s characterization of the second 
view of relevance, these are the seeds which would eventually germinate into ascriber 
contextualism – although, depending on who you talk to, may turn into the weeds for later 
ascriber contextualists to get rid of.
19
  
Although Goldman indicates some favouritism towards the second view of relevance, 
partly because the knower‟s circumstances are so hard to map (There is what I am calling the 
problem of cartography: Where are the boundaries to be drawn?), Goldman remains officially 
non-committal about which view is correct.
20
 Goldman‟s neutrality comes from him being more 
interested in providing an analysis of non-inferential perceptual knowledge, which does not turn 
on which view of relevance is adopted. So long as there are ways of explicating the qualifier 
„relevant,‟ the “scope of knowledge could be substantial,” according to Goldman; otherwise, “If 
knowledge required the elimination of all logically possible alternatives, there would be no 
knowledge (at least of contingent truths).”21 Goldman finds two ways of explicating the qualifier 
„relevant,‟ and so moves on to analyzing perceptual knowledge. I turn next to the second view of 
relevance and its storied, but controversial, relationship to ascriber contextualism. DeRose thinks 
we must take account of how the speaker‟s linguistic and psychological context affects the 
semantic content of the word “know.” Yet, against Goldman, DeRose contends that the ascriber 
contextualist can take account of this without invoking the second view of “relevance” or the 
notion of “relevance” altogether. According to DeRose, ascriber contextualism is exclusively 
about how the ascriber‟s context affects the semantics of the word “know,” and has nothing to do 
with the issue of “relevance.” Accordingly, the ascriber contextualist need not be a relevant 
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 As we shall see, DeRose (1992) plays the role of gardener by getting rid of the weeds of the relevant alternatives 
theory and discovering the roots of ascriber contextualism.   
20
 Here is what Goldman says about this problem of mapping the putative knower‟s circumstances: “The problem, of 
course, is to specify when an alternative is „idle‟ [„irrelevant‟] and when it is „serious‟ („relevant‟). Consider Henry 
once again. Should we say that the possibility of a facsimile before him is a serious or relevant possibility if there 
are no facsimiles in Henry‟s district, but only in Sweden? Or if a single such facsimile once existed in Sweden, but 
none exist now?”(Goldman 1976, 775). The notion of “relevance” is vague and fuzzy. It is thus a problem to answer 
this question – of where the boundaries are to be drawn – with precision. Because of this problem, Goldman favours 
the second view of relevance.   
21
 Goldman 1976, 775.  
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alternatives theorist. On this particular matter, I think that DeRose is correct, although I do not 
endorse ascriber contextualism.     
Goldman‟s second view of relevance is sometimes seen as an early expression of what 
has come to be known as ascriber or attributor contextualism, which in the words of prominent 
ascriber contextualist Keith DeRose (1992) states that “...the truth conditions of sentences of the 
form „S knows that p‟ or „S does not know that p‟ vary in certain ways according to the context 
in which the sentences are uttered.”22 There is considerable, and not altogether tolerable, 
vagueness in both DeRose‟s definition of ascriber contextualism and his characterization of how 
the truth-conditions
23
 for “knowledge”-ascriptions, to use his clause, “vary in certain ways.”24 
But vagueness aside, by “the context in which the sentences are uttered,” with which the truth-
conditions accord, DeRose means the conversational context of the ascriber or attributor of the 
“knowledge”-ascription; that is to say, the ascriber who is the speaker who claims, for instance, 
that “Henry knows that he is looking at a (genuine) barn.”25 DeRose‟s definition reveals that he 
takes the truth-conditions to be what determine the proposition expressed by the sentences “S 
knows that p” or “S does not know that p,” and that these truth-conditions vary with changes in 
the ascriber‟s conversational context. According to DeRose, this variation means that the 
meaning of a proposition can be affected by what he calls contextual or attributor factors, such 
as the mentioning or considering of an error-possibility in a conversational context, factors which 
factor into the truth-conditions of “knowledge”-ascriptions.26  
The rival position to contextualism, which denies that attributor or contextual factors play 
a role in determining the meaning of knowledge-claims, is known as invariantism, a position 
famously credited to Unger (1975) and further developed in Unger‟s (1984) later work. In his 
characterization of invariantism, DeRose writes: “According to the invariantist, such features of 
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 DeRose 1992, 914. Although ascriber contextualism has traditionally been associated with the RA theory, DeRose 
argues that the two are independent of one another and should be seen as distinct. One need not be a RA theorist to 
be a contextualist (DeRose 1992, 918-923).  
23
 Unfortunately, contextualists tend to use the terms “truth-conditions” and “semantic standards” interchangeably.   
24
 The scare quotes around the word “knowledge,” in “knowledge”-ascriptions, are used to indicate that 
contextualism is a meta-linguistic thesis about the meaning of the word “knowledge,” which goes beyond the object-
level of propositional knowledge. Other authors, such as Bach 2005b, have used similar devices to signal to the 
reader that contextualism concerns the context-sensitive meaning of the word “knowledge.” See: Bach 2005b, 59.  
25
 For contextualists, the words “attributor” and “ascriber” are synonyms.  
26
 DeRose 1992, 915. See: Unger 1975, 1984. In his later work, Unger (1984) does not argue for invariantism. In 
this later work, he neither supports invariantism nor contextualism; rather, he holds the position of semantic 
relativity, claiming that there are equally good arguments on both sides.    
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an utterance of a knowledge attribution do not affect how good an epistemic position the putative 
knower must be in for the attribution to be true.”27  
It may appear that DeRose is simply rehashing Goldman‟s two views of relevance, since 
DeRose‟s contextualism claims that attributor factors factor into the truth-conditions of 
“knowledge”- attributions, which appears to be similar to Goldman‟s second view about the role 
that the putative knower‟s psychological and linguistic context plays in affecting the semantic 
content of “knowledge”-claims, whereas, invariantism denies this, which makes invariantism 
much closer to the first view of relevance.
28
 Moreover, the RA theorist who holds the first view 
of relevance would contend that subject factors – to borrow DeRose‟s term, which he uses in 
contrast to attributor or contextual factors – such as, for example, the epistemic subject‟s 
environmental circumstances, indeed determine the semantic content of knowledge-claims.
29
 But 
before making this rough comparison and hasty generalization, one needs to appreciate a twist in 
this story. 
The twist is that DeRose distances his ascriber contextualism from the relevant 
alternatives theory of knowledge, because he contends that one can be an ascriber contextualist 
without having to be a relevant alternatives theorist. For DeRose the “birthmark” of the ascriber 
contextualist appears when that theorist accepts a contextualist approach to semantics. As this 
approach is applied to epistemology, true colours are revealed when the theorist accepts that 
attributor factors can affect the truth-conditions of “knowledge”-claims. Consequently, DeRose 
argues that the notion of “relevance” has nothing to do with ascriber contextualism per se, and 
that ascriber contextualism can remain independent of the relevant alternatives theory of 
knowledge.  
DeRose‟s argument comes in the form of a challenge to Goldman‟s assumption that the 
first view of relevance affects the semantic content of knowledge-claims. DeRose widens the 
scope of his challenge by challenging Goldman‟s fundamental assumption that “relevance” has 
something important to do with semantic content. To begin with, DeRose claims that Goldman 
too quickly draws the distinction between these two views of “relevance,” because Goldman 
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 To be clear, the words “attributor” and “contextual” in the phrase “attributor or contextual factors” is simply a 
difference of words. They function as synonyms in that phrase.  
29
 DeRose 1992, 918.  
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overlooks the reasons which motivate drawing the distinction: “Although Goldman draws the 
distinction between what I am calling subject factors and attributor factors, he does not explain 
the importance of the distinction.”30 Crucially, DeRose narrows the point of his challenge by 
directly challenging Goldman‟s assumption that the first view of relevance or the set of subject 
factors associated with that view can actually affect the semantic content of knowledge-claims:  
There seems to be a fairly straightforward and important sense in which one does mean 
something different if the range of relevant alternatives has been changed by attributor 
factors but does not mean something different if the range of relevant alternatives has 
been changed by subject factors.
31
   
To appreciate DeRose‟s point, consider what Stine (1976) claims in discussing Dretske‟s (1970) 
zebra example, in which we are to imagine our hero John looking at an animal that looks like a 
zebra at the public zoo:  
In Dretske‟s zoo example, the animal‟s being a mule painted to look like a zebra is not a 
relevant alternative. So what one means when one says that John knows the animal is a 
zebra, is that he knows that it is a zebra, as opposed to a gazelle, an antelope, or other 
animals one would normally expect to find in a zoo. If, however, being a mule painted to 
look like a zebra became a relevant alternative, then one would literally mean something 
different in saying that John knows that the animal is a zebra from what one meant 
originally and that something else may well be false.
32
  
With DeRose‟s direct challenge to Goldman in mind, consider the following suggestive series of 
questions: What caused the painted mule possibility to become a relevant alternative in Stine‟s 
description? Was it caused by a subject factor – a subject factor in the sense of a factor in the 
epistemic subject’s environment? For instance, was it caused by the introduction of painted 
mules into the zebra pen during John‟s visit to the zoo, which on Goldman‟s first view of 
relevance would seem to make the cleverly painted mules in the pen relevant alternatives, and 
which would seem to prevent John from gaining knowledge in these circumstances if he were 
unaware of such an introduction? Or was it an attributor factor, such as the painted mule error-
possibility being mentioned or considered by the ascriber or denier in a conversational context? 
Unfortunately, Stine does not say which kind of factor caused an alteration in the meaning of 
what was said.  
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DeRose argues, however, that changes in John‟s environmental circumstances or in the 
set of subject factors would not make the meaning of the utterance “John knows that there is a 
zebra” literally mean something different. This is especially apparent if the ascriber were 
ignorant of changes in John‟s environmental circumstances. In that case, without the ascriber 
being aware of these changes in John‟s circumstances, DeRose contends that that ascriber would 
not literally mean something different in ascribing “knowledge” by saying that “John knows that 
he is looking at a zebra.”  
In stark contrast, DeRose contends that attributor factors can indeed affect the semantic 
content of “knowledge”-claims. To see this, imagine an ascriber who at first claims that “John 
knows that there is a zebra” (as opposed to a gazelle, an antelope, or any other zebra-like animals 
at the zoo) in a conversation about specimens at the public zoo. Now consider that when 
someone else in the conversation mentions to that ascriber that there might be cleverly painted 
mules wandering about in the zebra pen, this error-possibility changes the set of attributor 
factors. According to DeRose, if the ascriber were to repeat the claim that “John knows that there 
is a zebra” in the face of this error-possibility, then this claim would now carry the meaning that 
John knows that there is a zebra as opposed to a cleverly painted mule in the zebra pen. In 
DeRose‟s view, this latter claim supposedly means that John is in a good enough epistemic 
position to rule out the previously mentioned error-possibility. Essentially, DeRose argues that 
attributor factors – not subject factors – cause variation in the semantic content of “knowledge”-
ascriptions.  
From this DeRose contends that these differences in meaning between the two claims 
made in different conversational contexts – one context in which the error-possibility was absent 
and another context in which it was mentioned and became salient – cannot be accommodated or 
explained by Goldman‟s first view of relevance. DeRose more boldly rejects the relevant 
alternatives theory of knowledge altogether, however, because he thinks that so long as one 
espouses a contextualist approach to semantics, then this espousal alone weds one to ascriber 
contextualism.
33
 That is to say, a contextualist can drop talk of relevance altogether in favour of 
simple contextualist talk in terms of what attributor factors affect the truth-conditions – a 
terminology which does everything that the second view of relevance does without the additional 
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epistemic baggage. The important variation for DeRose, then, is not the variability within the set 
of relevant alternatives, but how the truth-conditions of “knowledge”-ascriptions co-vary with 
attributor factors. On my reading of DeRose, the separation is clear when he claims:  
RA‟s basic idea is not about contextual variations of meanings... It is, then going beyond 
this basic idea that RA theorists have, by my lights, gone wrong by tying the meaning of 
a given attribution too closely to what the range of relevant alternatives is.
34
  
Throughout this discussion I have tried to point out many of the loose ends that have tended to 
unravel the tie between the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge and ascriber contextualism, 
especially how the attributor factors alone are causing variation in the semantic content of the 
word “know.”35  
This concludes my examination of the issue of relevance and how ascriber contextualism 
historically developed out of the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge. DeRose considers 
this development to be a historical accident, since he contends that the ascriber contextualist 
need not be a relevant alternatives theorist. In DeRose‟s view, the two positions can remain 
independent of one another. Moreover, a commitment to a contextualist semantics alone makes 
one an ascriber contextualist. This is because attributor factors – and not subject factors – are 
causing variation in the meaning of “knowledge”-claims. According to DeRose, there is no need 
for the ascriber contextualist to invoke the notion of relevance in order for ascriber contextualism 
to be a coherent position. On this matter, I agree with DeRose.     
The issue of relevance will return when I examine Cohen‟s ascriber contextualist version 
of the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge in section 1.6.
36
 Cohen does not think that there 
is a way of generally specifying the relevance of alternatives, and so holds that the relevance of 
alternatives depends on the kind of conversational context in effect at the time of the 
“knowledge”-ascription or “knowledge”-denial. In section 1.5 Stine‟s discussion of different 
kinds of conversational context will be useful to get a sense of why Cohen appeals to different 
kinds of conversational context to specify the relevance of alternatives.  
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In connection with these discussions, a major problem faced by relevant alternatives 
theorists is to respond to scepticism. The form of scepticism that they are responding to is 
closure-based scepticism, which can be either radical or moderate in scope. The sceptic will 
argue that the subject must first rule out a sceptical alternative (a sceptical alternative which is 
entailed by an ordinary empirical proposition) to know an ordinary empirical proposition. 
Responding to this form of scepticism is a task taken up by Dretske, Stine, and Cohen. It is 
important to note that both Stine and Cohen find closure-based scepticism threatening, and aim 
to preserve the closure principle and mitigate that threat by using ascriber contextualism. Seeing 
that Dretske is not an ascriber contextualist, he does not claim that the closure principle holds 
relative to a kind of conversational context; rather, he rejects the closure principle. Dretske 
claims that the environmental conditions play a major role in determining whether alternatives 
are relevant or remain irrelevant to what a subject is said to know.  
In the next section, 1.4, I examine the status of the closure principle or what Dretske 
calls, to be historically accurate, the thesis of penetrability. Dretske rejects the thesis of 
penetrability, because he contends that epistemic operators are only semi-penetrating and that 
subjects do not know the falsity of sceptical alternatives. According to Dretske, because the 
closure principle fails to hold, closure-based scepticism is not threatening. Consequently, 
subjects only need to rule out the relevant alternatives to know ordinary empirical propositions. 
But I challenge Dretske‟s motivation for rejecting the closure principle. I argue that his rejection 
of the closure principle is poorly motivated, seeing that it rests on a dubious internalist 
assumption.  
The following section will show that there is no need to reject the closure principle. It 
will also reveal that sceptical alternatives are not threatening if an epistemologist continues to be 
an externalist. Much of the work in section 1.4 will figure prominently in section 1.7, in which I 
challenge the general acceptability of the proposition that subjects do not know the falsity of 
sceptical alternatives. This is the second proposition in the so-called sceptical “paradox,” which 
depends for its acceptability on an internalist view of knowledge. Without this proposition being 
generally acceptable, the so-called sceptical “paradox” does not arise. Any supposed “solution” 
to the sceptical “paradox” will thereby be unnecessary, as I will show in section 1.7. But first I 
need to discuss Dretske.    
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1.4 Dretske’s Epistemic Operators 
According to Dretske, a sentence or statement can be affixed by what he generally calls a 
sentential operator.
37
 For instance, if we affix „it is true that‟ to the sentence “Albert lost the 
election,” then the affixed „it is true that‟ is the operator which penetrates to the sentence “Albert 
lost the election.”38 Some operators, such as „it is true that,‟ when affixed to a sentence, penetrate 
to all of the consequences of that sentence. For instance, a (necessary) consequence of the 
sentence “Albert lost the election” is that “someone lost the election,” given that Albert is 
someone and the nature of elections requires that someone loses. According to Dretske, operators 
can be distinguished from one another in terms of penetrability: an operator is penetrating 
insofar as that operator reaches all of the consequences of the sentence or an operator is 
nonpenetrating insofar as that operator may not even reach some of the elementary consequences 
of the sentence.
39
 In a slightly different terminology, penetrating operators could be described as 
having the property of being closed, whereas nonpenetrating operators could described as 
lacking that property. The following operators are fully penetrating: „it is true that,‟ „it is 
necessary that,‟ „it is a fact that,‟ „it is possible that.‟40 In stark contrast to these fully penetrating 
operators, consider, for instance, the nonpenetrating operator „it is lucky that.‟ Let us affix this 
nonpenetrating operator to the sentence “I hit the bull‟s-eye,” and suppose that a necessary 
consequence of this sentence is that “I either hit the bull‟s-eye or the side of the barn.” The 
nonpenetrability of this operator is clear: if „„it was lucky that‟ “I hit the bull‟s-eye,”‟ then „„it 
was lucky that‟ “I either hit the bull‟s-eye or the side of the barn.”‟ In this case, the operator „it 
was lucky that‟ is nonpenetrating, because, when affixed to the main sentence “I hit the bull‟s-
eye,” that operator fails to penetrate to a necessary consequence of the main sentence; namely, 
the operator „it was lucky that‟ fails to even penetrate to that main sentence‟s elementary 
(necessary) consequence “I either hit the bull‟s-eye or the side of the barn.”41 Translating this 
into a non-technical language, it may have been lucky that I hit the bull‟s-eye, but it was not a 
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matter of luck that I either hit the bull‟s-eye or the side of the barn – for even the worst player 
can usually hit at least the (broad) side of the barn. 
But this classification of operators, according to differences in penetrability, remains 
incomplete until we take account of semi-penetrating operators, which possess a higher degree of 
penetrability than nonpenetrating operators, but a lower degree of penetrability than fully 
penetrating operators. Dretske examines a subclass of the semi-penetrating operators known as 
epistemic operators, such as the operators „S knows that‟ or „S has reason to believe that.‟42 In 
these epistemic operators “S” stands for an epistemic subject or agent, and since the kind of 
knowledge with which Dretske is concerned is propositional knowledge, these operators will be 
affixed to a sentence, statement, or proposition by way of a “that”-clause, as in “S knows that P.”  
With these basic points in mind, Dretske issues a warning about the application of 
epistemic operators: “When we are dealing with the epistemic operators, it becomes crucial to 
specify whether the agent in question knows that P entails Q.”43 One way of understanding 
Dretske on this point is to realize that for the agent to know that P it is necessary for that agent to 
believe that P, since meeting the belief or doxastic condition is a necessary condition for 
knowledge. Likewise, for the agent to know the entailment Q, that agent needs to believe that Q. 
With this first warning still reverberating, Dretske next warns epistemologists against a tendency 
to idealize epistemic agents: “Were we all ideally astute logicians, were we fully apprised of all 
the necessary consequences (supposing this to be a well defined class) of every proposition, 
perhaps then the epistemic operators penetrate to all the known consequences of a proposition.”44 
The reason why the first warning continues to echo through to the second is because, as John 
Hawthorne (2000) points out, “...one doesn‟t know all the logical consequences of one‟s 
beliefs.”45 Given that the non-idealized, concrete, epistemic agent does not know all of the 
logical consequences of her beliefs, it is crucial to specify whether that agent knows that P 
entails Q, as a particular consequence of her belief that P. It is worth noting, however, that 
defenders of the closure principle, such as Hawthorne (2005), among many others, who claim 
that an agent can, in principle, know all of the logical consequences as known entailments, 
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carefully make the following qualification on the closure principle: so long as the agent is in a 
position to know the entailment, then the closure principle holds. That is to say, were the agent to 
come to believe that entailment, retain knowledge of the main proposition, and “competently 
deduce” the entailment from the main proposition, then that agent would indeed have 
propositional knowledge of the entailment.
46
 Furthermore, defenders of the closure principle do 
not think that making this qualification at all idealizes the agent in Dretske‟s sense of treating the 
agent as an ideally astute logician.     
 Epistemic operators are the focus of his examination, because Dretske argues that 
traditional sceptical arguments exploit the semi-penetrability of these operators. In his 
characterization of the sceptical exploitation of epistemic operators, Dretske writes:  
The traditional skeptical arguments exploit precisely those consequences of a proposition 
to which the epistemic operators do not penetrate, precisely those consequences which 
distinguish the epistemic operators from the fully penetrating operators.
47
  
To stop this form of exploitation, Dretske challenges the thesis of penetrability, viz., “If you do 
not know whether Q is true or not, and P cannot be true unless Q is true, then you (obviously) do 
not know whether P is true or not,”48 since “Almost all sceptical objections trade on it.”49 To 
gain a preliminary appreciation of the point of Dretske‟s challenge, consider that philosophers 
who assume the thesis of penetrability (for example, G.E. Moore) could argue as follows: if one 
knows that the object on the windowsill is a (real) tomato, and if one knows that if the object on 
the windowsill is a (real) tomato then one knows that that object is not made of plastic, then one 
knows that the object is not made of plastic. In reply to these philosophers, however, the sceptic 
can make the following objection: if one does not know that the object on the windowsill is made 
of plastic, and if one does not know that the object on the windowsill is plastic then one does not 
know that the object is a (real) tomato, then one does not know that the object is a (real) tomato. 
This first argument made by some philosophers is similar to the logically valid pattern of modus 
ponens, whereas the sceptic‟s objection is similar to the logically valid pattern of modus 
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tollens.
50
 In an attempt to break the stalemate between a modus ponens argument and modus 
tollens objection at the level of abstract argument, Moore (1959) claimed that if one knew 
something, then one carried the concrete certainty of common sense. When even sceptical 
alternatives become radical and introduce the error-possibilities of dreams, demons, illusions, 
and fakes, Moore thought that common sense spoke against their plausibility. Most 
contemporary philosophers do not equate knowledge with certainty, as Moore did, but some 
contemporary philosophers still find his form of argument philosophically attractive.
51
 Dretske 
does not directly question Moore‟s appeal to commonsense against the sceptic, but rather 
questions the thesis of penetrability on which both Moore‟s argument, and the sceptic‟s 
argument, trade.
52
 Dretske especially questions the theoretical commitment that endorsing the 
thesis of penetrability carries; namely, that it commits one to the view that epistemic operators 
are fully penetrating operators.  
 The most critical observation that Dretske makes about epistemic operators is that they 
do not operate on or penetrate to presuppositions made by agents. Consider the following 
passage:  
...there are certain presuppositions associated with a statement. These presuppositions, 
although their truth is entailed by the truth of the statement, are not part of what is 
operated on when we operate on the statement with one of our epistemic operators. The 
epistemic operators do not penetrate to these presuppositions.
53
 
The presuppositions that Dretske is discussing in the above passage are not logical or semantical 
presuppositions, but rather are ones made by agents (and need not be logical consequences of 
statements or propositions). The presuppositions that Dretske is dealing with here are what the 
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agent thinks of as epistemically relevant or irrelevant. It is best to demonstrate what Dretske 
means by “presuppositions” by using an example. According to Dretske, when I state that “I 
know that the wine in the bottle is red,” I leave unasserted that it is wine – of the liquid in the 
bottle that looks red to me. That it is wine has been left unasserted and rather is presupposed in 
my stating that “I know that the wine in the bottle is red.” Dretske contends that epistemic 
operators do not penetrate to these presuppositions of my statement. It is important to point out, 
however, that he is not denying that I may have evidence for, say, the liquid in the bottle being 
red wine or that I find it plausible that there is red wine in the bottle. I may have checked by 
smelling, looking, or even having a glass of the liquid, or I may have another reason to believe 
that it is plausible that it is wine and not, say, water with red food-colouring in it. But Dretske 
thinks that often we do not make any such checks and make presuppositions instead. Moreover, 
the set of plausible reasons or evidence we have when making a statement often remains at the 
level of presupposition too.
54
 Notice that all of the presuppositions are made by the agent and 
have to do with what the agent knows from within that agent‟s perspective. This is a very 
important theoretical move that Dretske makes, and I will reveal why in a moment.  
Dretske thinks that sceptical objections rely on what he calls “contrast consequences.” 
Contrast consequences are predicates incompatible with the predicate contained in the main 
statement under examination. For instance, consider the main statement “the wall is red.” This 
statement contains the predicate „is red,‟ which could be contrasted with the predicates „is white.‟ 
The predicate „is red‟ could even be contrasted with the predicate „(but) is white cleverly 
illuminated to look red.‟55 This latter predicate is of the kind that is often contained in sceptical 
alternatives. The sceptic, accordingly, contends that the agent needs to know the falsity of a 
sceptical alternative in order to know an ordinary empirical proposition. These sceptical 
alternatives always contain contrast consequences. Endorsing the thesis of penetrability, then, 
would mean that the following conditional in, say, the red wall case, would need to be met in 
order to have knowledge: “...if anyone knows that the wall is red he must know that it is not 
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white cleverly illuminated to look red.”56 Generalizing from this case means that the same kind 
of conditional would need to be met in order to know ordinary empirical propositions.
57
  
Recall the important point that sometimes our evidence for statements is left at the level 
of presupposition and based simply on what we think is most plausible. For instance, the fact that 
the bottles of wine advertise a Merlot or Pinot Noir often supplies ample evidence to believe 
them to contain red wine. Yet Dretske thinks that ordinary, often presupposed, evidence and the 
often good enough reasons we have for knowing, say, that the wall is (painted) red, are not good 
enough reasons to eliminate the sceptical possibility that the room is set up with elaborate trick 
lighting to make a white wall look red. Consider Dretske‟s view on the matter:  
We seldom acquire any special reasons for believing the lighting normal although we can 
talk vaguely about there being no reason to think it unusual. The fact is that we habitually 
take such matters for granted, and although we normally have good reasons for making 
such routine assumptions, I do not think these reasons are sufficiently good, not without 
special precautionary checks in the particular case, to say of the particular situation we 
are in that we know conditions are normal.
58
 
Notice that Dretske is not claiming that this sceptical alternative is plausible or one that is 
frequently realized; rather, he knows that there is a bit of Moorean common sense within each of 
us, which very often refuses to take such possibilities seriously. The implausibility of the case, 
however, is not good enough to know that the sceptical alternative is false.
59
 Nevertheless, 
Dretske resists the idea that we always need to make special precautionary checks to have 
knowledge, since endorsing that idea would be tantamount to capitulating to the sceptic.  
Dretske does not capitulate to the sceptic, because he holds that we can continue to know 
ordinary empirical propositions, such as that the wall is red or that the animal in the pen is a 
zebra, on the basis of ordinary evidence, despite failing to know the falsity of sceptical 
alternatives. That it is to say, sceptical alternatives often remain irrelevant and non-threatening, 
since knowledge often only requires ordinary evidence and rarely requires the agent to make 
special precautionary checks. This exposition puts us in a position to truly appreciate Dretske‟s 
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rejection of the thesis of penetrability (or the closure principle). Consider what Dretske thinks he 
has shown:  
What I am suggesting is that we simply admit that we do not know that some of these 
contrasting “sceptical alternatives” are not the case, but refuse to admit that we do not 
know what we originally said we knew. My knowing that the wall is red certainly entails 
that the wall is red; it also entails that the wall is not white, in particular, it entails that the 
wall is not white cleverly illuminated to look red. But it does not follow from the fact that 
I know that the wall is red that I know that it is not white cleverly illuminated to look red. 
Nor does it follow from the fact that I know that those animals are zebras that I know that 
they are not mules cleverly disguised to look like zebras. These are some of the contrast 
consequences to which epistemic operators do not penetrate.
60
  
This is a denial of the closure principle, because Dretske holds that I can know that the animal is 
a zebra on the basis of ordinary evidence, and I can also know that the animal is a zebra entails 
that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule, but yet I can still fail to know that the animal is 
not a cleverly disguised mule, because I lack special evidence to know this and epistemic 
operators are only semi-penetrating. 
 This completes my exposition of Dretske (1970). We are now in a position to see the 
serious mistaken internalist assumption that Dretske makes, which causes him to reject the 
closure principle. This internalist assumption is in regard to the agent’s presuppositions. As 
Michael Williams‟s argues, Dretske makes a serious mistake when he conflates the 
presuppositions that the agent makes about the proposition with the logical presuppositions of 
that proposition (which are logical consequences). Before I point out this serious mistake, I want 
to briefly focus on the good part of Dretske‟s argument for closure failure. Recently, Dretske has 
received a barrage of harsh criticism for denying the closure principle. Some critics hold that the 
closure principle has an “axiomatic status,”61 others contend that “to many it seems crazy to 
actually deny the principle,”62 and still others point out that denying the closure principle makes 
Dretske‟s epistemology open to abominable conjunctions of the form “John knows that that is a 
zebra, but he does not know that that is not a painted mule.”63 Instead of adding to the barrage, I 
                                                          
60
 Dretske 1970, 1016-1017.  
61
 Cohen 1999, 68.  
62
 Cohen 2000, 102.  
63
 This quotation comes from Stanley 2005, 19. “Abominable conjunctions” are discussed by DeRose 1995, 27-29. 
DeRose, however, has Nozick (1981) in mind when he brings up these abominable conjunctions. Like Dretske, 
Nozick also denied the principle of closure.  
23 
 
want to tell you about both the good part as well as the bad part of Dretske‟s argument for 
rejecting the closure principle. Hopefully, I can find some balance in my assessment. 
 The good part of Dretske‟s argument is that it prevents a kind of bootstrapping in 
epistemology. By “bootstrapping” I mean that Dretske prevents epistemic subjects from being 
aware of the reliability of their own perceptions and environmental conditions. This prevents 
subjects from making inferences from these perceptions in order to expand the scope of their 
knowledge. Dretske especially wants to prevent subjects from knowing – from a first-person 
perspective – the falsity of sceptical alternatives by making deductions from what these subjects 
take themselves to already know. With Dretske (1970) in mind, Duncan Pritchard (2005) states:  
In effect, [Dretske‟s argument for] the failure of closure simply reflects the „anti-
bootstrapping intuition‟ that one cannot come to know the empirical truths that are 
presupposed in one‟s empirical knowledge simply by reflecting upon that knowledge.64  
Recently, Dretske (2005) claims that any act of perception carries with it what he calls 
“heavyweight implications” that cannot be similarly perceived.65 Heavyweight implications 
imply that there is an external world and that scepticism is false.
66
 For instance, I see that there is 
a computer in front me, which implies that there is a physical object in front of me. But that does 
not, according to Dretske (2005), mean that I similarly see (or perceive in the same manner) that 
a physical object is in front of me.
67
 That there are physical objects is a heavyweight implication 
of my seeing that there is a computer in front of me. Dretske claims that all heavyweight 
implications entail the falsity of radical sceptical alternatives.
68
 For example, my seeing that 
there is a computer in front of me entails the falsity of the radical sceptical alternative that, say, I 
am being tricked by an omnipotent evil demon to believe that there is a computer in front of me; 
although, if I were being tricked by an omnipotent evil demon, presumably, I would have no idea 
of it. Dretske denies that I can know the falsity of this radical sceptical alternative from my 
particular act of perception. To say otherwise would allow for bootstrapping. Since all ordinary 
empirical propositions known by perception entail heavyweight implications, Dretske thinks that 
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accepting the closure principle either enables bootstrapping in epistemology or has sceptical-
breeding consequences.
69
  
In his (2005) recent argument against the closure principle, I find that Dretske continues 
to respond to the sceptic as well as to Moore. Recall that Dretske (1970) is just as critical of 
Moore for accepting the thesis of penetrability as he is of the sceptic for doing so. Essentially, in 
Dretske‟s view, Moore‟s response to scepticism has about as little plausibility as when Doctor 
Johnson, in a legendary demonstration of “common sense” against Bishop Berkeley‟s idealism (a 
philosophical position which was apparently firmly grounded in common sense too, according to 
Berkeley), kicked a stone and then said that he had refuted the good Bishop thus. In my opinion, 
the anti-bootstrapping “intuition” that these commentators and critics of Dretske have noted is 
reflected in Dretske‟s resistance to those philosophers who use the same form of argument that 
Moore used to know a heavyweight implication from, say, raising one hand and then the other, 
observing that hands are physical objects, and finally declaring that there can be no scepticism 
about the external world – thus. To argue in this manner often requires a trust or faith in the 
reliability of one‟s own perceptions and reasons which is not altogether conducive to good 
philosophy.
70
 With these philosophers in mind, Dretske writes, “Despite its philosophical 
credentials (Moore, 1959), that sounds like chutzpah, not philosophy, to me.”71 Instead of 
choosing between two unpalatable options that come from accepting the closure principle, either 
a bootstrapping response or radical scepticism, Dretske (1970, 2005) chooses the remaining 
option, which is to deny the closure principle. Dretske then carefully mitigates the force of 
scepticism by claiming that epistemic operators are only semi-penetrating, and claiming that only 
relevant alternatives thereby have to be ruled out in order to have knowledge. I consider 
Dretske‟s attempt to prevent bootstrapping in epistemology to be the good part of his argument.  
The bad part of Dretske‟s argument is that he is confused about the relationship between 
the agent‟s presuppositions and the closure principle (which concerns logical presuppositions). 
Michael Williams (1991) is particularly clear about what is the matter: “...Dretske conflates the 
presuppositions of a proposition P with the presuppositions of my knowing that P. As a result, he 
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treats as my failure to know that P what is in fact only my failure to know that I know.”72 As 
evidence of Williams‟s charge of Dretske‟s conflating the two, consider again that Dretske holds 
that “...it does not follow from the fact that I know that the wall is red that I know that it is not 
white cleverly illuminated to look red.”73 To point out the serious mistake that Dretske makes, I 
will use his example of the red wall. Let P stand for “the wall is (painted) red” and Q stand for 
“the wall is not white cleverly illuminated to look red.” First consider that if I am able to rule out 
Q, then I must, according to Dretske, make special precautionary checks; that is to say, I must 
make sure that the environmental conditions are normal. Even lacking such checks, however, 
Dretske maintains that I can still know that P. Given that I have no special evidence, it only 
means that I am unable to rule out Q. Moreover, this may be so despite my knowing that P 
entails Q. This is not, however, a case of closure failure, since it merely shows I do not know that 
Q is false, although I may know that P entails Q. What Dretske needs to provide is a case in 
which I know that P, I know that P entails Q, but still fail to know that Q.  
The problem with Dretske‟s argument for closure failure is precisely that my 
presuppositions (the presuppositions I make as an agent) are not found among the known logical 
consequences of the statement I am said to know.
74
 My knowing from a first-person perspective 
that the wall is red does not entail my knowing from a first-person perspective that the wall is not 
white cleverly illuminated to look red. Let me be very clear. It is certainly true that P entails Q, 
no one disputes this; but it is false that my knowing that P entails my knowing that Q. 
Essentially, I can know that P entails Q, but I cannot know that P entails my knowing that Q 
using the closure principle. The closure principle is silent about my presuppositions, because they 
are not among the logical consequences of the statement. Accordingly, my presuppositions fall 
outside of the scope of epistemic operators. Crucially, that does not mean that the closure 
principle does not hold, for the closure principle concerns the logical consequences of 
statements.
75
 Dretske does not separate the logical consequences or entailments of the statement 
from the presuppositions that the agent makes about the statement. He rather conflates the two, 
which is why Williams‟s criticism is so powerful. All of the cases Dretske adduces for closure 
failure rest on this type of confusion. 
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I want to focus on issues of epistemological externalism and internalism and their bearing 
on Dretske‟s conflation, since these issues will figure prominently in my diagnosis of the error 
which will dissolve, in a non-contextualist manner, Cohen‟s so-called sceptical “paradox.” A 
number of prominent critics, including Williams (1991) and Pritchard (2005), have focused on 
Dretske‟s commitment to “epistemological externalism,” and how, after he makes this 
commitment, Dretske‟s argument for closure failure becomes poorly motivated. Yet before I 
define some terminology, I feel I must issue a brief warning.  
Although both Williams (1991) and Pritchard (2005) criticize Dretske for breaking 
“externalist commitments,” their criticisms are anachronistic. Dretske wrote “Epistemic 
Operators” in 1970, but the term “externalism” about knowledge was not coined until three years 
later by David Armstrong in 1973. Moreover, almost a decade after Dretske (1970), discussions 
of externalist justification began with Alvin Goldman‟s (1979) work and Laurence BonJour‟s 
(1980) subsequent criticism of that work. There is always a danger of one‟s misconstruing or 
“reading into” another‟s theory when that theorist could not have had the privilege of hindsight 
and the debates have advanced since the construction of the theory. Despite these criticisms 
being anachronistic, they are too important for this danger to stop their expression.  
Externalist accounts of knowledge claim that knowledge is a state in which there is a law-
like relationship or connection which holds between the subject‟s belief and truth – often 
understood as a non-accidental, nomological connection between belief and the way that the 
world is.
76
 In the words of David Armstrong (1973) who first stated this account of knowledge:  
According to “Externalist” accounts of non-inferential knowledge, what makes a true 
non-inferential belief a case of knowledge is some natural relation which holds between 
the belief-state, Bap [an agent a believes that p], and the situation which makes the belief 
true. It is a matter of a certain relation holding between the believer and the world. It is 
important to notice that, unlike “Cartesian” and “Initial Credibility” theories, Externalist 
theories are regularly developed as theories of the nature of knowledge generally and not 
simply as theories of non-inferential knowledge.
77
 
As Armstrong‟s statement indicates, externalism is largely a reaction against “Cartesian” theories 
or traditional accounts of epistemic justification, which limit knowledge and epistemological 
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analysis to the first-person perspective of the believer.
78
 The project most closely associated with 
internalism, which often starts from the first-person perspective, is called foundationalism, which 
states that there are basic, non-inferentially non-doxastically justified beliefs upon which the 
edifice of knowledge rests.
79
 There has always been a close relationship between internalism and 
foundationalism, with some critics, such as Williams (1991), even contending that 
“...foundationalism and internalism are two names for the same thing.”80 Epistemological 
Internalism states that the subject‟s reasons which turn a true belief into knowledge must all be 
cognitively or reflectively accessible to (that is to say, internal to) that subject.
81
 Internalists often 
hold that knowledge is gained through “a priori reasoning, introspective awareness, or through a 
memory of the knowledge that has been gained by either of these ways.”82 Importantly, 
internalists deny that any of the factors that convert belief into knowledge – besides truth – 
remain external to the subject‟s cognitive awareness or grasp. Externalism denies internalism by 
stating that whether the subject has knowledge can depend on whether that subject‟s belief in 
fact stands in relation to the truth, especially as that belief stands in relation to what the world is 
like. According to externalists, whatever turns the subject‟s true belief into knowledge can 
remain external to that subject‟s cognitive awareness, and thereby externalists deny that there is 
any special accessibility (or distinctively internalist) requirement for knowledge.
83
  
 The reason why issues of externalism and internalism about knowledge are pertinent to 
this discussion of Dretske (1970) is that Dretske explicitly makes externalist commitments to 
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knowledge, but compromises these commitments by making an internalist assumption when he 
denies that subjects can know the falsity of sceptical alternatives. Dretske makes a commitment 
to externalism by holding that environmental conditions often are normal and that subjects do not 
normally have to know what the environmental conditions are like to have knowledge. As 
Williams (1991) claims, “We can see right away that Dretske‟s treatment of his examples 
commits him to externalism. Which alternatives I need to rule out to know that the animals are 
zebras depends on the facts of the situation... not on what I know.”84 Dretske holds that subjects, 
however, do not know the falsity of sceptical alternatives, a verdict which comes from the 
limited penetrability of epistemic operators, the special evidence that that subject lacks, but 
especially from considering the subject‟s presuppositions and what that subject can and cannot 
know from within the first-person perspective. As an externalist, Dretske should not, however, 
claim that a subject needs to know, from a first-person perspective, what the environmental 
conditions are like to know that sceptical alternatives do not obtain.
85
 At best, as an externalist, 
Dretske is only entitled to claim that subjects do not know that they know that sceptical 
alternatives do not obtain. But this claim has an extremely odd ring to it, for externalists simply 
deny the claim that subjects need to know that they know in order to have knowledge. This claim 
may, however, ring true for the internalist.   
Both Williams (1991) and Pritchard (2005) contend that only internalists directly 
confront the problem of scepticism, since internalists claim that subjects must have cognitively 
accessible reasons to have knowledge, even when that knowledge is supposedly of the falsity of 
sceptical hypotheses. Internalists sometimes claim, more generally, that subjects must have 
reasons about whether the environmental conditions are normal or to trust the reliability of their 
perceptual abilities in order to have knowledge.
86
 That is to say, for the internalist, my knowing 
that the animal is a zebra will sometimes require my knowing that the environmental conditions 
are conducive to my knowing this, and sometimes I must, therefore, rule out the possibility that I 
am looking at a cleverly disguised mule to know that I am looking at a zebra. Since the 
internalist is committed to the view that all of the subject‟s reasons must gain their justification 
from within a first-person perspective, which means that they must be reasons of which the 
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subject is cognitively aware, the sceptic will raise precisely those error-possibilities which would 
be, to use Pritchard‟s (2005) apt term, “subjectively indistinguishable” to that subject, if the 
error-possibility were to obtain.
87
 As Jonathan Vogel (1990, 1999) argues, however, an 
internalist can hold that the subject indeed knows that the animal is a zebra and not a cleverly 
disguised mule by knowing that public zoos exhibit genuine specimens, by having ample 
statistical evidence against the possibility of fraud or hoax.
88
 In this particular example, I happen 
to agree with Vogel that this statistical evidence and certain well-known facts about public zoos 
could be the subject‟s reasons which could count against the possibility of fraud or hoax. But any 
comfort here is short-lived for the internalist, because the sceptic is simply unrelenting. Using an 
arsenal of error-possibilities, including dreams, demons, illusions, and fakes, the sceptic will 
bombard the subject with these error-possibilities, a subject who is seemingly defenceless to 
sceptical assault, because of the extreme vulnerability of the first-person perspective. When the 
(radical, closure-based) sceptic is on the prowl, the rather tame error-possibility of a cleverly 
disguised mule quickly turns into the zoo visitors, as putative knowers, having to also rule out 
the wild and radical error-possibility that they are not being deceived by an omnipotent evil 
demon bent on deceiving anyone who claims knowledge. Radical scepticism remains a major 
problem for the internalist, precisely because of the susceptibility of the first-person 
perspective.
89
 Yet radical scepticism would not be a problem for Dretske, if he were to 
steadfastly adhere to his externalist commitments.  
In summary, Dretske‟s most serious mistake is that he conflates the agent‟s 
presuppositions with the logical consequences of a statement. My presuppositions are not 
operated on by epistemic operators. This is precisely because, in making a statement, my 
presuppositions fall outside of the scope of epistemic operators and thereby, contra Dretske, are 
not logical consequences of statements. Dretske‟s argument for closure failure gives the 
appearance of closure failure, but this is merely an appearance – my knowing that P entails Q 
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does not mean that my knowing that P entails my knowing that Q. Therefore, Dretske‟s examples 
of the non-penetrability of the agent‟s presuppositions cannot be counterexamples to the closure 
principle. In addition to this conclusion, I am suggesting that Dretske‟s (1970, 2005) complaint 
about bootstrapping in epistemology reflects his dissatisfaction with what are really internalist 
“solutions” to scepticism, in the sense that Dretske vehemently denies that the subject can know, 
from a first-person, internalist perspective, the falsity of sceptical alternatives. Dretske‟s (2005) 
latest purported examples of closure failure tend to support my suggestion as well.
90
 Dretske‟s 
dissatisfaction is common among critics of internalism who share his anti-bootstrapping 
“intuition,” and who also claim that radical scepticism is indeed a real problem for the internalist. 
This further suggests that only internalists who accept the closure principle inherit the problem of 
radical scepticism.
91
 But critics of Dretske (1970), such as Williams (1991) and Pritchard (2005), 
stress that Dretske‟s externalist commitments are compromised by his insistence both that 
subjects do not know the denials of sceptical alternatives and that the closure principle does not 
hold. The externalist should not demand, however, that the subject needs to know, from a first-
person perspective, that sceptical alternatives do not obtain. Minimally, the externalist should 
claim that so long as a relation between the subject‟s belief and the world holds, then that subject 
has knowledge, even in the face of sceptical threat. Radical scepticism is not a problem for the 
externalist, or at least there is no obvious reason to think so. I fear, however, that Dretske (2005) 
continues to labour under mistaken assumptions about speaker presuppositions, about the scope 
of epistemic operators, and especially about issues pertaining to internalism and externalism. 
Without realizing these mistaken assumptions, Dretske continues to try to argue for closure 
failure. Ultimately, Dretske‟s argument for closure failure will be to no effect.   
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1.5 Stine’s Contextualism and Criticisms of Dretske          
Stine tries to improve upon Dretske‟s relevant alternative theory by contextualizing it in order to 
avoid an “equivocation” that Dretske (1970) commits in his argument for closure failure. After 
making this emendation, Stine claims that her contextualist version of the relevant alternatives 
theory finds a suitable corrective to scepticism.
92
 She also makes some extremely intriguing 
criticisms of Dretske that suggest her own externalist leanings.
93
 In the end, however, it is 
difficult to square Stine‟s externalist leanings with her supposed corrective to scepticism.  
According to Stine, a glaring problem with Dretske‟s argument for closure failure is that 
he commits “...some logical sin akin to equivocation.”94 To see this, consider again that on 
Dretske‟s relevant alternatives theory, I can know that the animal in the pen is a zebra, I can 
know that if the animal in the pen is a zebra then this entails that the animal is not a cleverly 
disguised mule, and yet I can fail to know that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule, 
because this is a sceptical alternative to which epistemic operators do not penetrate. But, as Stine 
keenly notes, the term “know” is equivocal in this argument, because the set of alternatives for 
the antecedent is different from that of the set for the consequent. For Dretske, in order to know 
the consequent “the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule,” the subject would need to rule out 
the sceptical alternative that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule. This particular 
alternative remains irrelevant, however, to whether the subject knows the antecedent “the animal 
is a zebra,” and which is thereby not a part of the set of relevant alternatives associated with the 
antecedent. This exposes Dretske‟s “equivocation.”   
To “absolve” Dretske of his “equivocation,” Stine claims that “...to be justified in 
claiming to know p (or simply to know p) it is sufficient to be able to rule out alternatives 
relevant to that context.”95 On this point, Stine crucially contends that there are different criteria 
appropriate to a given context, which Dretske fails to keep separate or even recognize. In 
identifying these different criteria, Stine claims:  
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It is an essential characteristic of our concept of knowledge that tighter criteria are 
appropriate in different contexts. It is one thing in a street encounter, another in a 
classroom, another in a law court – and who is to say it cannot be another in a 
philosophical discussion?
96
   
As I understand Stine, when John, a visitor to the public zoo, for instance, claims to know that he 
is looking at a zebra, then he only needs to rule out the other animals at the zoo which look like 
zebras, such as gazelles or antelopes. Yet, when Sherlock, an animal inspector who inspects 
animals at a private zoo, say, claims to know that the animal is a zebra, he may have to rule out 
not only the alternatives that John needs to rule out, but also the alternative that the animal is not 
a mule cleverly disguised to look like a zebra. The criteria appropriate to John‟s context are 
loose, whereas the criteria appropriate to Sherlock‟s context are much tighter. In Stine‟s view, 
the relevance of alternatives is largely determined by context. But notice Stine‟s provocative 
question at the end of the above quotation. Philosophical discussions are sometimes about radical 
scepticism. Although she finds the sceptic‟s criteria to be “perverse,” nevertheless, because the 
concept of knowledge is so elastic as to allow for differences of criteria relative to different 
contexts, Stine maintains that “...we cannot legitimately go so far as to say that their [sceptical 
philosophers‟] perversity has stretched the concept of knowledge out of all recognition – in fact 
they have played on an essential feature of the concept.”97 That essential feature of the concept 
of knowledge is contextualism, with its tighter criteria appropriate to different contexts. 
Consequently, even radical sceptical alternatives are sometimes relevant alternatives, at least 
according to the rarely legitimate criteria of philosophical discussions about radical scepticism.   
 Stine‟s remarks about the essential characteristic of our concept of knowledge, with 
different criteria for different contexts of use, however, too strongly suggest that the application 
of “knowledge” depends simply on different social uses. If Stine indeed holds this view that she 
is strongly suggesting, then she has things backwards. The concept of knowledge 
straightforwardly conceptually constrains these different social uses, and even excludes some of 
them that misapply the concept. To my mind, this makes it an open question whether the concept 
of knowledge should be applied to philosophical discussions of radical scepticism.  
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An instance of a type of social use to which the concept knowledge is misapplied, 
because it uses criteria that conceptually fall short of those compatible with the concept of 
“knowledge,” would be the criteria used in, say, trivia game shows. On such shows, when a 
contestant is said to “know” the answer to a trivia question, this is simply a matter of that 
contestant giving the right answer or supplying correct information. But sometimes contestants 
make guesses, and sometimes these guesses turn out to be lucky. According to the criteria for 
“knowing” in this particular social use, the contestant still “knows” the answer, despite making 
what was really a lucky guess. Evidence of this is that the contestant continues to enjoy the prize 
money. The concept of knowledge, however, is incompatible with a lucky guess, which is a kind 
of happy or fortunate accident. This is an example, then, in which the concept of knowledge 
should conceptually constrain the social use, and not the other way around: the concept of 
knowledge should not stretch out to accommodate the social use. From an epistemic view, we 
cannot consider the contestant making a lucky guess to have knowledge, because lucky guesses 
do not count as knowledge on any standard analysis of the concept of knowledge. 
I find it strange that Stine labels the criteria of sceptical contexts “extreme” and 
“perverse,” but yet finds the criteria appropriate to these contexts compatible with our concept of 
knowledge. The criteria of philosophical discussions of radical scepticism require subjects to 
achieve knowledge as certainty by having indubitable and infallible true beliefs. Stine may be 
right that our concept of knowledge is not stretched totally out of recognition by including some 
social uses with these extremely tight criteria, but if there are social uses in which the criteria are 
too loose to fall within the conceptual compass of knowledge, as in the example of trivia game 
shows, then I see no obvious reason to make concessions to the sceptic on the sole basis of 
observing that there are some philosophical discussions with extremely tight criteria. It may 
happen that these criteria for philosophical discussions of scepticism rest on a conceptual 
confusion similar to the too loose criteria of the trivia game shows, which may be the very reason 
why such criteria for philosophical discussions of radical scepticism are described as “extreme” 
and “perverse.” Stine needs to provide an argument, rather than simply making observations of 
different social uses and their applications of the word “knowledge,” to make a persuasive case 
for the inclusion of sceptical contexts and the appropriateness of these applications. It is not 
obvious to me that the sceptic is playing on our concept of knowledge, with the difference being 
merely one of degree in terms of tighter criteria or thresholds of justification; or whether the 
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sceptic has in mind distinct conceptual requirements, such as psychological certainty (in which 
any doubt by the subject counts against knowledge), which go beyond our concept of knowledge.             
 To be clearer about Stine‟s contextualism, the kind of contextualism that she has in mind 
is ascriber contextualism, since it concerns how the tightness of the criteria is determined by the 
error-possibilities raised in the conversational context of the speaker ascribing “knowledge,” and 
how these error-possibilities affect the very meaning of the “knowledge”-claim – although, as we 
have seen, DeRose (1992) finds Stine somewhat unclear on the matter, because she does not 
declare which of Goldman‟s two views of relevance she takes.98 Stine holds that the literal 
meaning of John‟s claim that “I know that the animal is a zebra” means one thing in a 
conversation during his leisurely visit to the public zoo, but would mean another thing if John 
were to make the claim in a conversation about the identity of the animal with, say, Sherlock, the 
animal inspector, in which conversational context the alternative that the animal is a cleverly 
disguised mule is a relevant alternative.
99
 The tighter criteria peculiar to that context make this 
so. Stine claims that unless we hold the set of relevant alternatives relative to a conversational 
context, we will remain prone to committing an equivocation of the kind that Dretske makes.   
 Stine severely criticizes Dretske for his evidential requirements on knowledge; 
particularly, for his requirement that subjects need to make special precautionary checks to know 
that sceptical alternatives do not obtain. As we have seen, this eventually leads Dretske to reject 
the closure principle when he pairs this claim about special evidence with his claim about 
speaker presuppositions (while making an internalist assumption in the process). In response to 
Dretske‟s evidential demands, Stine charges that “Dretske is deluded by the fact that many 
knowledge claims require evidence on the part of the knower into thinking that all knowledge 
claims require evidence.”100 But Stine should be careful here, because, although Dretske holds 
that subjects need evidence to have knowledge, he distinguishes between two kinds of evidence, 
ordinary and special evidence. Unlike Dretske, however, Stine claims that subjects can indeed 
know that sceptical alternatives do not obtain without evidence. To justify this claim, Stine 
writes: “...if the negation of a proposition is not a relevant alternative, then I know it – obviously, 
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without needing to provide evidence....”101 For instance, if I know that the animal in the pen is a 
zebra, then, Stine is claiming, I know that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule, because 
this alternative is an irrelevant alternative or one that has already been ruled out, given that to 
know that the animal in the pen is a zebra in the first place requires that I have ruled out all of the 
relevant alternatives to that proposition. Consequently, in Stine‟s view, I can know that the 
animal is not a cleverly disguised mule without evidence and simply on the basis of this 
alternative being irrelevant. Yet this should not suggest that the subject is privy to the evaluation 
of knowledge and knows which alternatives are relevant and which are irrelevant. To demand so 
much would be overly demanding, because it would force the subject to have to know when that 
subject has ruled out all of the alternatives to the main proposition. Fortunately, Stine has another 
way of making her claim about how it is that subjects sometimes gain knowledge of the falsity of 
sceptical alternatives. 
 Intriguingly, Stine suggests that the reliability of the subject‟s belief depends in large part 
on being in the right circumstances, and that that subject in those circumstances can, accordingly, 
know that the animal is a zebra, without having any particular evidence against the cleverly 
disguised mule alternative. Stine even cites a famous passage by David Armstrong (1973) to 
make this point.
102
 Combining Stine‟s above suggestion with her view that Dretske distorts “the 
evidence picture of knowledge,” strongly indicates her externalist leanings.103 But Stine‟s 
contention that the subject can know that a sceptical alternative does not obtain, because of the 
irrelevance of the alternative, has been met with stiff resistance. Palle Yourgrau (1983), for 
instance, contends that there are some knowledge-claims that do not require evidence, but that 
these are usually knowledge-claims based on “self-presenting states,” such as being in pain.104 At 
best, Yourgrau claims that Stine is revealing the implausibility of sceptical alternatives. But 
Yourgrau holds that the implausibility of sceptical alternatives is insufficient to know the falsity 
of sceptical alternatives.
105
 So much is certainly true from an internalist point of view. Moreover, 
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Yourgrau is borrowing the term “self-presenting states” from Roderick Chisholm (1973a) who is 
an internalist about knowledge, who counts self-presenting states as a basis for knowledge on the 
ground that such states, by their very nature, remain evident and internal to the putative 
knower.
106
 Granted it is true that knowing the falsity of a sceptical alternative is considerably 
different from knowing because one is in a self-presenting state; but Yourgrau‟s criticism would 
not stick if Stine makes externalist commitments about knowledge.  
A deeper problem, however, is to square Stine‟s externalist leanings with her concession 
to the radical sceptic that sometimes the conversational context is such as to allow for radically 
tight criteria for “knowledge”-ascriptions – or “knowledge”-denials, as it may be. For an 
externalist there is no good reason to concede to the radical sceptic that subjects do not know the 
falsity of radical sceptical alternatives, since all that the sceptic shows is that the subject cannot 
know from within a first-person perspective that these alternatives do not obtain. From an 
externalist perspective, this has no tendency, however, to show that subjects are not in fact in 
circumstances favourable to gaining knowledge. Moreover, the closure principle holds in these 
circumstances, since the proposition I know – “know” in the externalist sense of knowledge – 
remains closed along with the set of entailments that this proposition generates; and although I 
may not know all of these entailments as such, I will at least be in a position to know them. 
There is no “equivocation” in making closure-based arguments, if this externalist conception of 
knowledge is maintained.  
I submit that the above incongruity between Stine‟s externalist leanings and her 
concession to the radical sceptic results from her peculiar understanding (or perhaps 
misunderstanding) of the concept of knowledge as being extremely elastic. Against Stine I have 
argued that it remains an open question, however, whether the radical sceptic is actually playing 
on our concept of knowledge or going beyond it. This is so given that Stine is justifying her 
inclusion of the radical sceptical context as a legitimate context on the basis of an observation 
that there is such a context and that the concept knowledge is elastic enough to encompass this 
context without stretching the concept of knowledge beyond recognition. But seeing that there 
are other social uses that indeed do stretch the concept of knowledge beyond recognition, but yet 
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are ones that we nevertheless observe as having too loose criteria for the application (or 
misapplication, as it were) of “knowledge,” should make us wary of judgments made about the 
compatibility of the radical sceptical context with our concept of knowledge. The bolder 
suggestion I am making, however, is to include Stine among those ascriber contextualists who do 
not realize that the application of ascriber contextualism, in order to preserve the closure 
principle in the face of radical sceptical hypotheses, is simply unnecessary, if, like some ascriber 
contextualists, Stine begins by making externalist commitments. 
In section 1.5 we have seen that Stine preserved the closure principle and diminished the 
threat of (radical) closure-based scepticism by endorsing ascriber contextualism. According to 
the contextualist, so long as the sceptic remains quarantined to the sceptical conversational 
context, then subjects can continue to enjoy knowledge of ordinary empirical propositions in 
other kinds of context. In the sceptical context, the sceptic can claim that we suffer gross 
ignorance; and in that context, the sceptic is correct, according to the ascriber contextualist. Yet, 
as I discussed in section 1.4 and will further discuss in section 1.7, there is no good reason for the 
ascriber contextualist to make such a concession to the sceptic, especially if the ascriber 
contextualist is an externalist. The acceptability of the proposition that subjects do not know the 
falsity of sceptical alternatives precisely depends on an epistemological commitment to 
internalism. I will examine this claim further in section 1.7. 
In the following section, 1.6, the issue of relevance comes up again. Cohen holds that 
there are two conditions of relevance, but which do not enable the theorist to generally specify 
when an alternative is relevant or irrelevant. This worries Cohen, since, like Stine, he seeks to 
both preserve the closure principle and remove the threat of closure-based scepticism. To do so, 
Cohen endorses ascriber contextualism, which he thinks relieves much of the worry of having to 
specify when an alternative is relevant or irrelevant, since this will depend on the kind of 
conversational context in effect at the time of the “knowledge”-ascription or “knowledge”-
denial. Yet it is important to point out that Cohen is not simply interested in removing the threat 
of scepticism; he also desires to explain it. On Cohen‟s view, reasons are probabilistic and 
ultimately fallibilistic in nature, which means there will always be a chance that our beliefs that 
are based on reasons will be false. In Cohen‟s view, the explanation of why scepticism seems 
threatening is that the sceptic underscores the probabilistic nature of reasons whenever that 
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sceptic raises sceptical alternatives or error-possibilities. Cohen claims that contextualism does 
justice to the apparent threat that sceptical alternatives pose. Cohen‟s desire to explain the 
apparent threat of scepticism will come up again when I examine the sceptical “paradox” in 
section 1.7. The so-called sceptical “paradox” is just up ahead. But before I examine it, I need to 
discuss the aspects of Cohen‟s account that led him to formulate it.      
1.6 How to be a Fallibilist 
Cohen (1988) takes up the onerous task of explicating the notion of relevance. Eventually he 
comes to the conclusion that in order to remove the threat of scepticism, the relevant alternatives 
theorist must endorse ascriber contextualism. With Goldman‟s (1976) first view of relevance in 
mind, Cohen claims that there are two kinds of conditions on relevance: external and internal 
conditions, both of which can be considered Cohen‟s way of making modifications and 
refinements to Goldman‟s first view of relevance.107 Cohen asserts that the external conditions 
partially determine relevance, with these conditions embodying the same kind of factors that 
DeRose (1992) would later call “subject factors,” because Cohen‟s external conditions take 
account of the particular environmental circumstances of the subject.
108
 Cohen contends, 
however, that many relevant alternatives theorists have overlooked the importance of internal 
conditions, which evaluate the strength of the epistemic subject‟s reasons or evidence for the 
proposition under consideration. On Cohen‟s view, the internal conditions also play a critical 
role in determining relevance. 
With internal and external conditions in mind, Cohen further interprets Goldman‟s first 
view of relevance as suggesting “something like a probability conditional,” in which “an 
alternative is relevant if S‟s evidence and certain features of the circumstances constitute a 
reason to believe h [h is an alternative to some ordinary empirical proposition q].”109 According 
to Cohen, the probabilistic criterion is best reflected in the external conditions in the following 
way: 
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An alternative (to q) h is relevant, if the probability of h conditional on reason r and 
certain features of the circumstances is sufficiently high (where the level of probability 
that is sufficient is determined by context).
110
   
 But Cohen is keenly aware of the fact that playing this probability game brings up what we 
might call the problem of cartography: Where are the boundaries to be drawn? To avoid this 
problem of vagueness, Cohen tries to clarify the notion of “relevance” using both internal and 
external conditions.
111
  
Cohen contends that many relevant alternatives theorists, unfortunately, have overlooked 
internal conditions: “Both Stine and Dretske overlook the fact that S‟s evidence against h plays a 
role in S coming to know q because they think this evidence is not sufficient for S to know not-
h.”112 In Cohen‟s formulation of the probabilistic criterion, the internal conditions are also 
affecting the probability of when an alternative becomes relevant by making that probability 
depend on the subject‟s evidence as well as certain features of that subject‟s circumstances. 
Doubtless, those “certain features” in his formulation of the probabilistic criterion, include 
whatever may be creating a knowledge-defeating environment for the subject, such as – 
depending on where the subject is and what that subject‟s evidence is – fake barns, cleverly 
disguised mules, or wine bottles containing merely water with red food-colouring in them.  
The set of internal conditions is thus encapsulated in the following internal criterion: “An 
alternative (to q) h is relevant, if S lacks sufficient evidence (reason) to deny h, i.e., to believe 
not-h.”113  The question of when evidence is sufficient to rule out an alternative is particularly 
difficult for Cohen to answer, however, since he espouses a fallibilistic view with respect to 
reasons, according to which “S may know q on the basis of r, even though there is a proposition 
h, compatible with r but incompatible with q.”114 Consequently, Cohen claims that reasons lack a 
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normative component and are really statistical and probabilistic in nature, which means that there 
will always remain a chance that one can be mistaken in what one believes on their basis.
115
  
An alternative view to fallibilism, which would make it very easy to specify when a 
reason is strong enough to convert a true belief into knowledge and when one has ruled out an 
alternative, would be to endorse the entailment principle, which states that “S knows q on the 
basis of reason r only if r entails q.”116 But given that reasons or evidence for contingent 
propositions do not have the property of being factive or entailing, means that endorsing the 
entailment principle is tantamount to the scepticism, since there will be virtually nothing that we 
can know on this basis.
117
 I see a close parallel between Cohen‟s thoughts on the nature of 
reasons and those of Roderick Chisholm‟s (1973b), a prominent epistemologist who also rejected 
the notion of entailing evidence. In Chisholm‟s view, “Any adequate theory of evidence must 
provide for the fact that a proposition e may make evident a proposition h for a subject S even 
though e does not entail h.”118 Cohen claims that “fallibilistic theories reject this entailment 
principle thereby avoiding this immediate skeptical result,”119 while Chisholm holds that “we 
reject the sceptical view according to which there is no reason to believe that the premises of an 
inductive argument even confer evidence upon the conclusion.”120 Cohen‟s position on the 
nature of reasons and evidence seems aligned with Chisholm‟s position, especially insofar as 
rejecting the entailment principle precludes an “immediate sceptical result,” and both positions 
state that evidence is, at bottom, statistical.
121
 
 But how can a fallibilist who is a RA theorist, such as Cohen, respond to scepticism, if 
neither the external conditions nor the internal conditions are sufficient to determine relevance? 
Cohen comes to the ultimately unsatisfactory, but temporary, conclusion that there is no general 
specification for either of these kinds of conditions, given that specifying the external conditions 
faces the problem of cartography and playing the probability game, and that the internal 
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conditions reveal that reasons are, at bottom, statistical and ultimately fallibilistic. Cohen makes 
his verdict in the following passage:  
The very same considerations apply to the internal criterion. So there will be no general 
specification of what constitutes sufficient evidence to deny an alternative in order for it 
not to be relevant, and as such, no general specification of what constitutes sufficient 
evidence to know q.
122
   
This conclusion is extremely worrisome to Cohen, because he claims that the goal of the relevant 
alternatives theory of knowledge is to “rescue fallibilism” from scepticism, the antagonist 
position which now seems to be virtually invincible, since the sceptic can always raise sceptical 
alternatives without us having powerful enough reasons to rule them out; namely, because, in 
Cohen‟s view, we simply have no way of specifying what a powerful enough reason would be.123 
It follows that there is no way to consider sceptical alternatives as irrelevant, because Cohen has 
not worked out a precise account of relevance. But Cohen cannot be blamed for this, since his 
discovery is that the central notion of relevance per se cannot be defined precisely.  
Like Stine (1976), who despite considering sceptical criteria “perverse,” nevertheless 
permitted them in certain philosophical discussions, Cohen thinks that his account of 
“knowledge” too leaves some room for sceptical entry. On Cohen‟s view, when the sceptic raises 
an error-possibility, that sceptic essentially underscores the statistical nature of reasons, which is 
not altogether inappropriate by the sceptic, considering the nature of reasons.
124
 On this 
important point, Cohen initially claims that there are no independent considerations – in the form 
of, say, reasons or evidence against the error-possibility – to deny or dismiss the threat of 
scepticism:  
The fact that the denial of the hypotheses is not supported by any independent 
considerations, underscores our ultimate fallibility. The skeptic calls our attention to the 
fact that S has no such independent consideration, thereby focusing our attention on the 
chance of error. This leads us to consider these alternatives relevant.
125
   
 To diminish the sceptical threat, Cohen makes a key theoretical move, claiming that a 
specification of what counts as a relevant alternative “...will depend on the context in which the 
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attribution of knowledge occurs.”126 The clearest, most positive, statement of Cohen‟s theory is 
the following:  
An essential aspect of the version of the theory of relevant alternatives I wish to defend is 
that the standards that govern relevance are context-sensitive. How probable an 
alternative must be in order to be relevant will depend on the context in which the 
knowledge attribution is made. To say simply that skeptical alternatives are not relevant 
is to fail to do justice to the apparent threat skeptical arguments pose to our knowledge 
claims.
127
  
 Accordingly, the sceptic‟s alternatives will count as relevant when the sceptic calls attention to 
the ultimate fallibility of reasons, which makes that alternative salient and shifts the quotidian 
context to the sceptical context. Essentially, Cohen holds that there are different standards of 
relevance for the quotidian context from those of the sceptical context. By putting the sceptic‟s 
closure-based argument in conversational context, Cohen removes the threat of scepticism and 
rescues fallibilism, thereby achieving his goal. Cohen also thinks that ascriber contextualism 
does justice to the apparent threat of sceptical arguments by revealing that these arguments 
underscore the fallibilistic nature of reasons. This exposition puts us in a position to now 
examine the so-called sceptical “paradox.”   
1.7 The Sceptical Paradox  
 The sceptical “paradox” is one of the most widely discussed topics in the literature.128 
According to contextualists, the supposed sense of “paradox” is pronounced when we consider 
the sceptic‟s argument for closure-based scepticism.129 Where “K” stands for “knows that,” “s” 
for an epistemic subject, “p” for an ordinary empirical proposition, and “q” for an entailment of 
that proposition in the form of the falsity of a sceptical alternative, the argument for closure-
based scepticism states:  
 [Ksp & Ks (p → q)] → Ksq 
~Ksq 
~Ksp 
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In words, and making the right qualifications on the closure principle, the above argument states 
that if S knows that p and S knows that p entails q – or competently deduces q from p – then S 
knows that q or is in a position to know that q; S does not know that q; therefore, S does not 
know that p. This argument closely resembles the logically valid pattern of modus tollens. Many 
would accept this argument as valid, but few would consider it sound without qualification, 
because, given that “p” can stand for any contingent proposition, this argument can be 
generalized to result in a massive sceptical victory. That is to say, if this argument is sound, then 
this means that the argument is valid and its premises are true, which would deductively 
necessitate the conclusion that S does not know a given contingent proposition, which is 
tantamount to S not knowing any contingent propositions. This conclusion has very serious 
implications for the (now apparently dimming) prospects of knowledge. After laying out this 
argument, then, the sense of “paradox” becomes most pronounced for ascriber contextualists 
when we see that they claim that the premises of the argument are acceptable and that the 
argument is valid. Most contextualists seek to preserve the closure principle and rather freely 
accept this argument‟s second premise, which states that we do not know that sceptical 
alternatives do not obtain. Given that the premises of the argument for closure-based scepticism 
are acceptable – according to contextualists – makes it extremely difficult for anyone to answer 
the sceptic. Cohen (1988, 1991, 1999, 2005, 2008) and DeRose (1995) claim that our extreme 
sense of difficulty in figuring out what is wrong with the sceptic‟s argument for closure-based 
scepticism, and having our “intuitions” come into conflict when we are facing this argument, 
reveals that we are dealing with a “paradox.” 
Cohen (1988) defines a “paradox” as: “a set of inconsistent propositions all of which have 
considerable independent plausibility.”130 Cohen (1991) nicely lays out the set of individually 
plausible propositions, or conflicting “intuitions” that issue in the “paradox,” as follows:  
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(1) We know that some ordinary empirical propositions are true. 
(2) We do not know that skeptical alternatives are false.  
(3) If s knows q, and s knows that q entails not-h, then s knows not-h [in which “s” is an 
epistemic agent, “q” is an ordinary empirical proposition, and “h” is a sceptical 
alternative].
131
 
Before I canvass the different non-contextualist anti-sceptical theories which attempt to explain 
away the “paradox,” note that Cohen (1988) claims the following as a desideratum for any 
resolution: “…a satisfying resolution requires an explanation of why the paradox arises–an 
explanation of why we have the intuitions that saddle us with the paradox.”132 Moreover, if these 
propositions indeed express “intuitions,” then a satisfying resolution of the “paradox” will need 
to keep all of them intact; otherwise, a resolution that gives up one of these propositions will be 
too costly and simply counterintuitive.  
To begin with, no one but the sceptic denies proposition (1). So rejecting proposition (1) 
is out of the question, if we mean to respond to the sceptic. Moore and the Neo-Mooreans, which 
include Ernest Sosa (1999) and Duncan Pritchard (2004), deny proposition (2).
133
 Yet Cohen 
(1988) and DeRose (1995) argue that Moore and the Neo-Mooreans fail to explain how the 
“paradox” arises in the first place and how our “intuitions” saddle us with the “paradox.” They 
do not, then, meet Cohen‟s desideratum for a satisfying resolution. Furthermore, if proposition 
(2) indeed expresses an “intuition,” then its rejection, for that very reason, would make such an 
attempt at a “resolution” counterintuitive. Dretske rejects proposition (3). But contextualists 
argue that his rejection of closure suffers from a host of problems: it rests on an “equivocation” 
(Stine 1976) or leads to “abominable conjunctions” (DeRose 1995) or is simply counterintuitive 
(Cohen 1988, 1999). Most contextualists, along with many non-contextualists, find the closure 
principle to be thoroughly plausible. Many philosophers find it plausible that knowledge can be 
extended through deduction.
134
 The closure principle is an expression of this idea. So a rejection 
of the closure principle may be viewed as implausible for denying that knowledge can be 
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extended through deduction. But the best reason to resist Dretske‟s rejection of the closure 
principle is to realize that he mistakenly conflates the agent‟s presuppositions with the logical 
consequences of a statement. The most effective strategy of countering Dretske, then, is to point 
out his serious mistake in rejecting the closure principle by using his own terms to do so, as I 
have done. Even if contextualists do not realize this as the most effective strategy of countering 
Dretske, they nevertheless maintain that it is extremely doubtful that Dretske‟s rejection of 
proposition (3) can be the way to escape the “paradox.” A possible last non-contextualist option 
is to claim, as Stephen Schiffer (1996) does, that the concept of knowledge is, on examination, 
“implicitly incoherent.”135 The “implicit incoherence” of the concept of knowledge, which 
cannot be seen on the surface, may meet Cohen‟s desideratum for a satisfying resolution to the 
sceptical “paradox.” But for many Schiffer‟s claim that the concept of knowledge is incoherent is 
just as unsatisfying as scepticism is. Moreover, Schiffer‟s claim for the “implicit incoherence” of 
knowledge comes from him finding the sceptical “paradox” to be a genuine paradox.136 So, 
Schiffer‟s claim cannot resolve the sceptical “paradox.”            
 The contextualist resolution to the sceptical “paradox” is to claim that all of the 
propositions and supposed “intuitions” can be expressed at the same time within different kinds 
of conversational context, but never within the same kind of conversational context.
137
 
Contextualists argue that the standards which determine the truth of “knowledge”-ascriptions in 
the quotidian context are sufficiently different from those standards which determine the truth of 
“knowledge”-denials in the sceptical context. These standards make the “knowledge”-ascriptions 
made in the quotidian context mean something different from any “knowledge”-ascriptions made 
in the sceptical context (if they were repeated and made in this kind of conversational context).
138
 
According to contextualists, the key to unlocking the sceptical “paradox” is to see that the 
“knowledge”-ascription does not contradict the “knowledge”-denial when these are issued in 
different kinds of context.
139
 Accordingly, the following argument which closely resembles 
modus ponens is sound in the quotidian context. Where “K” stands for “knows that,” “s” for an 
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epistemic subject, “p” for an ordinary empirical proposition, and “q” for an entailment in the 
form of the falsity of a sceptical alternative, the argument for closure-based knowledge states: 
[Ksp & Ks (p → q)] → Ksq 
Ksp 
Ksq
140
 
In this argument, which is the opposite of the sceptic‟s argument for closure-based scepticism, 
this argument‟s conclusion, which it comes to on the basis of S knowing a given contingent 
proposition, such as that the animal is a zebra, states that S can know that a sceptical alternative, 
such as that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule, does not obtain. This argument, then, 
expresses “intuitions” (1) and (3), while it suppresses the “intuition” (2) that we do not know that 
sceptical alternatives are false. In contrast, in the sceptical context, the contextualist claims that 
the argument for closure-based scepticism is sound. Consequently, in the sceptical context, that 
argument expresses “intuitions” (2) and (3), while it suppresses “intuition” (1) that we know that 
some ordinary empirical propositions are true. According to contextualists, the closure principle 
(3) holds relative to the context in which the argument employing it is made. Everything 
depends, then, on which kind of conversational context the ascriber or denier is in at the time of 
making the “knowledge”-ascription or “knowledge”-denial. The contextualist resolution to the 
sceptical “paradox” apparently manages to keep all of the “intuitions” intact, although these 
“intuitions” are not all expressed within the same kind of context. 
But how does this contextualist resolution meet Cohen‟s desideratum, which states that a 
satisfying resolution must not only keep all of the “intuitions” intact but must also explain how 
the sceptical “paradox” arises in the first place? Cohen‟s (1988) explanation is that, 
“...attributions of knowledge are context-sensitive” and “the apparent closure failures are 
illusions that result from inattention to contextual shifts.”141 In his explanation, Cohen is 
contending that the sceptic exploits the fallibilistic nature of knowledge generally by raising 
error-possibilities which the subject cannot rule out, and that these error-possibilities tend to raise 
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the context-sensitive standards of “knowledge” by affecting attributor factors so that the kind of 
conversational context shifts and changes. Given that the meaning of “knowledge”-claims vary 
according to the conversational context from which they are issued and that speakers can 
sometimes be inattentive to shifts in contextual standards, contextualists are theoretically 
committed to the hypothesis that speakers are sometimes blind to the semantics of “knowledge”-
ascriptions or “knowledge”-denials.142 Contextualists often talk about this blindness being 
caused by the indexicality of the word “knowledge.”143 To understand Cohen‟s explanation of 
how the sceptical “paradox” arises, recall that the contextualist resolution states that the closure 
principle holds relative to the kind of conversational context that the speaker is in at the time of 
the ascription or denial. So, for instance, if the ascriber‟s context shifts from the quotidian 
context to the sceptical context without that ascriber noticing, then the ascriber‟s claims to both 
know a contingent proposition and the falsity of a sceptical alternative (as an entailment of that 
contingent proposition) will not go through, because these two claims, as a premise and 
conclusion of the above argument for closure-based knowledge, are false in the sceptical context. 
Consequently, this appearance of closure failure comes from being inattentive to contextual 
shifts. Which conversational mechanisms cause shifts in the context and affect the standards of 
“knowledge,” however, is a matter of debate among contextualists, with changes in relevance 
(Cohen 1988), the salience of error-possibilities (Lewis 1979; Cohen 1999) or the rule of 
sensitivity (DeRose 1995), all being candidates for the mechanisms which cause shifts in the 
context or affect the standards of “knowledge.” Nevertheless, failing to track changes in the 
conversational context generally explains how ascribers or sceptics get caught in the “paradox.”  
 Despite seemingly being able to accommodate propositions (1) and (3) with some ease, 
proposition (2), we do not know that sceptical alternatives are false, of the sceptical “paradox,” 
causes tremendous difficulty for ascriber contextualists to accommodate. The main reason for 
this difficulty is that contextualists do not realize that proposition (2) is plausible and acceptable 
only if there are internalist demands on knowledge, such as that the subject must be cognitively 
aware of the reasons or evidence that justify that subject‟s belief from a first-person perspective. 
It should be of no surprise, then, that ascribers will be unwilling to ascribe “knowledge” of the 
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falsity of sceptical alternatives to subjects if these ascribers also do not distinguish between 
internalist and externalist demands on knowledge, and often assume that, in facing sceptical 
challenges, the demands to meet such challenges are distinctively internalist.  
I asserted earlier, in the above discussion about Dretske breaking his externalist 
commitments, that the problem of radical scepticism is only a problem for the internalist, 
because the problem is posed in internalist terms. For Cohen (1988, 1999) the problem of radical 
scepticism becomes deep enough as to threaten to make his versions of contextualism 
theoretically incoherent. The reason why this is so is that Cohen‟s (1988) contextualist version of 
the relevant alternatives theory of knowledge is committed to internalism insofar as there 
remains a requirement for the subject to meet internal conditions on relevance in order for 
ascriptions of “knowledge” to be properly applied. In his recent version of contextualism, 
however, Cohen (1999) drops any talk of relevance in favour of talk in terms of strength of 
evidence, which is staunchly internalist in outlook: “My internalist account construes the 
strength of one‟s epistemic position as to a large part determined by the strength of one‟s reasons 
or evidence.”144 The deep problem and threat is that Cohen‟s contextualism commits him to the 
view that subjects can indeed know the falsity of radical sceptical alternatives when the ascriber 
ascribes “knowledge” to that subject in the quotidian context. But what kind of reasons or 
evidence, internalistically construed, can a subject have against sceptical alternatives, especially 
radical sceptical ones, such as the possibility of being deceived by an all-powerful evil demon? 
This is a tremendously difficult question for Cohen to answer because of his internalism. Yet his 
contextualism theoretically commits him to the view that such reasons or evidence can be given 
against radical sceptical alternatives by subjects in at least the quotidian context, since the 
closure principle is said to hold relative to quotidian context and some of the entailments within 
that closed set will be ones that prove the falsity of radical sceptical alternatives.  
 In my discussion of Dretske, I accepted Vogel‟s (1990; 1999) claim that internalists can 
supply some evidence and reasons against the cleverly disguised mule alternative, such as – 
using the following as a reason or piece of evidence – the well-known fact that public zoos do 
not orchestrate such elaborate pranks. I immediately pointed out, however, that the same kind of 
reasons – for instance, the statistical improbability of this event – cannot be given to know the 
                                                          
144
 Cohen 1999, 70.  
49 
 
falsity of radical sceptical alternatives, because the radical sceptic uses an arsenal of radical 
sceptical error-possibilities which cannot be ruled out from within the first-person perspective, so 
that any comfort for the internalist is at best short-lived. The difference between the sceptical 
alternative that the animal may be a cleverly disguised mule and the sceptical alternative that one 
may be being tricked by an all-powerful evil demon at this very instant is primarily a difference 
in scope.
145
 The relevant distinction is to view the first sceptical alternative of the cleverly 
disguised mule as being local and moderate, since there can be some evidence or reasons of a 
certain kind that can be supplied to count against that local sceptical alternative, whereas the 
second alternative of the all-powerful evil demon is global and radical, since there supposedly 
cannot be any evidence – internalistically construed – against that radical sceptical alternative.146  
Cohen‟s (1988, 1999) contextualism easily manages to deal with local sceptical 
alternatives, since he holds that subjects can have enough statistical evidence against the 
possibility of zookeepers playing pranks to rule out this possibility in the quotidian context.
147
 
But Cohen admits that radical sceptical alternatives cannot be dealt with in this same manner, 
since these alternatives hang at a level of possibility far removed from local sceptical 
alternatives, in which no evidence counts against them.
148
 On Cohen‟s view, the scant evidence 
that subjects have against local sceptical alternatives is indeed sufficient to allow ascribers to 
properly ascribe “knowledge” to subjects in the quotidian context, in which lax “knowledge” 
standards are in effect. But this same kind of treatment cannot be given to radical sceptical 
alternatives for the very reason that there is no evidence against them. There can be no 
evaluation of the subject‟s strength of evidence in relation to the quotidian context, since there is 
simply no evidence to evaluate. Thus, contextualism seems to fail Cohen‟s internalist 
commitments. But Cohen does not despair. He contends that “intrinsically rational” beliefs can 
be internally justified in the quotidian context when radical sceptical alternatives are under 
consideration.  
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 In the absence of evidence or reasons against radical sceptical alternatives, Cohen (1988) 
appeals to beliefs having the property of being “intrinsically rational” as the saving grace for his 
internalist contextualism. By beliefs being “intrinsically rational,” Cohen claims:  
I am referring to a way in which it can be rational (or reasonable) to believe a proposition 
without possessing evidence for the belief. We can call beliefs of this sort intrinsically 
rational. While we may concede to the skeptic that we lack evidence against radical 
skeptical hypotheses, I do not think we should be willing to concede that it is not rational 
to deny these hypotheses (believe they are false). If so we can view the denials of these 
hypotheses as intrinsically rational.
149
  
Doubtless, we make certain presumptions against the radical sceptic, which speak to the 
irrationality of radical scepticism. In Cohen‟s view, to say the opposite would be irrational: “We 
think it would be crazy to believe radical skeptical hypotheses. This suggests that we think it is 
rational to deny such hypotheses.”150 Yet it is important to put Cohen‟s contention in the broader 
perspective of his theoretical commitments. He is contending that subjects can indeed know the 
falsity of radical sceptical alternatives in the quotidian context, provided that these subjects 
believe that these alternatives are false because it is “intrinsically rational” to believe them not to 
obtain. I do not question that supposedly “intrinsically rational” beliefs may be internally 
justified, although it may be difficult to evaluate that justificatory property, since it likely 
remains at the less-than-explicit level of presumption. I would imagine that Cohen‟s anti-
sceptical strategy, however, would only infuriate other internalists who have sought to answer 
the sceptic more directly and without making presumptions against the sceptic. Cohen is keenly 
aware that his answer is likely to be seen as question-begging against the sceptic.
151
 But Cohen 
counters by accusing the sceptic of begging the question against putative knowers. On this score, 
he concludes that at best there is a trade off on the issue of question-begging.  
Cohen realizes that many will remain dissatisfied with his response to the sceptic. But he 
reminds us of the greater goal of his project: “To resolve the paradox is not to demonstrate to the 
skeptic that we know. Rather it is to demonstrate to ourselves that we can claim to know without 
paradox.”152 Looking at his project at large, however, what is precisely the problem with 
Cohen‟s internalist “resolution” is that it appears to be completely ad hoc, for he refuses to admit 
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that subjects can know the falsity of radical sceptical alternatives by using “intrinsically rational” 
beliefs to gain knowledge in any other context but the quotidian context. Moreover, it is only 
when radical sceptical alternatives are under examination that Cohen permits “intrinsically 
rational” beliefs as counting against these alternatives. “Intrinsically rational” beliefs cannot be 
used to know the falsity of local or moderate sceptical alternatives in the quotidian context; 
rather, reasons or evidence, internalistically construed, are required to know the falsity of these 
alternatives. Thus, “intrinsic rationality” is not an accredited way of knowing, even by Cohen‟s 
own lights. To my mind, this makes a glaring exception of “intrinsic rationality,” which merely 
serves Cohen‟s internalist commitments and saves his contextualism from turning incoherent in 
the face of radical sceptical alternatives. His internalist contextualist “solution,” which relies on 
“intrinsically rational” beliefs, is ad hoc and simply theory-preserving.153       
 Proposition (2) of the sceptical “paradox” is acceptable only if it is construed in a 
distinctively internalist manner. A number of critics, including Williams (1991) and Pritchard 
(2005), argue that radical scepticism is only a problem for internalism.
154
 Contextualists, many of 
whom are externalists, including DeRose (1995) and Lewis (1996), make similar mistakes to 
those of Dretske (1970), especially by compromising their externalist commitments in thinking 
that radical sceptical alternatives pose a problem. Pritchard (2005) is abundantly clear on the 
matter: “Primarily, however, the problem is that it is impossible to be internalistically justified in 
believing the denials of sceptical hypotheses.”155 Pritchard (2005) concludes: 
Since externalist theories do not regard internalist justification as being a necessary 
ingredient of knowledge, it follows that our in principle lack of internalist justification for 
our beliefs in the denials of sceptical hypotheses will not immediately translate into a lack 
of knowledge of these propositions... On the face of it, then, externalist theories of 
knowledge can resist the closure-based sceptical challenge.
156
  
I agree with Pritchard‟s finding. Unless internalist justification is demanded for our beliefs, then 
there is no good reason to conclude that we do not know that radical sceptical alternatives are 
false. Accordingly, proposition (2) of the sceptical “paradox” is unacceptable, or is acceptable 
only if it is restricted to internalism about knowledge; at the very least, proposition (2) does not 
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express an “intuition” that we all share. This dissolves the sceptical “paradox.” That the sceptical 
“paradox” continues to riddle internalists is no surprise, especially if Pritchard is right that it is 
impossible to be internalistically justified in believing the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses. 
It continues to riddle ascriber contextualists too, such as Cohen (1988; 1999), because of his 
internalist commitments. But it riddles even those contextualists who are externalists because 
they labour under the mistaken internalist assumption that radical sceptical alternatives threaten 
knowledge and must be ruled out from within a first-person perspective.
157
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CHAPTER 2 
CONTEXT-SENSITIVTY, SEMANTIC BLINDESS, AND INDEXICALITY 
2.1 Semantic Blindness and Error Theory 
A central task for ascriber contextualists is to explain how the meaning of the word “knows” is 
sensitive to the conversational context of the ascriber or denier at the time of the “knowledge”-
ascription or “knowledge”-denial.158 It is not obvious that either the word “knows” or an instance 
of the schema “S knows that p” is context-sensitive in this manner, although contextualists have 
argued for at least one of these options.
159
 Contextualists are aware that many find their claims 
for the context-sensitivity of epistemic vocabulary unobvious or perhaps even false. In 
acknowledging the initial resistance many feel towards the thesis that “knowledge”-ascriptions 
are context-sensitive, Cohen (1999) observes that, “…those who do accept the thesis, generally 
do so only as a result of being convinced by philosophical reflection.”160 This tendency of 
ordinary speakers to resist or deny the context-sensitivity of epistemic vocabulary could be what 
ultimately prevents such speakers from appreciating contextualism‟s alleged discovery that the 
word “knows” is context-sensitive. Nevertheless, given that many ordinary speakers have this 
tendency to resist the contextualist‟s thesis, the contextualist‟s task of elucidating the context-
sensitivity of epistemic vocabulary is made all the more demanding.  
As we have seen from an examination of the so-called sceptical “paradox,” contextualists 
contend that, from the point of view of ordinary speakers ascribing-“knowledge” or denying-
“knowledge,” the context-sensitivity of the word “knows” remains hidden from these 
speakers.
161
 Consequently, these speakers suffer from what John Hawthorne (2004) aptly terms 
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 The term “context” is highly ambiguous, even after it has been qualified as a “conversational context,” as 
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term “context.” 
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“semantic blindness,” which is being blind to the purported context-sensitive meaning of the 
word “knows.”162 That speakers suffer from this semantic blindness reveals that contextualism is 
committed to what Stephen Schiffer (1996) calls an error-theory.
163
 Contextualists are 
committed to an error-theory because, from a theoretical perspective, they claim that ordinary 
speakers make an error when these speakers think that a proposition expressed in a quotidian 
context conflicts with another proposition expressed in a sceptical (or in another extraordinary) 
conversational context.
164
 According to contextualists, however, there is no actual conflict 
between the “knowledge”-ascription and “knowledge”-denial when these are made in different 
kinds of context. That is why contextualists contend that ordinary speakers make an error when 
these speakers think that there is conflict.  
The contextualist is not seeking to correct this error, however. The error-theory is rather a 
theoretical explanation of how the error arises, which identifies semantic blindness as the 
cause.
165
 Moreover, the explanatory value of semantic blindness is indispensible to the 
contextualist, because it explains how the sceptical “paradox” arises. For if speakers were cured 
of their semantic blindness and able to see the context-sensitivity of epistemic vocabulary and 
hence realize which semantic standards were in effect at the time of making the “knowledge”-
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expressed.      
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ascription or “knowledge”-denial, then ascribers or deniers would neither mistakenly ascribe 
“knowledge” to epistemic subjects in sceptical contexts nor would they mistakenly deny 
“knowledge,” as the sceptic does, to epistemic subjects in quotidian contexts.166 The generation 
of the sceptical “paradox,” then, requires this kind of confusion on the part of ascribers and 
deniers. Thus, without the explanatory roles that semantic blindness and this error-theory play, 
contextualism would no longer offer an adequate solution to the sceptical “paradox,” because 
contextualism would not explain how the “paradox” arises in the first place. This theoretically 
commits the contextualist both to the claim that speakers suffer from semantic blindness and to 
an error-theory about how speakers sometimes mistakenly make “knowledge”-ascriptions in 
sceptical contexts and mistakenly make “knowledge”-denials in quotidian contexts. This error-
theory is manifest in the ascriber and the sceptic believing – mistakenly believing, according to 
contextualists – that there is a real disagreement between them. From the theoretical perspective 
of contextualism, there is allegedly no genuine disagreement between them, because the 
semantic standards of the ascriber, which determine the meaning of the “knowledge”-ascription, 
do not conflict with the semantic standards of the sceptic, which determine the meaning of the 
“knowledge”-denial.       
To account for the context-sensitivity of epistemic vocabulary, some contextualists, such 
as Cohen (1988) and DeRose (1992), treat the word “knows” as an indexical. On this account, 
the word “knows” is to be grouped with other context-sensitive words, such as “I,” “here,” and 
“now,” which are known as indexicals.167 On a more recent account, Cohen (1999, 2000, 2008) 
claims that schemas of, “S knows that p” at t1 (relative to a particular standard determined by a 
conversational context), are like schemas of, “surface X is flat” at t1 (relative to a particular 
standard determined by a conversational context), in the sense that both schemas exhibit the 
same type of indexicality.
168
 Cohen (1999, 2000, 2008) contends that the word “knows” remains 
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context-sensitive, but with indexical standards which determine its correct application; that is to 
say, the standards are implicit and ultimately refer back to the conversational context of the 
speaker.  
Both of these accounts take up the demanding task of elucidating the context-sensitivity 
of epistemic vocabulary. Cohen (1988) and DeRose (1992) do this by claiming that, because the 
word “knows” is an indexical, there is no contradiction between “knowledge”-ascriptions and 
“knowledge”-denials, and so there is no real disagreement between ascribers and deniers. Cohen 
(1999, 2000, 2008) does this by claiming that, because the “knowledge”-sentences and 
“flatness”-sentences take the above schemas and exhibit the same type of indexicality, the 
contextualist can explain purported cases of semantic blindness, explain away the apparent 
contradiction between “knowledge”-ascriptions and “knowledge”-denials that have these 
schemas, and also explain away disagreements between ascribers and deniers who make 
utterances of “knowledge”-sentences that have these schemas.   
2.2 The Argument of This Chapter 
What the contextualist owes us is both a semantic account of the context-sensitivity of epistemic 
vocabulary and an explanation of how fluent and competent speakers could systematically fail to 
see the context-sensitivity of epistemic vocabulary. The contextualist‟s explanation of semantic 
blindness should be closely connected to the contextualist‟s account of the context-sensitivity of 
the word “knows” in the epistemic vocabulary, because the contextualist is claiming that 
something about the semantics of the epistemic vocabulary is the cause of semantic blindness in 
ordinary speakers. Contextualists contend that indexicality holds the most promising explanation 
of this context-sensitivity. Ultimately, then, contextualists should present genuine cases of 
speakers‟ being similarly semantically blind to words that are not a part of the epistemic 
vocabulary; otherwise, contextualists risk their explanation of speakers‟ being semantically blind 
to words in the epistemic vocabulary appearing exceptional and ad hoc.  
In this chapter, I shall argue that both of these contextualist accounts fail to adequately 
explain the context-sensitivity of the word “knows” – the most central word in the epistemic 
vocabulary. Accordingly, I contend that both of these accounts fail to deliver a suitable 
explanation of the indexicality of the word “knows.” Consequently, I claim that contextualists do 
not present genuine cases of speakers‟ being semantically blind to epistemic vocabulary – or, to 
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put it differently, these supposedly analogous cases of speakers‟ being semantically blind to 
other non-epistemic but nevertheless context-sensitive terms turn out to only have a superficial 
similarity to the purported cases of speakers‟ being semantically blind to epistemic vocabulary. 
Lastly, I will try to meet Cohen‟s (2008) most recent challenge of having to explain, without 
using ascriber contextualism, the cases of “flatness”-scepticism that he cites as genuine cases of 
semantic blindness for non-epistemic terms.  
2.3 Is the Word “Knows” an Indexical?  
Cohen (1988) and DeRose (1992) treat the word “knows” as an indexical. Paradigmatic 
examples of indexicals, or of what David Kaplan (1989) more specifically classifies as pure 
indexicals, include the words “I,” “here,” and “now.”169 An indexical is a word which depends 
for its content on features of the (semantic) context in which it is used, so that these features 
establish an index for the word.
170
 An index is whatever completely specifies the content of the 
indexical, such as, in Kaplan‟s pure indexicals, the person uttering it, the time at which it is 
uttered, or the place where it is uttered. When an indexical is used in a sentence, the content of 
the indexical in that sentence needs to be specified for that sentence to express a proposition.
171
 
That is to say, for sentences containing pure indexicals, we need to know to whom the indexical 
“I” refers, to where the indexical “here” refers, and to when the indexical “now” refers, in order 
to give the indexical an index and assign the sentence containing it a truth-value. In short, 
indexicals need content and indices to express propositions.  
According to Kaplan‟s (1989) treatment of indexicals, an indexical has a context-variable 
content but a context-invariable linguistic character.
172
 The linguistic character of the indexical 
“I,” for instance, is a first-person reflexive pronoun, which invariably refers to whoever utters 
it.
173
 This is true simply as a matter of the word‟s linguistic meaning. The content of the 
indexical “I,” however, depends on the particular agent who sincerely uses it.174 This is because 
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the indexical “I” has a content that can vary from agent-to-agent. Again, we need to specify the 
content of the indexical for a sentence containing it to express a proposition and be assigned a 
truth-value. This would naturally happen when a particular speaker sincerely utters a sentence 
containing an indexical, because the indexical would then gain its content.
175
  
Affirmative sentences containing the same type of indexical need not contradict negative 
sentences also containing the same type of indexical, provided that there is a difference of 
content or indices for the relevant indexicals. To see this, consider that the sincere utterances of 
the sentences “I am hungry (at t1)” and “I am not hungry (at t1)” need not contradict one 
another, because the utterance of the first sentence could be said by one speaker, say, by David 
Kaplan, having an index such as David Kaplan is hungry at noon on January 1
st
 2000, whereas 
the utterance of the second sentence could be said by another speaker, say, by Stewart Cohen, 
having an index such as Stewart Cohen is not hungry at noon on January 1
st
 2000. In this case, 
the content of the indexical “I,” in the utterance of the sentence “I am hungry (at t1),” refers to 
David Kaplan, and this provides the indexical with an index, whereas the content of the indexical 
“I,” in the utterance of the sentence “I am not hungry (at t1),” refers to Stewart Cohen, and this 
provides the same type of indexical with an index distinct from the other one. Therefore, in this 
example, since David Kaplan‟s utterance of the sentence “I am hungry (at t1)” has the index of 
David Kaplan is hungry at noon on January 1
st
 2000, whereas Stewart Cohen‟s utterance of the 
sentence “I am not hungry (at t1)” has the index of Stewart Cohen is not hungry at noon on 
January 1
st
 2000, which has an index distinct from the other one, there is no contradiction 
between these utterances of these sentences. 
Speakers sometimes – albeit, rarely, in my opinion – fail to appreciate this lack of 
contradiction between utterances of sentences containing indexicals, especially in situations of 
the above sort in which affirmative and negative utterances of sentences contain the same type of 
indexical. This is what contextualists find so attractive about viewing the word “knows” as an 
indexical. After all, if the word “knows” were an indexical, then this would account for the lack 
of contradiction between “knowledge”-ascriptions and “knowledge”-denials issued in different 
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kinds of context. Moreover, it may enable the contextualist to explain away the apparent 
disagreement between the ascriber and sceptic, and also may account for semantic blindness.  
Cohen (1988) explicitly advertises the attractiveness of this lack of contradiction for 
utterances of sentences containing indexicals when he declares that, “…the theory I wish to 
defend construes „knowledge‟ as an indexical. As such, one speaker may attribute knowledge to 
a subject while another speaker denies knowledge to that same subject, without contradiction.”176 
Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on how exactly the word “knowledge” is an indexical. 
Fortunately, DeRose (1992) provides some much needed clarification of Cohen‟s passage. 
DeRose clarifies Cohen‟s passage and elaborates on how the word “knows” is an indexical by 
way of the following Intercom example: 
This lack of contradiction is the key to the sense in which the knowledge attributor and 
knowledge denier mean something different by „know.‟ It is similar to the sense in which 
two people who think they are in the same room but are in fact in different rooms and are 
talking to each [other] over an intercom mean something different by „this room‟ when 
one claims, „Frank is not in this room‟ and the other insists, „Frank is in this room–I can 
see him!‟ There is an important sense in which both do mean the same thing by „this 
room,‟ in which they are using the phrase in the same sense. But there is also an 
important sense in which they do not mean the same thing by the phrase; this is the sense 
by which we can explain the lack of contradiction between what the two people are 
saying.
177
   
In DeRose‟s Intercom example, I take it that the speakers think they are contradicting one 
another, and there is, therefore, a disagreement between these speakers. DeRose holds that the 
source of confusion comes from a failure on the part of these speakers to appreciate the context-
sensitivity of their utterances of sentences containing the same type of indexical, both speakers 
thinking that the sentences “Frank is in this room (at t1)” and “Frank is not in this room (at t1)” 
contradict one another. Like the above example of “I am hungry,” however, this is merely the 
appearance of contradiction, even if the speakers continue to disagree with one another.  
As DeRose notes, it is useful to employ Kaplan‟s terminology and description of 
indexicals to explain what is happening in the Intercom example.
178
 In DeRose‟s example, the 
relevant indexical is the word “this,” which is a true demonstrative, according to Kaplan‟s 
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classification of indexicals.
179
 Recall that Kaplan draws a distinction between the character and 
the content of an indexical. When DeRose observes “the important sense in which both do mean 
the same thing by the phase „this room,‟” the shared sense between the speakers of the phrase 
“this room” is its invariable character or linguistic meaning. Where the meaning of the phase 
“this room” diverges is with regard to the context-sensitive meaning of the phrase “this room,” a 
context-sensitive phrase which is to be explained by a difference in the variable content of the 
indexical “this.” The content of the indexical “this” depends on the context in which it is used 
and perhaps also on a demonstration by the speaker who makes a demonstration to aid 
communication.  
In the Intercom example, what the first speaker means by the phrase “this room” is the 
room where she is situated and Frank is absent, which could, with some further specification, be 
treated as an index of the first instance of the indexical “this,” whereas, what the second speaker 
means by the phrase “this room” is the room where Frank appears and which can be seen on the 
intercom‟s screen, which could be treated, with some further specification, as a distinct index for 
the second instance of the indexical “this.” Accordingly, there is no contradiction between the 
first speaker‟s utterance of the sentence “Frank is in this room (at t1)” and the second speaker‟s 
utterance of the sentence “Frank is not in this room (at t1),” since these two propositions differ 
with respect to their content. Nevertheless, as this example suggests, speakers sometimes – 
albeit, rarely, in my opinion – fail to appreciate the context-sensitivity of utterances of sentences 
that contain indexicals, and thereby mistakenly think that their utterances conflict with one 
another. For contextualists this kind of confusion on the part of speakers is a further attractive 
feature for treating the word “knows” as an indexical, because this would enable contextualists to 
explain how speakers could be semantically blind to the context-sensitivity of epistemic 
vocabulary. Essentially, if the word “knows” were an indexical, then this would rather easily 
enable contextualists to meet a desideratum for a satisfying resolution of the sceptical “paradox,” 
which is to explain how the “paradox” arises in the first place.     
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 DeRose applies Kaplan‟s (1989) analysis of indexicals to the word “knows” to allegedly 
reveal its context-sensitivity. On this point, DeRose writes:  
To make use of the character/content distinction, the „character‟ of „S knows that p‟ is, 
roughly, that S has a true belief that p and is in a good enough epistemic position with 
respect to p; this remains constant from attribution to attribution.
180
  
According to DeRose, attributor or contextual factors, such as the error-possibilities that the 
attributor is considering in the conversational context at the time of the “knowledge”-attribution, 
“…set a certain standard the putative subject of knowledge must live up to in order to make the 
knowledge attribution true: They [the attributor or contextual factors] affect how good an 
epistemic position the putative knower must be in to count as knowing.”181 Attributor or 
contextual factors, then, specify the content of the word “knows” and set the semantic standards 
for what the meaning of the word “knows” means. These factors also specify the epistemic 
position that an epistemic subject or putative knower must be in for the “knowledge”-ascription, 
in the form of the sentence “S knows that p,” to be true. Accordingly, attributor or contextual 
factors have a rippling-effect, in that they set semantic standards which will determine both the 
content of indexicals and the truth-values of “knowledge”-sentences.182 There remains 
considerable vagueness, however, in the phrase “good enough.” Yet this vagueness, according to 
DeRose, is not pernicious; rather, it is indispensible for DeRose‟s purposes, since it leaves ample 
room for the purported variable, context-sensitive, content of the word “knows.” On this point, 
DeRose asks: “But how good is good enough?” to which he answers, “This is what varies with 
context. What the context fixes in determining the „content‟ of a knowledge attribution is how 
good an epistemic position S must be in to count as knowing that p.”183 DeRose‟s phrase “how 
good an epistemic position S must be in to count as knowing that p” again emphasizes that 
ascriber contextualism is about how contextual or attributor factors, such as considering or 
mentioning error-possibilities in the conversational context, set the semantic standards for 
determining the meaning of the purportedly context-sensitive word “knows” and the epistemic 
position S must be in for the “knowledge”-attribution “S knows that p” to be true.  
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It is especially important to notice that contextualists, such as DeRose (1992; 1995; 2001; 
2004; 2005) and Cohen (1988; 1999; 2000; 2008), are not taking a stance on how epistemic 
subjects need to meet necessary conditions for knowledge. Contextualists are not interested in 
whether the subject meets epistemic conditions, such as the justification condition or whatever 
necessary epistemic conditions need to be met for the subject‟s belief to be non-accidentally 
connected to truth in order for that subject to have knowledge. Contextualists rather are 
concerned exclusively with the issue of setting semantic standards. Once these standards are set, 
they will determine the meaning of the sentence “S knows that p.” To their credit, contextualists 
are particularly clear on this point. In his description of how contextualists are concerned with 
setting standards, Kent Bach (2005b) notes:  
Contextualists do make clear that the context they have in mind is not the epistemic 
context of the subject of the knowledge attribution. Everybody agrees that what it takes 
for George to know that he has hands or, to put it more accurately, for the sentence 
„George knows that he has hands‟ to be true, can depend on George‟s epistemic situation. 
This is a matter not of setting standards but of meeting them.
184
   
What Bach (2005b) is pointing out when he makes the uncontroversial claim that everybody 
agrees that the truth of the sentence “George knows that he has hands” can depend on George‟s 
epistemic situation is that if, say, George‟s senses have been unreliable and failing him lately, 
then, whether the “knowledge”-ascription or the sentence “George knows that he has hands” is 
true or not will depend on – or better yet, in my opinion, will require taking into consideration – 
George‟s rather extraordinary epistemic situation. I presume Bach (2005b) is using the word 
“epistemic” to emphasize that the meeting of standards is a matter of the epistemic subject‟s 
situation rather than the ascriber‟s conversational context. Bach is correct to employ the word in 
this manner; although, the word “epistemic” appears somewhat out of place, considering 
George‟s extraordinary situation, which may not only prevent him from knowing that he has 
hands, but may also prevent “knowledge”-ascriptions made to him from being true. This indeed 
makes Bach‟s (2005b) point; but calling George‟s rather extraordinary situation “epistemic” has 
a rather odd ring to it.
185
 Nevertheless, the contextualist is not somebody who disagrees with 
what Bach has pointed out, but rather claims that attributor or contextual factors play a crucial 
role in the setting of semantic standards. The semantic standards have to be set before 
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determining the truth of the sentence, because the sentence “George knows that he has hands” 
contains the purportedly context-sensitive word “knows,” which supposedly does not have a 
meaning independent of its content. This brings us back to the main question of whether the 
word “knows” is an indexical. Not everybody, however, agrees with DeRose‟s (1992) claim that 
the word “knows” is an indexical.186 DeRose‟s claim, then, requires further examination.        
As in the Intercom example, in which the first speaker‟s utterance of the sentence “Frank 
is in this room (at t1)” meant something different from the second speaker‟s utterance of the 
sentence “Frank is not in this room (at t1),” DeRose similarly is contending that the utterances of 
the sentences “S knows that p (at t1)” and “S does not know that p (at t1)” can also have different 
meanings, since the word “knows,” like the word “this,” is supposed to be an indexical. 
Presumably, the index of the alleged indexical “knows” would be a specification of the features 
of the attributor‟s conversational context and the semantic standards in force at the time of the 
“knowledge”-attribution, for, unlike the character of the word “knows,” these vary from 
attribution-to-attribution. According to contextualists, these contextual features determine the 
content of the “knowledge”-attribution and set the standards for how good an epistemic position 
a subject must be in to count as having “knowledge.” Only after specifying these contextual 
features, then, does an utterance of a sentence containing the word “knows” express a 
proposition; after all, whether a proposition is expressed or not depends on content and 
contextualists argue that the word “knows” has a variable content. This makes the word “knows” 
appear to be an indexical. 
2.4 Yourgrau’s Objection 
DeRose (1992) contends that his account of the indexicality of epistemic vocabulary parries a 
seemingly powerful and popular objection to contextualism, which was first raised by Yourgrau 
(1983) in the form of what DeRose (2000) now calls the “now you know it, now you don‟t” 
objection to contextualism.
187
 More than simply parrying Yourgrau‟s objection, however, 
DeRose (1992) thinks that his account of the indexicality of the word “knows” exposes the faulty 
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assumptions upon which objections of this kind rest. Yourgrau constructs the following dialogue 
to underscore the seeming incoherence of contextualism:  
A: Is that a zebra? 
B: Yes, it is a zebra. 
A: But can you rule out its being merely a cleverly disguised painted mule?  
B: No, I can‟t. 
A: So, you admit you didn‟t know it was a zebra?  
B: No, I did know then that it was a zebra. But after your question, I no longer know.
188
 
Yourgrau concludes from this dialogue that “something is amiss.”189 His objection to 
contextualism is that it permits a kind of flip-flopping of knowledge-claims.
190
 From what is 
happening in this dialogue, one is tempted to agree with Yourgrau that if speaker B claims to 
know that the animal is a zebra on the one occasion, but subsequently admits to not knowing this 
claim after an error-possibility has been explicitly raised on another occasion, then speaker B 
should not have been counted as knowing the original claim, since, given that the particular 
error-possibility recently raised apparently destroys knowledge, speaker B never had the 
justification necessary to know that the animal was a zebra in the first place.
191
 Accordingly, if 
newly raised error-possibilities could overturn old knowledge-claims, then this would lead to the 
unpalatable phenomenon of “lost knowledge,” which would not be caused by forgetfulness on 
the part of the subject, but rather by potent error-possibilities destroying knowledge.
192
  
This appears to be a problem for the contextualist, because the contextualist is happy to 
allow for newly introduced error-possibilities raised in the speaker‟s conversational context to 
become relevant and affect the semantic standards. The important question to ask, then, is: Does 
speaker B‟s “knowledge”-denial at the end of the dialogue conflict with speaker B‟s original 
“knowledge”-claim? Yourgrau contends that there is indeed conflict between speaker B‟s 
knowledge-denial at the end of the dialogue and speaker B‟s original knowledge-claim, which 
seems to reveal that contextualism permits a kind of flip-flopping and remains open to what 
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DeRose (2000) now calls the “now you know it, now you don‟t” objection. This makes 
contextualism seem incoherent.  
DeRose (1992) counters by claiming that Yourgrau fails to appreciate the contextualist‟s 
claim for the context-sensitivity of the word “knows.”193 DeRose parries Yourgrau‟s objection to 
contextualism by arguing that speaker B‟s “knowledge”-claim was originally made in a 
conversational context with contextual parameters different from the conversational context in 
which the current dialogue is taking place, given that a new error-possibility has become 
salient.
194
 By treating the word “knows” as an indexical, DeRose contends that this change in 
speaker B‟s conversational context would be analogous to the following situation: speaker C 
sincerely claims “I am here” when he is at the office. But when questioned later – say, by his 
boss over the telephone – after having left the office, speaker C would speak falsely if he were to 
reassert “I am here,” with the word “here” standing for him being at the office.195 So, if speaker 
C were to say “I am not here” when he is not at the office, then this claim would not conflict with 
his original claim of “I am here” when he was at the office. Contextual factors – using this term 
loosely – in both cases, then, supposedly determine the content of the indexical under 
consideration. To return to the above dialogue with this analogy in mind, presumably, since 
speaker A‟s error-possibility has been recently introduced, speaker B‟s original “knowledge”-
claim was made in a conversational context with different semantic standards, in which 
“knowledge”-claims in this kind of context are often true. But this is not the whole story, because 
contextual or attributor factors, such as the newly raised error-possibility by speaker A, affect the 
semantic standards of the “knowledge”-claim in such a way that if speaker A‟s error-possibility 
becomes relevant, it follows that if speaker B were to assert what appears to be the same 
“knowledge”-claim in the form of a self-ascription, then this would actually mean something 
different from speaker B‟s original “knowledge”-claim or so DeRose claims. To be clearer on 
this point, if speaker B were to assert the new “knowledge”-sentence – if Speaker B asserts that 
“I know that the animal is not a cleverly disguised mule” – then this claim would not be the 
original claim, since speaker B‟s new claim, as a self-ascription, would mean that speaker B qua 
epistemic subject would be (or would have been) in a good enough epistemic position to rule out 
the error-possibility that the animal is a cleverly disguised mule. According to DeRose, speaker 
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B‟s “knowledge”-denial would be of this new “knowledge”-claim – which speaker B does not 
and did not make – since it would carry the implication that speaker B qua epistemic subject is 
(or was) in a good enough epistemic position to eliminate that potentially relevant error-
possibility. Crucially, then, speaker B‟s current “knowledge”-denial does not conflict with the 
speaker B‟s original “knowledge”-claim. The meanings of the “knowledge”-denial and the 
“knowledge”-claim do not conflict. Therefore, DeRose concludes that speaker B is not saying 
anything contradictory in asserting both the original “knowledge”-claim and the “knowledge”-
denial at the end of the dialogue.  
I think DeRose is correct that Yourgrau‟s objection to contextualism does not go through, 
because his objection to contextualism is aimed at knowledge at the object-level and not the 
meta-linguistic thesis that contextualism advances. Essentially, Yourgrau fails to appreciate that 
contextualism is not about meeting standards, but is about setting the standards which determine 
the context-sensitive meaning of the word “knows” and how contextual and attributor factors 
play a decisive role in determining what would be a good enough epistemic position for the 
subject to be in to count as “knowing.” Accordingly, Yourgrau fails to appreciate the context-
sensitivity of the word “knows” when he makes his objection to contextualism. But DeRose can 
only answer Yourgrau in this manner if DeRose is right about the claim that the word “knows” is 
an indexical. DeRose‟s account hinges on the truth of this claim. I think that DeRose‟s account, 
however, is on the verge of collapse. I will give you my reasons for thinking so in the next 
section.
196
     
2.5 Problems with the First Account  
A lot turns on whether the word “knows” is an indexical. If it is, then the contextualist can 
accomplish the following: the contextualist can readily explain away seemingly contradictory 
instances of “knowledge”-ascriptions and “knowledge”-denials and disagreements between 
speakers who think that their statements result in a contradiction; the contextualist can expose the 
faulty assumptions made in the popular “now you know it, now you don‟t” objection, of which 
Yourgrau‟s objection to contextualism is an instance; and the contextualist might also be able to 
explain how speakers sometimes remain semantically blind to epistemic vocabulary. The 
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contextualist claims that the word “knows” is an indexical, because contextual or attributor 
factors of the speaker‟s conversational context set the semantic standards of “knowledge”-
ascriptions or “knowledge”-denials. After these factors have been specified, the contextualist 
claims that the variable content and meaning of the “knowledge”-ascription or “knowledge”-
denial becomes fixed. This appears to be similar to the way in which indexicals gain their 
content, because specifying the context in which the indexical is used fixes that indexical‟s 
content. It is principally on this basis that the contextualist claims that the word “knows” is also 
an indexical.   
The contextualist, however, has presented a weak case for viewing the word “knows” as 
an indexical. To make my case against the contextualist on this matter, consider first that fluent 
and competent speakers rarely confuse the reference of pure indexicals or true demonstratives in 
the way the contextualist claims that they do. Consider again the two speakers in DeRose‟s 
Intercom example. In the Intercom example, the exchange strikes us as comical. The reason for 
this is not the recognition of some familiar kind of folly that speakers often make, but rather the 
exchange is comical because the speakers are in the same room and foolishly think that they are 
disagreeing with one another about Frank‟s location, supposedly unaware that the phrase “this 
room” could refer to different rooms.197 This kind of folly is rare and unexpected.198 Moreover, it 
is easy to imagine a third party in the form of a conciliator intervening in the dispute and being 
able to resolve the matter by explaining to the two speakers that there is no genuine disagreement 
between them, because they are simply referring to different rooms. In this case, the speakers, if 
they were reasonable, would realize their confusion, perhaps shrink with embarrassment, and 
promptly end the dispute. It would be surprising if things were to go even this far and the 
intervention were needed, however, because the indexical “this” is a true demonstrative.199 A 
true demonstrative sometimes requires a demonstration to aid communication. After the 
demonstration has been given, it should be clear what the reference is. In the Intercom example, 
the second speaker actually gives a demonstration. The second speaker, in a moment of 
exasperation, exclaims “I can see him!” with the word “him” referring to Frank. When the 
second speaker makes this exclamation, it demonstrates the room to which the speaker is 
referring. Fluent and competent speakers are often successful at figuring out indexical 
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references.
200
 This points to the conclusion that speakers are not semantically blind to indexicals; 
rather, they indeed see the context-sensitivity of sentences containing indexicals.
201
  
There are a number of important disanalogies between the kind of dispute in DeRose‟s 
Intercom example and the kind of dispute between the ascriber and sceptic who are disputing 
whether someone knows, although this latter kind of dispute is the one that DeRose is ultimately 
trying to explain. Unlike the dispute in the Intercom example, these disputes over whether 
someone knows are commonplace and do not strike listeners as comical, but rather often are 
taken quite seriously. It is further difficult to imagine a conciliator being able to smoothly resolve 
disputes of this nature. The contextualist tries to play this role in the dispute between the ascriber 
and sceptic, but after the contextualist has explained the context-sensitivity of the word “knows” 
to the parties involved, it is doubtful that it would have the same effects as in the dispute between 
the speakers in the Intercom example. That is to say, it is doubtful that the conversational 
participants disputing whether someone knows would suddenly recover from their purported 
semantic blindness, see the allegedly different semantic standards in place, and feel that there 
was no genuine disagreement between them.
202
    
At this point the contextualist may want to reiterate the claim that speakers remain 
semantically blind to the context-sensitivity of epistemic vocabulary. But repeating this claim 
now involves a major risk. For if I am right that speakers are not semantically blind to what pure 
indexicals and true demonstratives refer to and often recognize a kind of context-sensitivity for 
sentences containing indexicals, then the contextualist is taking a major risk by treating the 
alleged indexical “knows” as an exception, as the sole indexical to which speakers remain blind. 
Instead of being well-theoretically motivated, if the contextualist were to make this move, then it 
would appear be ad hoc. That is to say, making the word “knows” an exception appears to be ad 
hoc, because this move is motivated in such a way as to preserve the crucial explanatory roles of 
speakers‟ being both semantically blind to epistemic vocabulary and to the indexicality of the 
word “knows” play in adequately solving the sceptical “paradox.” The contextualist needs to 
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present cases of similar semantic blindness for indexicals in order for the contextualist‟s 
explanation of the word “knows” as an indexical to be well-theoretically motivated. DeRose 
argues that his Intercom example is one such case, but it is an odd case – to say the least. The 
speakers in his example rather foolishly misunderstand one another, even after a demonstration 
to aid communication has been given by the second speaker. The demand for the contextualist to 
cite genuine cases of speakers‟ being semantically blind to indexicals, cases which need to be 
similar to cases of speakers‟ being semantically blind to epistemic vocabulary, is a demand that 
remains unmet. This makes the contextualist‟s contention that there are genuine cases of 
speakers‟ being semantically blind to epistemic vocabulary appear exceptional and ad hoc. 
Another significant disanalogy between a semantic account of indexicals and the 
contextualist account, which tries to include the word “knows” as a fellow of familiar indexicals, 
is that the meanings of pure indexicals or true demonstratives do not simply change with changes 
in conversational contextual factors. As it is used by contextualists, the term “context” always is 
intended to mean the conversational context of speakers or listeners where “knowledge”-
ascriptions or “knowledge”-denials take place. Whenever contextualists speak of “attributor or 
contextual factors,” these are features of the conversational context, such as the mentioning or 
considering of error-possibilities by speakers.
203
  
It is worth noting that these error-possibilities do not have to be anchored in the world, 
but can rather be of outlandish radical sceptical error-possibilities, such as the possibility of 
being tricked by a Cartesian evil demon at this very moment. The contextualist claims that the 
speaker raising these error-possibilities does not need any evidence for the existence of such a 
demon or even a reason to plausibly believe that such a being could exist. This makes the error-
possibilities rather free-floating, since whether or not these error-possibilities are taken seriously, 
according to the contextualist, depends simply on what the conversation is like, without regard to 
what the world is like (or often taken to be like). 
 According to contextualists, however, these contextual or attributor factors set the 
semantic standards of “knowledge”-ascriptions. It was mostly on this basis that DeRose (1992) 
replied to Yourgrau‟s objection to contextualism. So if the contextualist is to make the analogy 
between the word “knows” and indexicals work, then there should be semantic standards for 
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indexicals as well. A natural way to interpret the contextualist on this point is to recognize that 
indexicals gain their content from the context in which they are used. In this way, contextual 
factors, such as person, place, and time, determine the content of the indexical and the meaning 
of the particular sentence containing the indexical. But notice that these contextual factors that 
determine the content of indexicals are different from the contextual factors of which the 
contextualist speaks, since these factors which determine the content of indexicals are extra-
conversational. To see this, consider, for instance, that when a speaker sincerely utters “I am 
here,” the content of the indexical “I” will be the particular speaker who uses it and the content 
of the indexical “here” will be the location of that speaker. This kind of contextual specification 
for indexicals is of no help to the contextualist who wants variable semantic standards for the 
word “knows,” since the contextual factors that create the index for indexicals remain outside of 
the conversational context. But the conversational contextual factors to which the contextualist 
appeals all remain inside of the conversational context. This is an important asymmetry that the 
contextualist should not overlook, although too often the contextualist glosses over this 
important difference by simply talking about “contextual factors.”  
2.6 Cohen’s Recent Account 
The contextualist account of the word “knows” as an indexical, which may have looked 
promising as an explanation for the context-sensitivity of epistemic vocabulary, is riddled with 
so many problems as to make it unsalvageable. To avoid these problems, Cohen (1999; 2000; 
2008) offers a new account of indexicality which maintains that the conversational context of the 
ascriber sets the standards and determines the content of the ascription. However, unlike on 
Cohen‟s (1988) and DeRose‟s (1992) old accounts, Cohen‟s recent account holds that 
“…ascriptions of knowledge involve an indexical reference to standards.”204 So whenever a true 
“knowledge”-ascription is made, there will be a corresponding indexical reference to standards, 
although from the point of view of ascribers, this indexical reference remains implicit and 
ascribers may fail to recognize the standards in effect at the time of the ascription.
205
 Cohen also 
thinks that the set of conversational contextual factors, or what David Lewis (1979) calls the 
conversational score, alone determines which standard will be in effect for both “knowledge”-
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ascriptions and their analogues. If so, then conversational contextual factors exclusively set the 
semantic standards. Moreover, Cohen claims that semantic blindness is a much more pervasive 
phenomenon than critics of contextualism assume it to be, which, if this were true, would avoid 
my criticism that the contextualist account of semantic blindness appears to be ad hoc.  
 In the last section, I held that fluent and competent speakers tend to see, with a 
reasonably high degree of clarity, the context-sensitivity of sentences containing pure indexicals 
or true demonstratives. Cohen (2008) does not contest this claim, but instead argues that speakers 
are semantically blind to other terms that are not pure indexicals or true demonstratives, but are 
terms which nonetheless can crucially provide analogues to “knowledge”-ascriptions and 
“knowledge”-denials. On this point, Cohen states:  
Some philosophers find this semantic blindness thesis implausible. If „know‟ is context 
sensitive, competent speakers should be aware of it. What can the contextualist say in 
defense of the semantic blindness thesis? First of all, we can note that semantic blindness 
exists for other terms in a natural language.
206
 
In this statement, the terms that Cohen has in mind include: “flat,” “bald,” “rich,” and 
“happy.”207 Cohen claims that these terms are context-sensitive in the sense that whether a 
predicate containing one of these terms is true depends on which particular standard is in effect 
at the time of the ascription, a standard which speakers can supposedly remain blind to 
altogether, or at the beginning of a conversation, or can lose sight of in the course of a 
conversation.
208
  
Cohen‟s favourite example of a context-sensitive term that may provide an analogue to 
the term “knows” is the term “flat.” Viewing the term “flat” as a useful term with which to 
compare the term “knows” is not without precedent. A number of prominent epistemologists, 
including Unger (1975; 1984), Lewis (1979), and Dretske (1981; 1991), have also done so; 
although these philosophers have come to different conclusions from their analyses. The leading 
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similarity between the terms “flat” and “knows,” which has been the focus of much 
philosophical attention, is that both terms seem to be absolute terms. The term “flat” is absolute 
in the sense that it is inconsistent to claim that surface Y is flatter than surface X, if surface X is 
said to be flat. Likewise, the term “knows” is absolute in the sense that it is inconsistent to claim, 
if Jones knows that p, that Smith can know that p better than Jones knows that p.
209
   
Cohen notes that the predicate “is flat,” when it enters into descriptions of surfaces, can 
be satisfied simpliciter for, say, the true ascription “the table is flat,” or according to varying 
standards, as it can be for, say, the true ascription in the form of a comparative “the table is 
flatter than the pavement.” But how do we determine which standard satisfies the predicate 
simpliciter or satisfies it to varying degrees?  
2.7 Unger’s Invariantism 
Cohen thinks that one option, taken by Unger (1975), is to espouse invariantism, which views the 
term “flat” as an absolute term with extremely high, determinate and fixed standards. These 
standards are so high, in fact, that if something is said to be flat then nothing could be flatter than 
it.
210
 Unger notes that the absolute term “flat” literally means that a surface is devoid of any 
bumps or curves. So the term “flat” correctly applies only to those surfaces which are without 
any bumps.
211
 From this, Unger claims that we speak falsely whenever we call roads, tables, or 
fields, “flat,” because each of these types of surface admit of some bumps, however minute or 
microscopic. Presumably, the predicate “is flat” is only satisfied simpliciter or per se for 
mathematical objects, such as Euclidean planes, because these objects are devoid of bumps and 
nothing could be flatter than them. Unfortunately, given that a natural language contains a 
number of familiar absolute terms, such as “flat,” “empty,” and “certain,” which speakers usually 
do not recognize as such and apply liberally to objects and states of the world, it follows from 
Unger‟s observations and claims that there will be a pandemic of semantic blindness. So 
whenever speakers use these terms, they will mostly speak falsely. Unger thinks that this is the 
price we pay for having a language that contains absolute terms. Like any good epistemologist, 
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Unger aims to say things which are true, or at least not false. Accordingly, he embraces the high 
invariant standards that are required for using absolute terms correctly. As a consequence, he 
accepts the scepticism that follows from this: speakers are massively ignorant and often speak 
falsely whenever they use absolute terms.
212
 Most epistemologists, including Cohen, find the 
sceptical consequences of Unger‟s invariantism unpalatable and ultimately unacceptable.  
Cohen cannot accept Unger‟s claims about the meaning of the absolute term “flat,” 
because accepting them would ensure that the predicate “is flat” cannot be sensitive to 
conversational contextual factors. On Unger‟s invariantist view, whether a surface is flat or not 
depends entirely on whether that surface meets the description of what it means for a surface to 
be flat; namely, for that surface to be without any bumps or curves whatsoever. For Unger, a 
surface X either is flat or is non-flat and bumpy. To find a model for the contextualist treatment 
of the word “knows,” however, Cohen needs the predicate “is flat” to vary with features of the 
conversational context of the speaker so that there could be cases in which one speaker could say 
of surface X that “surface X is flat,” while another speaker could say of the same surface X that 
“surface X is not flat,” with both the “flatness”-ascription and “flatness”-denial being mutually 
compatible and true at the same time. Unger‟s view does not allow for this, since the meaning of 
the term “flat” is invariant and absolute. Accordingly, the first speaker would flatly contradict the 
second speaker in the above case – pun intended.    
2.8 The Conversational Score   
Instead of taking this first option and endorsing Unger‟s invariantism, Cohen contends that the 
better option is to adopt Lewis‟s (1979) account of context-sensitive terms, an account which 
treats the term “flat” as context-sensitive and avoids the inevitable scepticism that results from 
invariantism. In considering this option, Cohen asks “How precisely do the standards for these 
predicates [predicates containing context-sensitive terms] get determined in a particular context 
of ascription?” and he answers: 
 This is a very difficult question to answer. But we can say this much. The standards are 
determined by some complicated function of speaker intentions, listener expectations, 
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presuppositions of the conversation, salience relations, etc.–by what David Lewis calls the 
conversational score.
213
  
But what exactly does Lewis mean by the conversational score?  
According to Lewis (1979), what happens in a conversational context or particular 
language game is like – to use his leading analogy – keeping score in a baseball game.214 Lewis 
considers a language game to be like a baseball game in the following respects: components of 
the score are abstract entities; what play is correct depends on score; score evolves in a rule-
governed way; efforts by participants are often cooperative; and the history of a particular game 
influences score.
215
 In a baseball game, the score is determined by the play on the field along 
with constitutive rules about what it means to score in the game, constitutive rules which define 
what counts for, say, scoring a homerun, a walk, an out, and so on.
216
 Analogously, Lewis claims 
that conversational elements create a context in which speakers understand why the conversation 
is taking place, are able to keep track of what has happened in the course of the conversation, and 
can anticipate what might happen next. Lewis claims that speakers can figure out what counts for 
what; essentially, speakers keep track of what the conversational score is.  
To make the idea of conversational score clearer, consider a main example that Lewis 
uses to demonstrate how salience relations can change the conversational score. Lewis presents 
an example in which he asks you – the reader – to imagine that you are in a room with both him 
and Bruce, Lewis‟s pet cat that keeps dashing about wildly. Bruce is the only cat in the room 
when Lewis says the following to you:  
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The cat is in the carton. The cat will never meet our other cat, because our other cat lives 
in New Zealand. Our New Zealand cat lives with the Cresswells. And there he‟ll stay, 
because Miriam would be sad if the cat went away.
217
  
According to Lewis, the conversational participants of this particular conversation – you, the 
listener, and Lewis, the speaker – are able to figure out which cat has become salient, despite the 
different cats being referred to by what appear to be identical instances of the definite description 
“the cat.” Conversational participants usually understand that these seemingly identical instances 
of this description of “the cat” have different denotations. In the above quotation, the first and 
second instances of “the cat” denote Bruce, whereas, after Lewis speaks of his other cat in New 
Zealand, the New Zealand cat becomes more salient than Bruce does to the conversation, so that 
the third instance of “the cat” denotes the New Zealand cat. When Lewis starts to talk about his 
New Zealand cat, the conversational score is changing so that listeners will count the next 
instance of “the cat” as the New Zealand cat. The salience relations have changed. In this way, 
conversational participants are able to keep score in the conversation and know what counts for 
what.  
But, aside from salience relations, what conversational rules have allowed Lewis to so 
smoothly move from talking about Bruce to talking about his New Zealand cat? Lewis‟s answer 
is that conversations exhibit rules of accommodation, which allow for swift conversational 
transitions.
218
 That rules of accommodation can factor into the conversational score is what 
Lewis considers the greatest difference between scorekeeping in a conversation and 
scorekeeping in a baseball game. A conversation is loosely structured so as to permit an array of 
different moves and ways to score, whereas a baseball game is tightly structured in such a way as 
to enable its participants to recognize, with a much greater degree of precision than in a 
conversation, what definitely counts as correct play and a score. As Lewis sees it, 
“…conversational score does tend to evolve in such a way as is required in order to make 
whatever occurs count as correct play. Granted, that is not invariable but only a tendency.”219 As 
for correct play in the above conversation about Lewis‟s pet cats, introducing and describing the 
New Zealand cat as “the cat,” after that description had already been used to denote Bruce, was 
easily accommodated by the conversational participants, because of salience relations. According 
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to Lewis, this made the move correct play. Correct play in a baseball game, however, is much 
more well-defined. For instance, if I am the batter and the count is three balls and no strikes and I 
suddenly decide to waltz over to first base, I will not thereby score a walk. This move breaks the 
rules of baseball and cannot be normally accommodated by the participants – by the players, 
coaches, umpires, and perhaps also by the spectators – of the game. Unlike a baseball score, the 
conversational score often adjusts to the conversational moves of the participants, which is 
because of the rules of accommodation. 
But how does Lewis‟s idea of the conversational score serve Cohen‟s purposes? It may 
do so in the following way: Lewis claims that what he calls standards of precision, which permit 
an utterance to be treated as true enough or acceptable for the sake of conversation, are also 
included in the rules of accommodation and thereby in the conversational score as well.
220
 Lewis 
argues that for some context-sensitive and vague terms, such as the terms “bald” or “rich,” 
conversational participants will treat utterances containing these terms as true enough according 
to the standards of precision in force at the time of the utterance.
221
 The standards of precision, 
however, are also vague; but Lewis does not consider this a problem. He thinks that speakers will 
figure out the strictness or laxity of the standards of precision by testing whether listeners will 
accept what has been uttered as true enough. For instance, imagine speaker D says “France is 
hexagonal.” If listener E does not object to what speaker D said, then listener E will probably 
also treat as true enough the utterance of “Italy is boot-shaped.”222 Speaker D could do further 
tests. But if there is no protest from listener E after a few tries, then the standards of precision are 
likely to be quite lax and quotidian. Accordingly, the conversational participants are able to find 
out the conversational score from these tests. But, as sometimes happens, a conversational move 
may cause the standards of precision to soar to extreme heights, so that not only is the utterance 
of “France is hexagonal” vehemently protested, but, in “Ungerian” style, the utterance of “there 
are material objects that are hexagonal” could also be vehemently protested. In this case, if the 
speaker making these utterances accepts the ultra-precise standards favoured by the other 
conversational participants, then speakers and listeners may accommodate these standards. 
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Interestingly, Lewis thinks that Unger‟s observation of the meaning of the term “flat,” as an 
absolute term, is the correct one: “Some might dispute Unger‟s premise that “flat” is an absolute 
term; but on that score it seems to me that Unger is right.”223 In parallel fashion to the example 
about the approximate shape of different countries, Lewis holds that Unger is correct in the 
context of a conversation, provided that ultra-precise standards are in force at the time when the 
speaker is denying that a surface is “flat.” The conversational score sometimes allows for 
extreme “flatness”-denials. According to Lewis, this will not, however, affect the truth of 
previous utterances containing the term “flat” made under less precise standards. These previous 
utterances remain true enough. As Lewis states:  
The right response to Unger, I suggest, is that he is changing the score on you. When he 
says that the desk is flatter than the pavement, what he says is acceptable only under 
raised standards of precision. Under the original standards the bumps on the pavement 
were too small to be relevant either to the question whether the pavement is flat or to the 
question whether the pavement is flatter than the desk. Since what he says requires raised 
standards, the standards accommodatingly rise. Then it is no longer true enough that the 
pavement is flat. That does not alter the fact that it was true enough in its original 
context.
224
      
 Lewis concludes that the ultimate “arbiter” of correctness is the standard of precision in force at 
the time of the ascription or denial. This remains the case even after the standards of precision 
have changed, and thereby the conversational score as well has changed.   
2.9 Problems with Cohen’s Recent Account 
It is unclear whether Cohen wants to import into his recent account of indexicality all of the 
elements that Lewis makes a part of the conversational score. Cohen often emphasizes the 
importance that salience relations play in determining standards. So much is clear. As Cohen 
(1999) states: “In the case of knowledge ascriptions, salience relations play a central role in 
determining the standards. In particular, when the chance of error is salient, it can lead 
knowledge ascribers to intend, expect, presuppose, etc., stricter standards.”225 As we have seen, 
conversational participants can figure out the conversational score by paying attention to salience 
relations, as in the example of Lewis‟s pet cats. Cohen remains silent, however, on whether he 
wants to incorporate the other parts of the conversational score, such as the rules of 
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accommodation generally, into his account. A warranted interpretation from what Cohen says is 
that, along with salience relations, he also wants to take Lewis‟s description of the dynamics of 
the standards of precision, of how the standards tend to become raised. Cohen‟s account leans 
quite heavily on Lewis‟s explanation of the conversational score. Cohen is so eager to explain 
semantic blindness, however, that he rather optimistically overlooks some of the features of 
Lewis‟s explanation of the conversational score that will present theoretical difficulties for his 
own account. In what immediately follows, I will reveal how these features in Lewis‟s 
explanation can cause problems for Cohen‟s recent account of indexicality.      
 Lewis‟s description of how the standards of precision shift in a conversation may at first 
appear to help Cohen to explain how ascribers and deniers can sometimes remain semantically 
blind to the standards in force at the time of the ascription or denial. As Lewis claims, “…a 
player of language games who is so inclined may get away with it if he tries to raise the 
standards of precision as high as possible…”226 As I understand Lewis on this point, the 
uncooperative or Sneaky Player – if I may call him that – trying to “get away with it” is trying to 
raise the standards so that the other players will not see this change, and hence these other 
players will not be able to protest the Sneaky Player‟s move for the simple reason that they never 
saw it. This may not be cheating or breaking the rules of language games, but it is not exactly an 
innocent move either. That aside, often the conversational participants will be aware of the rules 
of accommodation, because they tacitly, if not explicitly, agree to them, as is evident from 
speakers conducting tests to see which standards are in effect and figure out what the 
conversational score is. But perhaps the other players will sometimes unwittingly let the Sneaky 
Player “get away with it,” and the standards will rise up accordingly. So much looks promising 
for Cohen‟s recent account. 
 It is doubtful that Cohen, however, can develop out of Lewis‟s explanation of the 
conversational score a suitable account of semantic blindness. One problem is that, although 
conversational participants can lose sight of the standards of precision during the course of a 
conversation, on Lewis‟s explanation of the conversational score, there may remain a real 
possibility of genuine disagreement between these participants. An ascriber could genuinely 
disagree with a denier if there is the (one and only) conversational score, and it reads in favour of 
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one of the conversational participants at the time of the ascription or denial.
227
 The account that 
Cohen needs to provide, however, must hold that the “knowledge”-ascription does not contradict 
the “knowledge”-denial at the same time.228 One piece of textual evidence that appears to 
challenge my reading is that Lewis clearly concedes to Unger that the ultra-precise standards at 
the time of the “flatness”-denial can be correct, but maintains that these standards do not conflict 
with the correctness of the less strict, rather imprecise, standards that were in force for the 
previous “flatness”-ascriptions in the original context. This seems to allow for a lack of 
contradiction. This is of no real help to Cohen, however. For notice that Lewis is giving a 
diachronic explanation, in the sense that he is explaining how the standards have mutated over 
time, whereas what Cohen needs for his recent account to work is a synchronic explanation, 
since contextualism states that both the ascriber and the denier can be correct at the same time, 
without contradiction.
229
 Therefore, Cohen cannot simply use Lewis‟s diachronic explanation, 
because Cohen needs a synchronic explanation to match his recent account of the indexicality of 
standards for the word “knows.”  
To elaborate on the possibility of a genuine dispute between ascribers and deniers, it 
appears that the Sneaky Player who “got away with it” wins if the scoreboard reads in his favour. 
Presumably, in similar circumstances, the uncooperative sceptic, as a conversational participant, 
would also win if the conversation were about “knowledge.” But a principal attractive feature of 
contextualism, if not a theoretical necessity for its viability, is its even-handedness and ability to 
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explain away disagreement, which is supposed to reveal that there is no winner or loser, and 
ultimately no real opposition between the sceptic and ascriber. Both participants can supposedly 
be simultaneously making “knowledge”-ascriptions and “knowledge”-denials according to non-
conflicting standards.
230
 The indexicality of “knowledge”-ascriptions and “knowledge”-denials – 
or the indexicality of “flatness”-ascriptions and “flatness”-denials, for that matter – is supposed 
to be what shows that speakers are really at “cross-purposes” or “talking past one another.” That 
the conversational participants can lose sight of the conversational score may be a form of 
semantic blindness – although something more akin to “conversational blindness” may be a 
better term for this – but it is not an explanation that will explain away the disagreement between 
ascribers and deniers. It is not, therefore, an explanation that will serve Cohen‟s purposes. 
What I have said so far presents theoretically difficulties for Cohen‟s recent account. But 
there may be a deeper, more fundamental, theoretical problem that Cohen must confront. Much 
of what I have said in criticizing Cohen hints at a toxic ambiguity that is lurking in the 
background, which, without Cohen removing it, threatens to poison his recent account. What is 
threatening is that the term “context” is ambiguous. As Bach (2005a) notes, the term “context” 
could either refer to those parameters whose values delimit the semantic values of context-
sensitive terms with variable contents or to the shared set of salient beliefs that speakers presume 
or presuppose in a particular conversation.
231
 Which sense of the term is Cohen using? This is a 
problem for Cohen, because he does not remove the ambiguity. This problem moves to the 
forefront, since it appears that Cohen is using the first sense of “context” when he discusses the 
semantics and indexicality of terms such as “knowledge” and “flat,” but Lewis seems to be using 
the second sense. Conflating the two senses, however, really confuses the two, because they have 
distinct features; roughly, the first sense being more akin to semantics, whereas the second is 
more akin to pragmatics. But without getting into thorny issues of classification or the specific 
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issue of whether indexicality is to be located in semantics or pragmatics or whether it lies nearer 
to the border – if there is a well-defined, non-fuzzy border or if there is any border at all – we 
may thankfully avoid these issues by noting that Cohen takes himself to be considering the 
semantics of indexicality and epistemic vocabulary.
232
 This would strongly suggest that the sense 
of “context” that Cohen has in mind is closer to the first sense, especially when he tries to find a 
suitable account of semantic blindness in Lewis‟s explanation of the conversational score. Yet 
Cohen cannot develop such an account out of Lewis‟s explanation of the conversational score, if 
Lewis is using “context” in the second sense of the set of shared salient beliefs presumed and 
presupposed by conversational participants – a description of the second sense of the term 
“context” which looks very similar to Lewis‟s own description of the conversational score.233  
Cohen cannot take the second option of elucidating the standards for “flatness”-
ascriptions or “knowledge”-ascriptions by using Lewis‟s idea of the conversational score. It is 
further difficult to see how Lewis‟s conversational participants could be semantically blind, 
although perhaps they could temporarily suffer from something more akin to “conversational 
blindness.” But even if they were to suffer from semantic blindness, there would still need to be 
a lack of genuine disagreement between the ascriber and denier and a form of evenhandedness 
exemplified by the contextualist. Yet, given that Lewis provides a diachronic explanation of a 
lack of contradiction, it may be that conversational participants can genuinely disagree with one 
another if the conversational score reads in their favour. Many of the same problems with the old 
account of the word “knows” as an indexical return and remain unresolved in Cohen‟s recent 
account of indexicality.  
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2.10 In the Grip of “Flatness”-Scepticism 
But where does this negative conclusion leave us? Does it mean that we should accept Unger‟s 
observation that the meaning of the term “flat” is simply absolute, after all? But if so, then we 
would have to also accept the rather unpalatable sceptical conclusion that follows from this. I 
think that Cohen is right to reject Unger‟s conclusion, but my reasons for being opposed to 
Unger are not ascriber contextualist reasons. The main point of my raising these questions, 
however, is to acknowledge that Cohen may have some of the facts or data right about how 
speakers behave when these speakers consider whether or not a surface is flat. Yet it is my 
contention that even if Cohen is right about some of these facts or data, he provides the wrong 
theoretical explanation of them.  
The following is Cohen‟s (2008) characterization of how a speaker can go from being a 
confident ascriber of “flatness”-ascriptions to quickly being overtaken by Ungerian 
considerations and engulfed by scepticism:  
But when we are in the grip of „flatness skepticism,‟ we are inclined to deny the truth of 
previous utterances of the form „X is flat.‟ That is, we mistakenly think that our utterance 
„Nothing is flat‟ conflicts with our (and others‟) previous utterances of the form „X is 
flat.‟234  
Cohen continues by providing a theoretical explanation to cover both phenomena of “flatness”-
scepticism and “knowledge”-scepticism: 
This is exactly the same kind of mistake the contextualist attributes to us regarding 
„knows.‟ So it appears that competent speakers can be blind to the context sensitivity of a 
term in their language. This lends credibility to the contextualist‟s claim that competent 
speakers are semantically blind with respect to „knows.‟235   
I have supplied reasons to challenge Cohen‟s main claim that cases of speakers‟ being 
semantically blind to the indexicality of “flatness”-ascriptions are analogous to cases of 
speakers‟ being semantically blind to terms in the epistemic vocabulary. To his credit, Cohen 
immediately acknowledges a relevant disanalogy between these two supposed forms of semantic 
blindness: “There is, however, a relevant disanalogy between „know‟ and „flat.‟ Contextualist 
theories of flatness ascriptions gain easy and widespread acceptance among people, but 
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contextualist theories of knowledge do not.”236 I am not so sure about Cohen‟s empirical claim 
that contextualist theories of “flatness”-ascriptions “gain easy and widespread acceptance among 
people.”  
In response, I will use Dretkse‟s (1981; 1991) relevant alternatives theory to provide an 
alternative explanation of Cohen‟s claim about the widespread acceptance of contextualist 
theories of “flatness”-ascriptions in the next section. For now note that there is a deeper sense in 
which these alleged forms of semantic blindness are disanalogous, even by the contextualist‟s 
own lights, but which Cohen fails to fully report in his reporting of the above disanalogy: in 
considerations of “knowledge,” the supposed “intuition” that generates the so-called sceptical 
“paradox” is that speakers rather freely admit to not knowing the falsity of sceptical error-
possibilities. In considerations of “flatness,” however, speakers only grudgingly accept 
“flatness”-scepticism – after all, they have to be in its grip – and find such sceptical error-
possibilities counterintuitive and Unger‟s general sceptical conclusion outlandish. Cases of 
“flatness”-scepticism, however, are supposed to be a very similar to cases of “knowledge”-
scepticism, since Cohen ultimately wants to use the former cases to explain the latter cases.  
Unlike the contextualist, however, I really do not wish to have this discussion to be in 
terms of intuitions. As Bach (2005b) claims, talk of intuitions is a risky business for philosophers 
to engage in for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that we may be simply wrong 
about our own alleged intuitions or the alleged intuitions of others.
237
 Furthermore, philosophical 
intuitions are thought to constrain theories and used to judge theories as plausible or implausible, 
whereas facts or data, some of which I am taking Cohen to be presenting in his purported cases 
of “flatness”-scepticism, are to be explained by and incorporated into theories.238  
I will take Cohen‟s description of the behavior of speakers in the so-called grip of 
“flatness”-scepticism as containing some data that should be explained theoretically, although I 
have qualms and reservations about Cohen‟s description, since I think that something more akin 
to speaker confusion or a loss of confidence is happening. Unlike Cohen, I do not think that 
speakers in the so-called grip of “flatness”-scepticism are inclined to deny their previous claims, 
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but rather, in these situations, speakers will simply retract previous claims because of a loss of 
confidence. To be more specific, Cohen views ascribers who suddenly find themselves in the so-
called grip of “flatness”-scepticism to be mistakenly thinking that there is a conflict between 
their previous “flatness”-ascription and their current “flatness”-denial. Doubtless, Cohen needs to 
say this to explain how the ascription and denial have different meanings and are really non-
contradictory. In the case of knowledge, however, I think it would be better to view the speaker 
as failing to meet the doxastic or belief condition, which is because of a lack of confidence. So, 
the speaker may feel some conflict, yet not of the kind that comes from the speaker having a 
belief and subsequent disbelief about the same proposition, but rather a belief and then a loss of 
that belief. A similar assessment should be made for Cohen‟s description of the speaker going 
from making confident “flatness”-ascriptions to then supposedly making “flatness”-denials 
(which should be viewed as retractions of the “flatness”-ascriptions, in my opinion). In what 
follows, I will present Dretske‟s (1981) relevant alternatives theory and his clarification of it 
(1991) as a non-contextualist theory that provides a way around Unger‟s general sceptical 
conclusion. I also intend for Dretske‟s theory to provide an alternative explanation of Cohen‟s 
description of being in the grip of “flatness”-scepticism.239        
2.11 Dretske’s Theory and Relationally Absolute Terms 
Using his version of the relevant alternatives theory, Dretske (1981) claims that “flat” is a 
relationally absolute term – along with the terms “empty” and “knows.”240 To understand what 
he means by a relationally absolute term, consider first the mundane fact that the term “flat” is 
liberally applied by speakers to different types of surfaces, such as roads, fields, tables, and so 
on. According to Dretske, whether the application of the term “flat” is correct or incorrect 
crucially depends on the type of surface being considered at the time of the application. Dretske 
argues that what counts as a relevant bump on a table, for instance, may not count as a relevant 
bump on a road.
241
 From this observation, Dretske claims that there are distinct thresholds for 
each type of surface. In applying the term “flat” to a type of surface, Dretske holds that, after the 
distinct threshold has been passed, there will be no more relevant alternatives in the form of, say, 
bumps, to rule out for that type of surface. This means that if X is a flat road, then road Y cannot 
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be any flatter than road X, since all of the relevant bumps for road X as a road, as that type of 
surface, have already been ruled out. Dretske‟s theory, then, expresses the absolute character of 
the term “flat,” since another road cannot be flatter than a flat road – both roads as tokens of that 
type of surface – while the term also exhibits a relational character, since whether the road is flat 
is in relation to the type of surface that it is.
242
  
Unger (1984) proposes another somewhat complimentary interpretation of Dretske‟s idea 
of a relationally absolute term, which is to view it as revealing a theory of sortalism: the theory 
that the identity conditions of a thing depend on the sort of thing that it is.
243
 Although this 
provides a different angle from which to understand Dretske‟s relevant alternatives theory and 
his idea of a relationally absolute term, Unger‟s interpretation of Dretske as a sortalist should 
receive cautious acceptance at best. This is because Dretske‟s interest is with regard to the 
identity of a thing as having the relevant property in question. That is to say, Dretske is not 
interested in identifying, say, roads as a sort of thing per se, but rather is interested in identifying 
roads which have the relevant property of being flat. Flat roads may be a sort of road, but to say 
so is to make a qualification on sortalism – to make the identity conditions depend on both the 
sort of thing that the thing is and the sort of thing having the relevant property that those sorts of 
things have – which is my reason for saying that Unger‟s interpretation should receive cautious 
acceptance, if it receives any acceptance at all.     
 In the face of Unger‟s (1975) threatening sceptical conclusion, Dretske‟s (1981) theory 
holds the possibility of relief and compromise. Dretske agrees with Unger that the term “flat” has 
an absolute character.
244
 Yet he disagrees with Unger that any bump, visible or microscopic, on a 
particular surface, simply disqualifies that surface from being flat, since what counts as a bump 
will depend on the type of surface under consideration. Dretske‟s treatment of the term “flat” as 
a relationally absolute term captures the distinctive semantic character of the term, on which 
Unger focuses, while it allows the term to also exhibit the “contextual relativity,” which is 
manifested in the way that ordinary speakers liberally, but not incorrectly, make claims about 
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objects and surfaces in the world. Dretske‟s treatment of relationally absolute terms harmonizes 
and explains semantic considerations, pragmatic interests, and empirical facts about the way in 
which speakers behave. It also has the theoretical virtue of avoiding Unger‟s sceptical conclusion 
that speakers are massively ignorant, for, according to Dretske, speakers can accept the term 
“flat” as an absolute term and still apply it to surfaces which have irrelevant bumps on them.245   
More recently, in response to Cohen‟s (1991) insistence that particular temporary 
conversational interests of speakers set the standards for the correct application of context-
sensitive terms, Dretske (1991) clarifies his (1981) theory by contending that group interests can 
play a significant role in setting the threshold for the relevant alternatives that need to be ruled 
out.
246
 Dretske‟s (1981) previous statement of the relevant alternatives theory did not discuss 
how group interests could play this role, and the correct application of the term under 
consideration seemed to depend simply on the type of thing under consideration. To appreciate 
Dretske‟s (1991) reason for making this clarification, consider, for instance, that a teacher may 
walk into a classroom and remark that “it is empty,” because there are no students or other 
people present, while a custodian may enter that same classroom at the same time and remark 
that “it is not empty,” because there are many chairs, desks, and other furniture in the classroom. 
According to Dretske‟s clarified theory (1991), the teacher and custodian, as representatives of 
different groups with different interests, are not contradicting one another in stating that the 
classroom is empty and not empty at the same time, because their statements differ with respect 
to the correct application of the terms and the relevant alternatives that need to be ruled out to 
correctly say of a space, in the form of the classroom, that it is empty. The thresholds are set 
differently in this case, which are in relation to the interests of the representatives. Although he 
does not say so, Dretske‟s (1991) clarification of his (1981) theory makes the “relational” aspect 
of relationally absolute terms more prominent, because a surface is flat in relation to both its 
type and group interests. 
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Contextualists seek to have the particular, if not peculiar and perhaps sometimes even 
idiosyncratic, temporary conversational interests of ascribers and deniers play a decisive role in 
setting the standards which determine the correct application of relationally absolute terms.
247
 
For the contextualist whether the application of the term is correct or incorrect will be in relation 
to the conversational context of the ascriber or denier.
248
 The contextual relativity with which 
Dretske is concerned, however, is beyond particular temporary conversational interests. For 
Dretske is concerned with longer-lasting, more permanent, group interests. Group interests often 
will anchor the error-possibilities in what the speakers qua representatives assume the world to 
be like. Yet, despite the diversity of group interests, this does not threaten to set things adrift. For 
with a high degree of regularity, these group interests will coincide with one another about what 
the world is generally like, with different members agreeing that the world has some flat 
stretches of road, flat slates on pool tables, flat tops of desks, and so on – even if, say, the 
speaker qua pool player judges the tops of desks generally to be too bumpy to cover them up 
with slate and felt and turn them into pool tables. This is in stark contrast to what contextualism 
sometimes permits, since, to give an explanation of “knowledge”-scepticism or “flatness”-
scepticism, the contextualist must honour and take seriously even those radical sceptical error-
possibilities raised by the sceptic in sometimes free-floating, radical sceptical, conversational 
contexts. On this score, it is telling that the contextualist claims to have a clear understanding of 
how the standards rise, but admits that it remains a mystery as to how those standards drop down 
again: “But for some reason raising of standards goes more smoothly than lowering.”249 Notice 
that this is not a difficulty for Dretske, however, because thresholds shift with and track the 
changes of the speaker qua representative‟s interests. Speakers can be different representatives 
on different occasions. For example, a speaker qua detective announces that “the room is full (of 
fingerprints)” on one occasion, but later that speaker, now as speaker qua teacher, can announce 
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of the same classroom that “the room is not full (of people),” naively ignoring any forensic 
evidence at the scene. In this case, the larger set of relevant alternatives decreases with a shift in 
the speaker‟s role, which is similar to a shift from higher to lower standards. Unless the 
contextualist can solve the mystery of how the standards can shift back down after they have 
gone up, then the particular temporary conversational interests of the denier raising radical 
sceptical possibilities poses a serious theoretical difficulty for the contextualist. Dretske‟s theory 
can meet this criticism. Better yet, the contextualist criticisms of Dretske on this matter are at 
best “doubled-edged” – with the rather sharper edge, if I may say so, facing the contextualist.  
But what explains “flatness”-scepticism? How can speakers go from being extremely 
confident in making judgments about flat surfaces to subsequently doubting whether those same 
particular surfaces are flat? Jonathan Vogel (1990) cites as evidence of such a phenomenon that 
when ordinary speakers attend to error-possibilities the very act of attending to them makes 
ordinary speakers treat even rather improbable error-possibilities as much more likely.
250
 In these 
circumstances, speakers tend to have strong doubts about whether they really know what they 
originally claimed to know, and then often retract claims to knowledge. The evidence that Vogel 
cites may also explain cases of “flatness”-scepticism. The speaker claiming that, say, the table is 
flat, may retract that claim if someone else calls attention to an unrealized error-possibility, such 
as that there may be unseen bumps on its surface. The claim may be retracted for the sole reason 
that the person who attends to the error-possibility may treat that error-possibility as having a 
much higher probability than it actually has. Even if that speaker retracts the claim, but really 
should have continued to claim that the table is flat, because she had indeed ruled out all of the 
relevant alternatives, this would not tell against Dretske‟s theory. In this case, the speaker qua 
representative may be simply confused about which standards are in effect. This would be 
especially possible if the conversational participants are different representatives using different 
standards for the application of the same term. But could there be any place for the Ungerian 
sceptic on Dretske‟s view? I would suggest that there could be, and that that sceptic exemplifies 
the standards of a geometer, although such a geometer would have to be rather eccentric to go 
out of her way to deny the flatness-claims of others. Yet even these standards remain legitimate. 
Moreover, unlike contextualist standards, these standards often remain public – for all eyes to 
see.    
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CHAPTER 3 
THE “SKEPTICAL PROBLEM,” TRACKING, AND CONTEXTUALISM 
I intend for this final chapter to support my claim that distinctively epistemological commitments 
to either internalism or externalism make the difference for whether the sceptical “paradox” 
arises. The focus will be on DeRose‟s (1995) externalist contextualist “solution” to what he calls 
the “Skeptical Problem,” which he admits only differs from Cohen‟s sceptical “paradox” with 
respect to its name and details.
251
 DeRose relies on Nozick‟s (1981) philosophical explanation of 
radical scepticism, which comes out of Nozick‟s subjunctive conditionals account of knowledge. 
Nozick admits that agents cannot know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses, but maintains 
that this has no tendency to prevent agents from continuing to know ordinary empirical 
propositions. A familiar pattern emerges: Nozick rejects the closure principle in the face of 
radical sceptical hypotheses, but in the process mistakenly compromises his externalist 
commitments by making an internalist assumption about knowledge when radical sceptical 
hypotheses are under examination. To preserve the closure principle and avoid what he calls 
“abominable conjunctions,” DeRose contextualizes Nozick‟s subjunctive conditionals account of 
knowledge. Since DeRose is an externalist about knowledge, if he were aware of Nozick‟s 
mistake, then DeRose would realize that the application of ascriber contextualism is simply 
unnecessary. The “Skeptical Problem” is not a problem for the externalist who remains steadfast 
in his commitments to externalism.   
3.1 Solving the “Skeptical Problem” and the Argument from Ignorance   
DeRose (1992; 1995) observes that, “Contextual theories of knowledge attributions have almost 
invariably been developed with an eye towards providing some kind of answer to philosophical 
skepticism.”252 DeRose (1995) continues to propose intriguing ways of answering “philosophical 
skepticism” in a distinctively contextualist manner. More than just answering the sceptic, 
however, DeRose claims to have solved the “Skeptical Problem.”253 But what is the “Skeptical 
Problem”? The “Skeptical Problem” is to figure out exactly what is wrong with the Argument 
from Ignorance. So we must understand this argument to see what the problem is.  
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Where “O” stands for an ordinary proposition (for example, the proposition “I have hands”) and 
“H” a sceptical hypothesis (for example, the hypothesis “I am a bodiless brain-in-a-vat 
[henceforth, BIV] who has been electrochemically stimulated to have extremely similar 
experiences to those experiences I would have or have had outside of the vat”), DeRose presents 
the Argument from Ignorance (henceforth, the Argument) as follows:  
(1) I don‟t know that not-H 
(2) If I don‟t know that not-H, then I don‟t know that O. So,  
(3) I don‟t know that O.254   
DeRose‟s Argument has the same structure as the argument for closure-based scepticism. 
DeRose‟s Argument also receives the same kind of contextualist treatment that Cohen (1988, 
1999) gives to the argument for closure-based scepticism, which is to quarantine the Argument 
to the sceptical context and keep the quotidian context pristine and free of scepticism. But unlike 
Cohen‟s (1988, 1999) internalist contextualist treatment of scepticism, DeRose‟s (1995) 
contextualist treatment of scepticism is externalist.
255
 Moreover, DeRose claims that his 
contextualist externalist “solution” to the Argument better explains how it is that speakers could 
become ensnared by having conflicting “intuitions.” When the Argument is made using a radical 
sceptical scenario, such as the BIV scenario, DeRose holds that ordinary speakers sometimes 
find premises (1) and (2) intuitive, but have a strong intuition against the conclusion (3). As in 
the argument for closure-based scepticism, the problem, however, is that if premises (1) and (2) 
are true and the Argument is valid, then this deductively necessitates the conclusion (3). Yet no 
one but the sceptic claims that the Argument is sound without qualification. The contextualist 
claims that the Argument is sometimes sound, but quickly makes a number of qualifications on 
this claim; first, that the Argument is sound only in the sceptical context, in which premise (1) 
and the conclusion (3) are true; and second that premise (2), as a partial expression of the closure 
principle, holds relative to the sceptical context, so that the set of entailments of the main 
proposition in the sceptical context have the property of being closed. DeRose‟s externalist 
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“solution” to the Argument has an advantage over Cohen‟s internalist “solution,” given that 
Cohen‟s characterization of intrinsically rational beliefs appears to be ad hoc. This makes 
DeRose‟s “solution” worthy of closer examination.    
After DeRose presents the Argument, he defends the view that the Argument indeed 
poses a real epistemological problem. He defends this view from both an uncritical dismissive 
response and what he calls “the Moorean reaction,” both of which are responses that try to block 
the Argument by rejecting premise (1) that I do not know that sceptical hypotheses are false. To 
those who respond uncritically and dismissively to the possibility of being a BIV because of the 
sheer improbability of this, DeRose replies, “For however improbable or even bizarre it may 
seem to suppose that I am a BIV, it also seems that I don‟t know that I‟m not one.”256 But why 
do I fail to know that I am not a BIV? Notice that DeRose casts the Argument in terms of what I 
can know from within a first-person perspective. DeRose believes that the most effective radical 
sceptical hypotheses employ this perspective, especially when he observes and then asks: “Upon 
hearing the hypothesis, typically one can‟t help but projecting oneself into it. How would things 
seem to me if that situation obtained?”257 This first-person perspective is a prominent feature of 
the Argument, which Duncan Pritchard (2005) focuses on in his characterization of how radical 
sceptical hypotheses pose problems:  
The problem that a sceptical hypothesis such as the BIV hypothesis poses is that it is 
subjectively indistinguishable to the agent whether her experiences indicate that the 
world is as she takes it to be as opposed to being completely unlike how she takes it to be, 
which it would be if she were the victim of the sceptical hypothesis.
258
     
The BIV in DeRose‟s paradigmatic example of a radical sceptical hypothesis is supposedly 
having experiences sufficiently similar to those that I am having right now, but the BIV‟s 
experiences are caused by it being hooked up to a super-computer which generates its 
experiences, unlike mine which are supposedly being caused by my being a human and standing 
in a certain relation to the (non-vat) world – at least I hope so. If I were the BIV being 
electrochemically stimulated, however, it is imaginable that I would still have experiences like 
those experiences that I am having right now. Presumably, if I were a BIV, I would have no idea 
of it, for my experiences, from my point of view, would be subjectively indistinguishable to me, 
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either as caused by the BIV or being a human in the world. The apparent problem posed by the 
BIV radical sceptical hypothesis, then, is for me to know that I am not a BIV and figure out how 
I can know this. DeRose‟s point about the effectiveness of the BIV hypothesis is that I cannot 
rule it out on the basis that it seems to me that I am not a BIV, for that is how it would seem to 
me if I were one. But if we concede premises (1) and (2), then the sceptic appears to be an 
inference away from carrying the day.    
From a theoretical point of view, I do not think that the Argument is a problem for the 
externalist about knowledge, and that it, therefore, should not bother DeRose either, despite him 
staunchly defending its status as a genuine problem for all epistemologists. The “Skeptical 
Problem” is rather a problem for the internalist about knowledge. Accordingly, as an externalist 
about knowledge, DeRose proposes a contextualist “solution” to the “Skeptical Problem” which 
is ultimately poorly motivated and unnecessary. My reasons for thinking so will become clearer 
as these sections develop.      
To deal with the Moorean reaction that counters with common sense and denies that the 
Argument exposes any such ignorance on the part of putative knowers, DeRose contends that the 
Moorean reaction fails to explain how anyone could ever be ensnared by the Argument: “In 
seeking a solution to this puzzle, we should seek an explanation of how we fell into the skeptical 
trap in the first place...”259 Thus, just like Cohen (1988, 1999), DeRose argues that the Moorean 
reaction fails to meet a desideratum for a satisfying resolution of the Argument. 
DeRose further holds that an adequate resolution of the Argument has to account for, 
what Pritchard (2001) calls, the “phenomenology of scepticism,” which requires that we explain 
why ascribers often refrain from making “knowledge”-ascriptions when sceptical hypotheses are 
the topic of conversation and how conversational factors can be sufficient to cause this form of 
behaviour in ascribers.
260
 To account for the “the phenomenology of scepticism,” DeRose 
attempts to refine and contextualize Nozick‟s philosophical explanation of radical scepticism, 
which uses an externalist subjunctive conditionals account of knowledge.
261
 DeRose‟s main 
supposed refinements include: avoiding abominable conjunctions that arise from Nozick‟s 
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rejection of the closure principle; and removing the threat of scepticism, while preserving the 
closure principle, by endorsing ascriber contextualism. I need to present the most critical parts of 
Nozick‟s subjunctive conditionals account of knowledge to put us in a position to appreciate and 
criticize both DeRose‟s account of the “phenomenology of scepticism” and his attempt to solve 
the “Skeptical Problem.”  
3.2 Nozick’s Subjunctive Conditionals Account of Knowledge 
Nozick (1981) defines knowledge as follows: “knowledge is a real relationship to the facts, 
subjunctively contoured.”262 In seeking an externalist account of knowledge, Nozick tentatively 
proposes, as a first approximation, four individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions 
on knowledge.
263
 Where “p” is some ordinary contingent proposition and “S” is a subject, 
Nozick claims that the following four conditions must hold in order for S to know that p:  
(a) Truth Condition: p is true 
(b) Belief Condition: S believes that p  
(c) Variation Condition: If p were not true, S would not believe that p 
(d) Adherence Condition: If p were true, S would believe that p.264 
When conditions (a) and (b) are met, these conditions hold in the actual world as a matter of fact, 
whereas conditions (c) and (d) are tracking conditions containing subjunctive conditionals, which 
are met by a possible-worlds-analysis, in which the agent‟s belief tracks the truth (of p) through 
different possible worlds. The tracking conditions (c) and (d) are intended to ensure that the 
factual conditions (a) and (b) are non-accidentally related to one another, with the variation 
condition (c) being the one on which Nozick primarily focuses.
265
 On Nozick‟s view, the 
tracking conditions ensure that that agent‟s true belief is responsive to counterfactual 
circumstances, which makes the true belief non-accidental in the actual world and an instance of 
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knowledge.
266
 Nozick‟s account of knowledge is admittedly externalist, because the agent cannot 
be cognitively aware of the non-accidental connection between the factual conditions (a) and (b), 
since possible worlds and counterfactuals are a matter of analysis, which remain beyond that 
agent‟s first-person perspective.267 A consideration of Nozick‟s concern over conditions (a) and 
(b) standing in a non-accidental relationship to one another, together with his denial of the need 
for any intermediate justification condition (as traditionally understood) on knowledge, reveals 
the kinship between Nozick‟s account and Armstrong‟s (1973) externalism; although Armstrong 
stresses the naturalistic character of the crucial relationship between belief and truth in the actual 
world, whereas Nozick finds subjunctive contours on that relationship.
268
     
To explain how the tracking conditions (c) and (d) are met, Nozick provides a possible-
worlds-analysis.
269
 Understood as an analytic tool, a possible world is a world which is supposed 
to be causally isolated from the actual world and other possible worlds, and which differs from 
the actual world in a certain relevant respect that makes it useful to an analysis of subjunctive 
conditionals.
270
 Possible worlds are ordered in terms of their similarity to the actual world, with 
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nearby possible worlds being much more similar to the actual world than are far away ones.
271
 
With this possible-worlds-analysis in mind, Nozick‟s aim is to figure out whether the agent, if 
resituated in a possible world where what was believed in the actual world would now be false 
because at least one fact about the actual world is different in the nearby possible world, would 
in that possible world now (mistakenly) believe what that agent did in the actual world. If so, 
then the agent‟s actual world belief is merely accidental.272 Essentially, Nozick is trying to find 
out whether the agent‟s belief in the actual world would track the truth across possible worlds or 
if the agent in the possible world would simply lose sight of these tracks that lead to the truth. To 
get a sense of how this analysis is supposed to work, consider, for instance, the most widely cited 
example in the literature: the proposition “I have hands.” To know this proposition, we need to 
see whether my belief tracks the truth. In the actual world, assume it is true both that I have 
hands and that I believe I have two. Consequently, conditions (a) and (b) are met. For my true 
belief to be an instance of knowledge, however, we need to test the strength of this connection 
between the factual conditions (a) and (b) by using subjunctive conditionals and the possible-
worlds-analysis. One nearby possible world, slightly different from ours, in which the 
proposition “I have hands” is false is the possible world where I have been the victim of a grisly 
accident and have lost my hands. One far away possible world, very different from ours, in 
which the proposition “I have hands” is false is the possible world where I am a handless BIV 
hooked up to a super-computer on Alpha Centauri. This is a far away possible world, since the 
actual world is radically dissimilar to this possible world, with this far away possible world 
having super-technology that we do not currently have. Most important to this analysis, however, 
is to notice that were I in that nearby possible world where I have been the victim of that grisly 
accident, my belief would indeed track the truth, because I would see that my hands are missing 
and would thereby believe that I am handless.
273
 Yet this is not so in the far away possible world 
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where I am a BIV on Alpha Centauri, since I would continue to (falsely) believe that I have 
hands, given that the super-computer feeds me (as a BIV) a simulated experience of hands, 
although I am really a handless BIV. Therefore, my belief that I have hands would not track the 
truth in this far away possible world or in far away possible worlds generally. 
From this general conclusion, that I do not know the denials of radical sceptical 
hypotheses because my beliefs do not track the truth in far away possible worlds, Nozick thinks 
that he must reject the closure principle. For given that the proposition “I have hands” entails the 
falsity of “I am a handless-BIV,” Nozick thinks that it must be the case that if I can know that “I 
have hands” (in nearby possible worlds), can know that this proposition entails the falsity of the 
entailment that “I am a handless-BIV,” but yet always fail to know this entailment that “I am not 
a handless-BIV” (in far away possible worlds), then the closure principle does not hold. It is 
worth noting that Nozick, unlike Dretske (1970), is not explicitly giving a relevant alternatives 
account of knowledge to motivate his rejection of the closure principle, although Nozick‟s 
account holds that in order for the subject to have knowledge that subject‟s belief must track the 
truth in all of the nearby possible worlds, a subset of the possible worlds, which makes some 
theoretical commitment to salience or relevance, however implicit.
274
 The major problem with 
Nozick‟s rejection of the closure principle, however, is that he ends up compromising his 
externalist commitments by making an internalist assumption about the method by which the 
agent gains a belief.  
In rejecting the closure principle, Nozick makes a mistake remarkably similar to 
Dretske‟s mistake, insofar as both externalists compromise their externalist commitments by 
claiming that subjects do not know the denials of sceptical alternatives, because these subjects 
cannot, from a first-person perspective, have such knowledge. To see this mistake, we need to 
appreciate Nozick‟s peculiar characterization of the term “method.” On Nozick‟s considered 
account of knowledge, factual condition (b) and counterfactual conditions (c) and (d) need to 
hold relative to the method used by the subject in coming to a belief. Nozick demonstrates this 
need using his famous example of the grandmother:  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
limb syndrome. In these variations of the example, I may believe that I have hands, despite having none, which 
would mean that my belief would not track the truth in these circumstances.    
274
 This commitment should not be surprising, however, given that possible worlds are ordered according to how 
similar they are to the actual world.  
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A grandmother sees her grandson is well when he comes to visit; but if he were sick or 
dead, others would tell her he was well to spare her upset. Yet this does not mean she 
doesn‟t know he is well (or at least ambulatory) when she sees him. Clearly, we must 
restate our conditions to take explicit account of the ways and methods of arriving at the 
belief.
275
 
Nozick clearly needs to distinguish which method is being used to come to the relevant belief 
when testing knowledge, since, in the grandmother example, the grandmother‟s belief that her 
grandson is well, gained from seeing him, indeed tracks the truth in nearby possible worlds; 
whereas, this same belief, gained from the testimony of her family, would not track the truth in 
nearby possible worlds. On the one hand, in a nearby possible where her grandson would be sick 
in a hospital bed, were the grandmother to base her belief on sight, then the grandmother would 
not believe that he is well, since she would not see him as being even ambulatory. On the other 
hand, in a nearby possible world where her grandson is sick in a hospital bed, were she to base 
her belief on the testimony of her family, then the grandmother would now (falsely) believe that 
her grandson is well. The grandmother‟s belief tracks the truth via the method of sight, but not 
via the method of testimony, which makes it necessary to identify the method that the agent used 
to gain the belief when evaluating whether a true belief counts as knowledge. Although Nozick 
clearly distinguishes the method of sight from that of testimony in the grandmother example, 
what should we say about the previous example of having hands? Should we also distinguish 
between methods, making sure to distinguish between my seeing I have hands from my being a 
BIV having a simulated experience of having hands when in fact I have none?  
 One would think that the answer to this question is that these are definitely 
distinguishable methods being used in coming to the belief that I have hands; namely, that basing 
my belief that I have hands on sight is distinguishable in terms of method from basing my belief 
that I have hands on receiving stimulation from the super-computer to which I am, as the BIV, 
connected. Nozick claims that an agent can use a method “...without knowledge or awareness of 
what method he is using,” as any thoroughgoing externalist should.276 But Nozick goes on to 
characterize “method” using a distinctively internalist criterion:  
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...any method experientially the same, the same „from the inside‟, will count as the same 
method. Basing our beliefs on experiences, you and I and the person floating in the tank 
are using, for these purposes, the same method.
277
  
To make this equivalence of method based on experiential or phenomenological sameness is, for 
the externalist, to make an egregious mistake. The reason it is egregious is that externalists claim 
that knowledge depends on external relations; that is to say, on whether my beliefs are in fact 
appropriately connected to the world, and so these beliefs need not depend on what I know from 
within a first-person perspective, even in the face of radical sceptical alternatives.
278
 In response 
to Nozick, Michael Williams (1991) asks the following critical question: “Whether my beliefs 
track the truth is not determined by „internal‟ factors, so why should the method I am using be 
individuated in such terms?”279 I submit that Nozick individuates methods in internalist terms for 
the very same reason that Dretske (1970; 2005) disallowed subjects from knowing the falsity of 
sceptical alternatives; namely, because Nozick too is trying to prevent bootstrapping in 
epistemology by denying the closure principle, and achieves this through his internalist 
characterization of methods. Let me briefly try to justify this claim.  
In considering what a subject can know from within the first-person perspective when 
that subject is using the method of deductive inference, a method which centrally concerns the 
status of the closure principle, Nozick writes:  
The problem is that the method of inferring q from know p is indistinguishable by the 
person from the method of inferring q from (believed) p. We have said that knowledge is 
a real connection of belief to the world, tracking, and though this view is external to the 
viewpoint of the knower, as compared to traditional treatments, it does treat the method 
he uses as identified from the inside, to the extent it is guided by internal cues and 
appearances.
280
       
This is one of the main pieces of argumentation that Nozick uses to justify his claim that 
seemingly different methods which are experientially (internally) alike are really the same 
method. For instance, when I use the method of deductive inference, Nozick is arguing that I 
cannot know, from my knowing that I have hands, and my knowing that I have hands entails that 
I am not a BIV, that I am, therefore, not a BIV. This is a closure argument which I am attempting 
                                                          
277
 Nozick 1981, 184-185.  
278 Perhaps, especially so, since it looks like radical sceptical alternatives are testing an externalist‟s commitment to 
externalism.   
279 Williams 1991, 343.  
280
 Nozick 1981, 232.  
99 
 
to make, but one which I fail to make, according to Nozick, because I cannot know this 
entailment on Nozick‟s possible-worlds-analysis (provided, of course, that this peculiar 
characterization of methods is in place). Doubtless, if I have hands, and a BIV is a handless 
being, then this entails that I am not a BIV. There is nothing objectionable with this inferential 
process. But in blocking the inference about what I can know from a limited first-person 
perspective, from the method I am using, Nozick is making precisely the same kind of mistake 
that Dretske (1970) makes in not realizing that my knowing, from a first-person perspective, that 
I am not a BIV, is not an entailment of my knowing that I have hands. To be clear, “my 
knowing” is simply not found among the logical consequences of known propositions. 
Knowledge from a first-person perspective lies outside of the scope of the closure principle, so 
that it would not be my knowing from within the first-person perspective the falsity of a sceptical 
hypothesis. This is why Nozick‟s thinking otherwise undermines his motivation for rejecting the 
closure principle. For an externalist, the way I can know that I am not a BIV is not from within a 
first-person perspective, but rather is by the way in which my belief is in fact appropriately 
related to the world, which would include factual conditions and may also include counterfactual 
conditions, all of which can remain outside of my perspective and external to me. Nozick should 
have kept saying so. He should not have compromised his externalist commitments by making 
an internalist assumption about methods in the face of the BIV radical sceptical hypothesis.  
3.3 DeRose’s Rule of Sensitivity and the Phenomenology of Scepticism 
 DeRose‟s externalist contextualist account of non-propositional “knowledge” relies on 
Nozick‟s idea of tracking, especially Nozick‟s variation condition, to account for the 
“phenomenology of scepticism.”281 DeRose is trying to explain how conversational factors in the 
conversational context, in which the ascription is made, could raise the standards that determine 
the proper application of “knowledge”-ascriptions to epistemic subjects. Recall that DeRose 
(1992) was concerned with how attributor or contextual factors, such as the mentioning or 
considering of error-possibilities in conversational contexts, could cause variation in the truth-
                                                          
281
 Recall that, for the contextualist, the word “knowledge” should be put in scare quotes to mark that contextualism 
is a metalinguistic thesis, involing semantic ascent, which is about the meaning of the word “knowledge,” and not 
about propositional knowledge. I have tried to do this throughout, and this is a perfect example of why it is 
important to do so. In DeRose‟s words: “Unlike Nozick, I‟m not presenting an analysis of propositional 
knowledge”(DeRose 1995, 21). This is because DeRose, as a contextualist, is concerned with the meaning of the 
word “knowledge” and how that word is context-sensitive. 
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conditions or semantic standards that determine the meaning of “knowledge”-ascriptions.282 In 
building upon this idea, DeRose (1995) tries to discover the conversational mechanism that shifts 
contexts and explains how contextual factors can cause variation in the meaning of 
“knowledge”-ascriptions. It is crucial for DeRose to do so, since he claims that the “knowledge”-
ascription in the quotidian context means something different from the “knowledge”-ascription 
in the sceptical context. 
 By leaning on Nozick‟s understanding of tracking, DeRose claims that the context-
shifting conversational mechanism is the following Rule of Sensitivity:  
When it is asserted that some subject S knows (or does not know) some proposition P, the 
standards for knowledge (the standards for how good an epistemic position one must be 
in to count as knowing) tend to be raised, if need be, to such a level as to require S‟s 
belief in that particular P to be sensitive for it to count as knowledge.
283
    
Richard Feldman (2001) provides a nice gloss on what DeRose means by “sensitivity”: “S‟s 
belief that p is sensitive if it is not the case that if p were false, S would believe p.”284 DeRose‟s 
Rule of Sensitivity, then, is really Nozick‟s variation condition applied to non-propositional 
“knowledge” in a conversational context. Feldman also succinctly captures DeRose‟s notion of 
strength of epistemic position as it is applied to DeRose‟s “solution” to the “Skeptical Problem” 
as follows: “The strength of one‟s epistemic position is measured by the range of worlds through 
which one accurately tracks the truth value of a proposition. The further out from reality that one 
tracks a proposition, the stronger one‟s epistemic position.”285 However, as Feldman also 
correctly points out, context plays a key role in determining what DeRose calls “the sphere of 
epistemically relevant worlds,” in which the subject‟s belief needs to remain sensitive in this set 
of possible worlds for that subject to have “knowledge.”286 Consequently, if the BIV sceptical 
hypothesis, for instance, is raised in a conversation, then when the ascriber tries to ascribe 
“knowledge” to the subject, that subject must be in a strong enough epistemic position to rule out 
the BIV hypothesis. This would mean that that subject‟s belief must remain sensitive in the far 
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away possible world where the subject is the BIV, provided that the “knowledge”-attribution is 
made within the (sceptical) context, in which that far away possible world is within the sphere of 
epistemically relevant worlds. Although, in principle, it is supposedly possible for a subject to 
rule out the BIV hypothesis, it is practically impossible to do so. Thus, the Rule of Sensitivity 
raises the standards that determine how good an epistemic position the subject needs to be in, 
which, in turn, determine the proper application of the “knowledge”-ascription.  
DeRose diverges from Nozick, however, in denying the importance of the subject‟s belief 
having to be evaluated relative to the method used to come to that belief. According to DeRose, 
it is unnecessary for the contextualist to follow Nozick on this point:  
One possibility here is to follow Nozick very closely by modifying that generalization [S 
knows that P if S‟s belief tracks the truth] so that it refers to Nozick's modified, rather 
than his original, third condition, and thus, like Nozick, explicitly relativizing our account 
to the method by which S believes that P. Often, though, context takes care of this for 
us.
287
      
Essentially, context takes care of this because ascribers or deniers will be aware of, say, in the 
grandmother example, the family‟s false testimony to the grandmother as an error-possibility 
raised in the conversational context, rather than this error-possibility – at the first-order level of 
propositional knowledge – as one which would simply prevent the grandmother‟s belief from 
tracking the truth across nearby possible worlds.  
 Nozick‟s pivotal move to ensure the possibility of knowledge was to claim that 
knowledge could be gained so long as the subject‟s belief tracks the truth in all of the nearby 
possible worlds. To achieve this, Nozick denied the closure principle and did so by making a 
dubious internalist assumption about methods, specifically by contending that my belief does not 
track the truth in far away possible worlds if we assume that the method by which I come to 
believe that I have hands from seeing them is the same as the one by which I come to this same 
belief by being a BIV. According to DeRose, it follows from Nozick‟s analysis that I can know 
that I have hands and cannot know that I am not a handless BIV, since my belief that I have 
hands tracks the truth in nearby possible worlds but fails to do so in far away ones. DeRose calls 
the conjoining of these two facts of analysis, which yield this “intuitively bizarre result,” an 
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“abominable conjunction.”288 Abominable conjunctions are the result of Nozick‟s rejection of the 
closure principle.
289
 In response to Nozick‟s rejection of the closure principle, DeRose claims 
that “...it would be no wiser to bet one‟s immortal soul on O‟s [that I have hands] being true than 
to bet on not-H‟s [that I am not a handless BIV] being true.”290 To preserve the closure principle 
and thereby avoid abominable conjunctions, DeRose contextualizes Nozick‟s account using the 
Rule of Sensitivity. Specifically, DeRose combines the Rule of Sensitivity with what he calls the 
Basic Strategy, which states:      
Suppose a speaker A (for “attributor”) says, “S knows that P,” of a subject S‟s true belief 
that P. According to contextualist theories of knowledge attributions, how strong an 
epistemic position S must be in with respect to P for A‟s assertion to be true can vary 
according to features of A‟s conversational context.291 
DeRose contends, then, that the closure principle holds relative to the context in which the 
“knowledge”-attribution is made, so that speaker A‟s attribution that “S knows that P” is true if S 
is in a strong enough epistemic position with respect to the standards in force in speaker A‟s 
context at the time of the “knowledge”-attribution. By talking about strength of epistemic 
position in terms of possible worlds and contextual standards in terms of speaker A‟s 
conversational context, DeRose employs ascriber contextualism to keep closed the set of 
propositions and entailments in the particular context in which the “knowledge”-attribution or 
“knowledge”-denial was issued. Essentially, contextualism preserves the closure principle and is 
the means of evaluating arguments containing allegedly context-sensitive terms from the 
epistemic vocabulary.  
DeRose‟s Basic Strategy enables the ascriber to ascribe “knowledge” to agents in the 
quotidian context with lax standards and the sceptic to deny “knowledge” to agents in the 
sceptical context with strict standards. Although the Rule of Sensitivity tends to raise the 
standards, DeRose clearly wants to ensure that “knowledge” can be ascribed in the quotidian 
context. On this point, he writes:  
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For the fact that the skeptic can install very high standards that we don‟t live up to has no 
tendency to show that we don‟t satisfy the more relaxed standards that are in place in 
more ordinary conversations and debates.
292
 
The reason why DeRose focuses so much attention on the very high standards of scepticism is 
that he is trying to account for the “phenomenology of scepticism,” which he believes the Rule 
of Sensitivity reveals, insofar as the sceptic raises radical sceptical error-possibilities in the 
conversational context that the other conversational participants recognize as the subject being 
unable to rule out; namely, because that subject‟s belief would be insensitive and would not track 
the truth across possible worlds if these error-possibilities were to obtain.  
 Things are not this straightforward, however. DeRose‟s most glaring oversight is 
overlooking Nozick‟s mistaken internalist assumption about methods. In the quotation above, in 
which DeRose discusses Nozick‟s modification to his subjunctive conditionals account of 
knowledge by making conditions (b), (c), and (d) relative to a method, DeRose clearly misses 
Nozick‟s mistake and instead enthusiastically declares that Nozick‟s modification is unnecessary 
for the ascriber contextualist, since context will take care of this. Had he realized Nozick‟s 
mistake, DeRose likely would not have applied ascriber contextualism to Nozick‟s subjunctive 
conditionals account of knowledge in order to try to solve the “Skeptical Problem.” But 
DeRose‟s account was really doomed from the beginning, seeing that he believed that the 
“Skeptical Problem” was indeed a genuine problem for all epistemologists, because agents 
seemingly cannot know the falsity of radical sceptical hypotheses. Recall that his initial 
explanation of why the “Skeptical Problem” poses a problem is that I, as an agent, cannot know 
that I am not a BIV from it seeming to me that I am not BIV, because that is how it would seem 
to me if I were a BIV. Of course, I cannot know this if we are making an internalist assumption 
about knowledge. Nozick makes this assumption and ends up denying the closure principle. 
DeRose makes this same assumption, but applies ascriber contextualism to Nozick‟s subjunctive 
conditionals account to preserve the closure principle and to attempt to solve the “Skeptical 
Problem.” DeRose sees this application as an improvement on Nozick‟s externalist 
epistemology. But the needed improvement would be to correct Nozick‟s mistaken internalist 
assumption about methods. The “Skeptical Problem” would disappear had DeRose not followed 
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Nozick and made internalist assumptions. Ultimately, DeRose‟s “solution” to the “Skeptical 
Problem” is unnecessary.    
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CONCLUSION 
A main lesson I have drawn throughout has been that whether the sceptical “paradox” (or 
“Skeptical Problem”) arises depends on whether a commitment is made to internalism. A 
familiar pattern that has emerged in the course of this investigation has been that a commitment 
to externalism proves that there is no obvious reason to view radical sceptical hypotheses as 
threatening, and thereby renders the application of ascriber contextualism unnecessary. Both 
Stine (1976) and DeRose (1995) conformed to this pattern. After having made commitments to 
externalism, they should have continued to view radical sceptical hypotheses as non-threatening. 
Yet both of them continued to perceive radical sceptical hypotheses as threatening, and applied 
ascriber contextualism to their epistemologies to remove this supposed threat. Externalism alone, 
however, would have achieved this and would have prevented the sceptical “paradox” from 
arising.   
Ascriber contextualists have tried to emend Dretske‟s (1970) and Nozick‟s (1981) 
epistemologies by contextualizing them in order to preserve the closure principle and explain 
scepticism. But ascriber contextualists have not realized that these epistemologies are 
fundamentally flawed, because of mistaken internalist assumptions. Correcting these 
assumptions would have been enough, but ascriber contextualists do not recognize these 
mistakes, and rather have inherited and continue to suffer from them. Cohen (1988, 1999) 
appeared to be the exception to this pattern, for he explicitly accepted internalism. A significant 
finding made in the first chapter was that Cohen‟s “solution” to the sceptical “paradox” appeared 
ad hoc and was ultimately unacceptable. A related, more general, negative conclusion by 
Pritchard (2005) was that it is impossible to be internalistically justified in believing the denials 
of radical sceptical hypotheses. Consequently, there can be no real possibility of an internalist 
“solution” to the sceptical “paradox,” even if that “solution” combines internalism with ascriber 
contextualism. 
Despite these negative conclusions, an anticipated response from ascriber contextualists 
is that they will contend that they alone have the only viable explanation for how the sceptical 
“paradox” arises in the first place. Of course, if one is an externalist, then there is no need to 
explain how it arises, since there is no “paradox.” The internalist, however, will indeed need 
such an explanation. To provide such an explanation, we have seen that ascriber contextualists 
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contend that the meaning of epistemic vocabulary is context-sensitive. Yet the findings of the 
second chapter proved that none of the accounts of the indexicality of the word “knows” do what 
they purport to show. This casts doubt on whether such an account can be given. But without 
such an account, ascriber contextualists cannot continue to claim that they have the only viable 
explanation of how the sceptical “paradox” arises in the first place.  
One important issue, beyond the scope of this thesis, but in the near vicinity of the 
epistemological issues discussed, is how externalists can provide an adequate response to radical 
scepticism. This response will not be from within a first-person perspective, but will be 
developed from a distinctively externalist point of view. Critics of externalism find externalist 
responses to radical scepticism to be question-begging and to have given up on a traditional goal 
of epistemology that traces its roots to Descartes. Moreover, externalists tend to be less than 
sanguine in developing such responses. Evidence of this may come from the fact that many 
externalists make internalist assumptions in the face of radical sceptical hypotheses. Lately, 
however, there have been significant developments in such externalist responses. This should 
give externalists reasons to be optimistic and remain steadfast in their commitments. Michael 
Bergmann (2006), for instance, canvasses a number of different viable externalist responses to 
radical scepticism. Michael Williams (1991) too has developed an externalist response to radical 
scepticism, which is to diagnose the “doubts” of this form of scepticism as unnatural. The 
character of these “doubts” is markedly different from the character of what are normally 
considered doubts. For example, upon setting out on a long foreign travel, the doubt I experience 
in believing that I may not have bought enough insurance for the trip is quite different from the 
“doubt,” if any, I may experience in considering whether I am a BIV. The former sense of doubt 
is quite natural, whereas the latter sense seems unnatural and manufactured. The latter “doubts” 
are typical of radical scepticism. Their artificiality should make us suspicious of them, however. 
At the very least we should not exaggerate their significance, although ascriber contextualists 
have a bad habit of doing so.            
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